Zimmermann Telegram was a telegram used by US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson to justify the declaration of war in Germany at the end of the First World War; was published in the press and caused outrage of Americans. In late 1916, German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann has developed a plan to bring Mexico to the side of Germany in the event of war with the United States.
On the eve of the war in Europe there were two opposing coalitions - the Allies and the Central Powers. The position of these two coalitions were very different. By 1914, the Central Powers, led by Germany, have achieved, apparently, the peak of their power. Axis Berlin-Vienna maintains military and economic domination over their continental rivals, Russia and France. Realizing the power of the German colossus, Paris and St. Petersburg were willing to make concessions to Berlin - and the Middle East, and in Morocco. However, there was a limit, beyond which Russian and French retreat were not ready, and in Berlin and Vienna realized it too late (Gathen 6).
German and (especially) the Austro-Hungarian rulers were aware of the fact that time is working against the Central Powers. But in Berlin, not all were delighted with that adventure, in which Germany was drawn by the policy of its younger partner, who also (in Berlin on this score was not much doubt) was falling apart. However, considerations prevailed that if it comes to war, then, according to Bethmann Hollweg, so let it break out now than a year or two, when the Allies will be stronger.
Hence - the reckless support of Austria-Hungary from Germany after the Sarajevo incident. On June 28, 1914, Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip, with a few shots from a revolver killed the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. Of course, the principle was not a suicide alone - he was an activist of the Serbian nationalist organization "Young Bosnia", advocated the establishment of the so-called "Greater Serbia", which was to include not only the Kingdom of Serbia, but also a number of other South Slavic lands (Boghardt 116). Great help the organization received from high-ranking officers of the Serbian military intelligence. There is evidence that the then Serbian Prime Pasic was informed of this conspiracy. In any case, the Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans directly confronted with claims of Greater and, moreover, this policy threatened the independence of the Kingdom of Serbia.
But not only in Belgrade anxiously watched the aggressive policy of Vienna. After the annexation of Serbia (or its transformation into a submissive vassal patchwork empire), it would mean that the Central Powers (through the Federal Bulgaria and Turkey) have the opportunity to establish a direct rail link Berlin - Baghdad (and from there it was not far to the British India, and to Russian Turkestan). Thus, the loss of Serbia's independence would mean a dramatic change in the geostrategic situation in the world not in favor of the Allies (Axelrod 7).
July 23 followed by the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. Belgrade is actually required to agree to hold the Austrian punitive action on Serbian territory. Of course, this requirement is incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of the Kingdom of Serbia, was rejected, although the answer Belgrade demarche was born in Vienna in general conciliatory tones. On July 25, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, and began to mobilize. Nobody doubted that little Serbia alone will not stand against a great power, and only support of Russia can save the Serbs.
Thus, a great power - Austria - early mobilization. And here is a crucial role to play not started considerations politicians and diplomats, and completely different factors: the rate of mobilization, the capacity of the railways, the military plans of the General Staff. In response to the actions of Austria, Russia announced on July 28 on the mobilization of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan military districts. The problem, however, was that Russia had no plans for a partial mobilization, only against the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There was a general mobilization plan - and for Berlin, it was well known. Russian mobilization, before the German mobilization meant the failure of the Schlieffen Plan - the only German plan in the event of a major war in Europe.
Hence - the ultimatum to Germany for an immediate cessation of military preparations of Russia. In his telegram to Nicholas II on July 29, Wilhelm II wrote: "The actions of Austria should be regarded as intended to achieve a full guarantee that Serbian promises translate into real facts. This is my opinion based on the application of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria does not seek to - or territorial captured through Serbia. So I think it is possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict, without involving Europe in the most terrible war, which it had ever seen, of course, the military preparations on the part of Russia that could be considered as Austria threat, would accelerate disaster.”
In Berlin, were convinced that Russia will give way. This belief was based on the belief that England would prefer not to intervene in the conflict breaking out on the continent - and Russia and France on their own, without the help of the British, as has been said, were much weaker than the Central Powers. On July 30, 1914, in Russia general mobilization was declared. Nicholas II hesitated and even overturned this decision, but under pressure from the Chief of Staff Yanushkevich and Foreign Minister Sazonov was forced to concede. The next day William Nicholas sent a telegram to suspend mobilization, promising to mediate in the conflict between Russia and Austria, threatening to declare a general mobilization in Germany. In response telegram, Nicholas II expressed the hope that the mobilization in Germany and Russia does not mean war. War plans of Berlin (i.e., Schlieffen Plan) demanded an immediate attack on France, before completed mobilization in Russia. On August 1, Germany declared, in turn, a general mobilization, and in the evening of the same day the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, Sazonov handed a note declaring war on Germany.
