How Stalin succeeded in transforming the U.S.S.R.
Stalin’s plans to achieve the modernization of the Soviet Union through rapid industrialization and the collectivization of the land transformed the Soviet Union, but came with an immense cost in human suffering. How was Stalin able to pursue such inhumane policies without risking insurrection or revolt? This paper examines five sources in order to answer that question. It will be seen that through a mixture of tyranny and terror, through propaganda designed to bolster the cult of personality, and through associating himself the legacy of Lenin, Stalin was able to achieve his economic aims despite the suffering of large numbers of the Russian people.
The first source is “The Hard Line” – a speech delivered in 1931 by Stalin to industrial managers. He is essentially attempting to inspire support (for his five year industrial plans), which were designed to industrialize the Soviet Union very rapidly. The speech uses very little Marxist ideology, but instead plays on fears regarding Russia's international standing and security. He is calling for massive modernization, primarily industry, to be achieved as quickly as possible. Presumably the speech was written by a speechwriter with Stalin's input and approval: it is a public meeting for important industrial leaders and would therefore be ‘on the record’. Hence his frequent references to their obligations to the peasants and to the working class, but most strongly to Russia herself. He is trying to convince them of the rightness of his plans and encouraging the managers to believe that rapid modernization is the only way forward. His use of comparisons to past failures during the reign of the Tsars and to Russia's backwardness compared with capitalist countries helps to drive this point home to his particular audience – not the working class, but faithful party managers of industry. It is a dogmatic and forceful speech, but its main intention is to persuade. The speech is about the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union through the use of Stalin's five-year plans and why they were necessary. The speech reveals a lot about Stalin's Russia: this source demonstrates the air of change that dominated Stalin's rule – it is both a condemnation of the past regime, a distancing from the failures of early Bolshevism and the lack of rapid modernization following the October Revolution. It also demonstrates Stalin's attempts at creating a more unified, stronger Russia – at least in economic terms – and a strong awareness on Stalin’s part of the historic failure of Russia when faced with aggressive outside forces over several centuries. Modernization at any cost is demonstrated at the very beginning of the speech, where he quashes doubts and suggestions that he should “slow down the temp a bit” (Stalin, 322). His references to both Nekrassov and Lenin also reflects Stalin’s tendency to use a romanticized view of the Russian Revolution to meet his own goals and persuade others of his strength and sincerity. In terms of human nature, this source demonstrates the determination of the human spirit and the tendency to patriotism. Stalin evokes past weakness to inspire future strength and manipulates the relationship between the individual and Russia. It also demonstrates that fear can be used to manipulate – fear of weakness and fear of Stalin himself. He says, “We are fifty or one hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us” (Stalin, 322). His choice of the word “crush” is clearly intended to evoke fear. Stalin's economic ideology is a large factor in the five-year plans and in his attempts at rapid modernization – improving Russia's industry with a focus no other leader had used before. This links to the attempts at an ideological break from the past, using Bolshevik imagery and references to Lenin but in a new way. Clearly this source is biased in favour of rapid modernization which Stalin implemented, since it is he who is giving the speech praising modernization and arguing that there is no alternative. However, there is some truth to be found regarding Russia's past failures to modernize and its contemporary industrial situation. Backwardness had plagued the country for several hundred years, particularly in the military – an area that, due to modern warfare, went hand-in-hand with an extremely underdeveloped industrial base. While other countries were growing their industrial base, Russia relied on a backwards agricultural economy. Therefore, the speech, while hardly being a trustworthy or impartial view of Stalin's proposed economic policy, is an honest statement of his intentions.
The second source, entitled “Liquidation of the Kulaks” is the text of the speech that Stalin delivered in December 1929 to a Conference of Marxist Students. This speech is about the deliberate and institutional elimination of the kulak class as a means to rapidly collectivize the agricultural system. Stalin discusses the progress made: this deliberate elimination of the kulaks from the level of administrative restrictions to the deliberate policy of killing kulaks. He explains in the speech why they, the Bolsheviks, can now destroy the richer peasants and claims that it is a necessity in order to modernise agriculture and increase production. This speech is essentially a piece of propaganda which attempts to justify the mass murder of the kulaks. Presumably this speech was written by Stalin, perhaps with the help of a speechwriter. The speech is being made to a Conference of Marxist Students of the Agrarian Question and because of this it's to the knowledgeable and the party faithful and to committed Marxists. The speech attempts to justify and praise the success of several different policies aimed at the destruction of the kulaks. It defends forced collectivisation because “today we have an adequate material base which enables us to strike at the kulaks” (Stalin, 324). It justifies the indoctrination of the peasant class by asserting that “the kulaks are being expropriated by the masses of the poor and middle class peasants the masses who are putting collectivisation into practice” (Stalin, 324). Thirdly, Stalin asserts the importance and the success of the liquidization process which, he claims, is bringing about very palpable and whilly positive results. This source demonstrates several aspects of the nature of Stalin's Russia. Firstly, and bearing in mind the audience for this speech, it demonstrates how dedication to the cause (whether class struggle, modernization or collectivisation) could allow ordinary people to openly support genocide and see mass murder as not only necessary but also positive. Stalin's sway over the party faithful can be seen in his support of an abhorrent and evil policy. Even in Nazi Germany genocide as a policy was not openly spoken about, but here it is openly discussed, albeit behind the extremely thin veil of words like “offensive” and “eliminate them as a class” (Stalin, 323 & 324). This source reveals a darker side to human nature, namely the ability of people to commit atrocities without compunction if they are convinced that they are justified. Stalin's own lack of shame about the mass murder of the kulaks and indeed his flippant final comments also suggest that his own attitude is part of what encouraged his followers. Multiple ideologies were behind the collectivization of the kulaks economically. The kulaks opposed collectivization. The kulaks were not especially rich or prosperous as a class and Stalin cleverly presented their opposition to state farms as part of a class struggle – he calls them “capitalist elements in the countryside” (Stalin, 323); this made the mass murder of the kulaks seem more acceptable and also reduced opposition to the state farms, mostly because of intimidation: refusal to join a kolkhoz could mean being labeled a kulak with starvation or execution being the result Stalin repeats rhetoric about the liquidation of the kulaks being a class issue, which suggests political and ideological motivations. Clearly, as a piece of propaganda by Stalin this is not a trustworthy analysis of the extermination of the kulaks or economic growth. It can provide a trustworthy insight on the presentation of the genocide to the public, and in particular to the party. It may also provide some information on Stalin's personal attitude to these events, though it should be noted that this represents Stalin's public persona, although this public image is corroborated by his clear personal role in the purges.
