Abstract
The paper investigates Steiney Richards, Petitioner v. Wisconsin case in order to justify whether the police officers’ use of deceptive means and forcible entry into Richards’ room violates the protection rights granted by the Fourth Amendment. It offers a summary of the case, thereby presenting the issue of the case. The paper also analyzes the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s judgment by evaluating the facts of the case. It presents the reasons offered by Richards in favor of his privacy interests and compares them with the reasons offered by police officers to gain forcible entry into Richards’ room. Therefore, the conclusion is that it is at the ultimate discretion of the police to decide the execution of the search warrant. If the police seek a no-knock entry, they have to provide valid reasons for such an action. Finally, the paper argues that the blanket exception to one criminal category is easily applicable to other criminal categories, which makes it irrelevant in every situation.
In Steiney Richards, Petitioner v. Wisconsin case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court announced that police officers do not have the necessity to knock the door and reveal their presence while executing the search warrants in felony drug investigations. While the Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution authorizes a comprehensive exception of knocking and announcing requisite for all categories of criminal activity, the evidence provided in support of the police officers’ actions establishes the decision of not knocking and announcing as reasonable in the corresponding context of this case . Hence, the judgment announced by the Wisconsin court is affirmable. Steiney Richards is the petitioner, while the Wisconsin state is the respondent of the case. The petitioner claimed that the police officer violated the Fourth Amendment through the use of trickery and force for entering his hotel room. The chief lawyers for the petitioner were Henry Schultz, John Wesley Hall, Jr. and David Karpe, and the chief lawyers for the respondent were Stephen W. Kleinmaier and James E. Doyle .
On 31st December, 1991, police officers obtained a search warrant for inspecting Steiney Richards’ hotel room in Madison, Wisconsin, for possession of drugs and other related stuff . The warrant was the result of an inquiry that uncovered potential evidence of Richards being a member of drug-dealing gangs, who supply drugs from Madison’s hotel rooms. While the police officers requested for a warrant that offers permission for “no knock” entry, the magistrate denied the clause. When the police officers arrived at the hotel, one of the officers, Pharo knocked the Richards’ room and stated that he was the maintenance staff. Richards opened the door and noticed a man behind Pharo in police uniform. Richards slammed the door immediately post which the officers began to kick and ram the door to enter the locked room. The officers affirmed that they revealed their identity as police while they were banging the door.
After breaking the locked door, the police got hold of Richards who was attempting to escape from the window. The officers were able to recover cocaine and cash, which were hidden in synthetic bags in bathroom ceilings. Richards pled guilty for possessing and intending to deliver the drugs. In the trial court, the officers admitted before the judge that they revealed their identity, yet Richards argued that the police failed to implement the knock-and-announce rule . Therefore, the trial court concluded that the police took the decision of breaking the door from Richards’s abnormal behavior when they sought entry initially. The judge of the trial court also emphasized that the nature of drugs and circumstances of the case justify the actions of the police. When Richards appealed to the Supreme Court, the court declared that there is a blanket exception to knocking the door and announcing the presence in the event of drug cases .
The major issue of Steiney Richards, Petitioner v. Wisconsin is whether or not there is a blanket exception to the drug cases. In terms of rationale of the case, the exception comprises overgeneralization. For instance, while drug investigations pose risks to police officers’ safety and evidence preservation to a certain degree, not all investigations pose such risks . Furthermore, the criminal category exception to the knock-and-announce requisite is not applicable as creating an exception to one category will in turn lead to the creation of exceptions for other categories. Although per se exception is an option, it poses risks of danger and devastation of evidence, thereby making the reasonableness of the Fourth Amendment meaningless. Drug investigations often lead to circumstances that permitting a no-knock entry fail to remove from the scrutiny of court, the reasonableness of police officers’ decisions of not knocking and announcing their presence in a specific case . Therefore, it is the responsibility of the court to justify the provision of knock-and-announce depending upon the facts and circumstances of a case.
Under specific circumstances, the police must present a reasonable suspicion in order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry that knocking the door and announcing their presence would be risky and futile, and constrain the investigation of a crime in the form of evidence destruction . In contrast to the probable cause requirement, the knock-and-announce requirement strikes a balance between genuine law concerns in terms of executing search warrants. In this case, although there is a disagreement over Wisconsin Supreme Court’s blanket exception to knocking and announcing the presence, no-knock entry does not violate the Fourth Amendment as the police officers have reasonable evidence to show that Richards might destroy the evidence if he had been given an opportunity . The judge of the Supreme Court concluded that Richards knew when he opened the door that it was the police that were seeking entry into his room. It is only after revealing to Richards about their identity that the police officers sought a forceful entry.
On the other hand, Richards emphasized that the magistrate did not permit a no-knock entry in the search warrant. However, this fact does not change the reasonableness of the decision taken by the police officers as the magistrate had no idea about the circumstances that would be confronted by the officers. The actual circumstances, such as Richards’ recognition of the police, in addition to the disposable nature of felony drugs justified the ultimate decision of police officers to enter Richards’ room without announcing their authority and presence . The Supreme Court also affirmed that intrusion to privacy occurs from issuing the search warrant and not its manner of execution. The Court also reasoned that violation of privacy occurs in cases wherein officers with a search warrant enter a residence in a forcible manner without announcing their minimal presence in the context that the residents are without authority to restrict police entry.
Permitting the police to take control of the situation is vital as it concerns with their safety as well as preservation of evidence. Furthermore, the officers who execute the search warrant are the best ones to decide on how they could take command of the context . While a no-knock entry is safe in certain cases, it might prove dangerous in other cases. Therefore, it is under the sole discretion of the police according to the circumstances as to whether or not to prefer a no-knock entry. In felony drug investigations, public interests outweigh individual interests as the balance favors potential public interests in comparison of limited privacy interests and predominant public interests . Although Richards argued that his privacy interests had been violated, the reason is not sufficient to elevate Richards’ violation of privacy as it was a mandate for the police officers to safely execute the search warrant for evidence of drug delivery.
References
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Karagiozis, M. F., & Sgaglio, R. (2005). Forensic Investigation Handbook: An Introduction to the Collection, Preservation, Analysis, and Presentation of Evidence. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher.
Lippman, M. (2016). Criminal Procedure. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