It was only in late July - early August when Wilhelm and his entourage began to realize with horror, at the edge of a precipice they were. On July 29, British Foreign Secretary E. Gray told the German ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky that if the conflict will be drawn and France, the British government, may be forced to take immediate decisions, and if war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe that the world has ever seen (Evans 49).
In January 1917, Zimmermann sent a telegram giving details of the plan to Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington. It shall notify the Ambassador that Germany is planning to launch an all-out submarine warfare against ships Entente, but will try so as from German submarine attacks were not damaged American ships, so as US had no reason to violate its neutrality.
In case if Washington decides to go to war, the German ambassador in Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt ordered to contact the President of Mexico, to induce him to take military action against the US on the Quadruple Alliance. In case of victory after the war, Germany had promised to convey Mexico territory previously annexed by the United States – Texas southern states, Arizona, New Mexico.
This "secret telegram" was caught and deciphered by the British cryptographic department of room number 40 and transferred to the United States. It was published in the US media. On April 6, 1917, the US Congress officially declared war to Germany.
The Mexican government has found it impossible to join the former territories for several reasons:
Trying to capture the former territories would lead to full-scale war with the United States.
Regardless of the size, the German financial assistance would be useless. Mexico would be unable to acquire weapons, ammunition, etc., as the United States was the only major manufacturer of weapons in the Americas. Royal Navy controlled the sea lanes in the Atlantic, so that Germany would not have to transport a sufficient amount of weapons.
Even if Mexico has received all the necessary tools to capture territory, it was very difficult to negotiate with the local English-speaking population (Freeman 100).
Militarily, the plans of Germany, which have been reported in the telegram, were meaningless. Mexico torn by civil war, its economy was in ruins, and the army did not present serious military force, it did not even have enough ammo.
Venustiano Carranza, Mexico's president, rejected a proposal of Zimmerman on April 14th. By that time, the United States has declared war on Germany.
The telegram was transmitted by radio and also by telegraph under the guise of diplomatic posts across the two neutral states: Sweden and the United States. Germany had no direct access to telegraph in the Western Hemisphere, because the British have chopped transatlantic cables of Germans and destroyed the German transmitting station in neutral countries. All this forced Germany to use the telegraph channels in Britain and America, despite the risk of interception by the British intelligence service.
On the other hand, President Wilson allowed Germany to use US diplomatic channel, hoping to preserve friendly relations between the two countries and bring an end to the war. Germany believed that this privilege would allow it relatively safe to send secret messages to the western hemisphere, because Britain would not be able to use the intercepted message, not recognizing that it checks the pouch of the United States. The message transmitted in this way, it was sent from Berlin to the German ambassador in Washington (Evans 60).
The telegram was intercepted immediately after posting. Cryptanalysts of Room 40 of British Admiralty received a copy of the decryption. In a telegram was used the code 0075, which was already partially broken in Room 40. The British were able to decipher the German codes thanks to codebook captured on the Magdeburg in the battle in the Gulf.
For the British government telegram was a golden opportunity to make the United States be involved in the First World War on the side of the Allies. Anti-German sentiment in the USA at that time were extremely strong because of unrestricted submarine warfare of Germans (Morton 18). But before Britain had two problems: it was necessary to explain to the Americans how the telegram was received without revealing at the same time that the British intelligence service checks pouches of neutral countries; and it was necessary to give the public an explanation of how the telegram was deciphered, so that Germany does not suspect that its codes were cracked.
Britain solved the first problem by obtaining the encrypted text of the telegram from the telegraph office in Mexico. British guessed that the German Ambassador in Washington would give a message to Mexico commercial telegraph, so the Mexican telegraph office will copy the encrypted text.
The second problem was solved by made up story that the decrypted text of the telegram was stolen in Mexico (Britain informed the United States of decoding, but this fact reinforced the story of the theft). The German government has refused to consider the possibility of breaking the code, instead it has instructed von Eckhardt to find the spy at the embassy in Mexico.
On February 19, William Reginald Hall, the head of Room 40, showed the telegram to the Secretary of the Embassy of the United States in the United Kingdom Edward Bell. Reading Zimmermann telegram, Bell initially, as expected, found this trick the British Secret Service in order to draw the US into the war (Cornelius 44). But Hall vowed to honor the British officer that dispatched genuine and eventually managed to convince his American friend. On February 20, Hall informally sends a copy to the United States Ambassador Walter Page. Paige met with Foreign Minister Balfour and received ciphertext, the original German and English translation. After that, Paige said all US President Woodrow Wilson.
At this time, the United States were dominated by anti-German and anti-Mexican sentiment. General John Pershing long pursued Mexican revolutionary Pancho Vilya, who together with a group of rebels made several attacks on the American frontier settlements. Mexico, in turn, led the anti-American and in some cases anti-European policy. So the news of the Telegram even more taut relationship between the US and Mexico.
On the other hand, in the US were visible anti-British sentiments as well, especially among the Germans and immigrants from Ireland. Before the beginning of 1917, the American press sympathized with Britain and France no more than Germany, and the vast majority of Americans wanted to avoid war in Europe (Rojo 5).
First telegram was received as a fake, made by British intelligence. This belief (which is shared not only by pacifists and German lobbyists) supports German and Mexican diplomats and some American newspapers, newspapers in particular of American media magnate William Hearst.
All doubts are dispelled by Arthur Zimmermann himself. On March 29, he said about the authenticity of the telegram.
On February 1, Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, which has caused numerous casualties among civilians, including American passengers of the British ships. This caused the spread of anti-German feelings in the United States, and much of their efforts Telegram. Particularly offensive Americans believed that it was transmitted through diplomatic channels Communications. The American public believed in the authenticity of Telegrams and US entry into the war was inevitable.
Wilson asked Congress to strengthen the arms of American ships, so that they can resist the possible attacks of German submarines. A few days later, on April 2, 1917, he put the question before Congress to declare war to Germany. On April 6, 1917, Congress agreed. The United States entered the First World War.
The telegram was not the only reason that led the United States to declare war. German submarines sank the ships and vessels of the United States with US citizens on board. Passenger liner Lusitania was sunk off the coast of Ireland in 1915 (Axelrod 119). Lusitania, however, was under the flag of a belligerent State (UK) and was in a war zone, and the Germans were warned about the dangers of being on this ship. Confident that the citizens of neutral countries have the right to freely float on these courts, the United States has ignored these warnings. German submarines sank other ships of the United States: Housatonic in February 1917 in the Bay of Biscay and California off the coast of Ireland.
For a long time the original telegram was considered lost. The bulk of the documents relating to the First World War was destroyed by the orders of the head of Naval Intelligence Admiral Reginald Hall. The National Archives of the UK remained only a photocopy of that later gave rise to even historians believe that the "Zimmermann Telegram" was a fake.
Anonymous British historian who studies the history of the State of Staff Communications (intelligence organization, engaged in the interception of communications), said that he was able to find the original document with autograph to R. Hall: "This document handed to Page and shown to the President."
Works Cited
Axelrod, Alan. Political history of America's wars. CQ Press, 2007.
Boghardt, Thomas. The Zimmermann telegram: intelligence, diplomacy, and America's entry into World War I. Naval Institute Press, 2012.
Cornelius, John. "The Hidden History of the Balfour Declaration." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 24.8 (2005): 44.
Evans, David. The First World War: Teach Yourself. Hachette UK, 2012.
Evans, Martin Marix, ed. American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920. Routledge, 2014.
Freeman, Peter. "The Zimmermann Telegram Revisited: A Reconciliation of the Primary Sources." Cryptologia 30.2 (2006): 98-150.
Gathen, Joachim von zur. "Zimmermann Telegram: The Original Draft." Cryptologia 31.1 (2007): 2-37.
Hakim, Joy. War, Peace, and All That Jazz: 1918-1945. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Morton, James. Spies of the First World War: Under Cover for King and Kaiser. National Archives, 2010.
Rojo, Javier. "Erich L. Lehmann, The Lehmann Symposia, and November 20th 1917." Lecture Notes-Monograph Series (2009): 1-7.