The third source is entitled “Terror in the Countryside”. This source is a personal account of Lev Kopelev’s involvement in the engineered famine of the early 1930s and the atrocities committed against the kulaks. Writing from presumably the period following his exile in 1980, he is looking back on the events of the period and reflecting on his feelings regarding his own involvement. This is a highly emotive piece regarding the human suffering caused by forced collectivization, grain seizures and murder. It is a memoir-style account of how the writer not only accepted what happened but actively and enthusiastically participated in them. An ex- party member, Kopolev wrote this after a period in a gulag and in exile, as part of reflection of his life under Stalin and his experiences as a party member. Writing for possibly financial and cathartic reasons – his motivations are hard to pinpoint – he is attempting to discuss the events from his own experience and perhaps provide some insight as to why people like himself participated in these crimes and how they could ignore and even justify the suffering they caused. This source reveals an important aspect of the nature of Stalin's Russia. “We were raised as the fanatical believers of the new creed” (Kopelev, 326) – Kopelev portrays Stalin's Russia to be a country of devotion to the cause by its militant followers and of suffering for the peasantry, of terrible sacrifices for the greater good of the ideology of socialism. In short, the ends justified the means. It was the drive to complete the goals of the five-year plans that allowed fanatics like Kopelev to commit the crimes associated with forced collectivization: he says of the kulaks, “their distress and suffering were results of their own ignorance or the machinations of the class enemy” (Kopelev, 326). Kopelev also touches on the power of the rhetoric of the old Communist idols and of the sway Stalin had over his followers: “the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin were accepted as holy writ and Stalin, was the infallible high priest” (Kopelev, 326). According to the writer “we believed him [Stalin] unconditionally” (Kopelev, 326). This can be linked to indoctrination, the cult of personality and Stalin's manipulation of the history of the Bolshevik Revolution. Of course, the descriptions of suffering also reveal the appalling atrocities committed in Stalin's Russia. This source reveals a great deal about how an individual can be affected by devotion to something greater than himself, and how that devotion can lead him to doing the unthinkable without guilt or doubts. This is particularly visible in the final paragraphs of the passage where he claims that he was possessed by a desire to serve powers and values above and beyond humanity. This passage provides interesting insights into the motivations of the perpetrator and as such would be of value in discussing how the terrible events Stalin's Russia brought out the most dark and slave-like aspects of human nature in the fanatics who believed their atrocities were justified. Kopelev makes it clear ideology was the prime motivator behind his crimes and those of Stalin's administration. He demonstrates the power of political dogma over those who followed Soviet communism: “the concepts of conscience, honor, humaneness, we dismissed as idealistic prejudices, “intellectual” or “bourgeois” and hence, perverse” (Kopelev, 327). While a personal account obviously contains bias based on the individual's perspective, this is a reasonably unprejudiced and fairly trustworthy account. Kopelev is not apologising for his actions but explaining his motivations and exploring how and why he acted as he did. It should be noted that his prejudice against Stalinism due to his later treatment may cause issues regarding his reliability, but his accounts is largely true to the historical events which we know to have occurred. Its emotive nature again highlights the fact that this is not an analytical or historical view of these events, but a personal account. It is still useful, though, since it provides reason behind the perpetrator's actions which a purely analytical approach might ignore
Source four entitled “The Cult of Stalin” is a piece of writing and poetry by Russian poets A. O. Advienko and it is a good example of the cultural limitations put on creative artists and the use of the arts by Stalin to promote greater national unity and in particular to promote the cult of personality. It is a sycophantic piece written to perpetuate the ideal of Stalin as a great leader without faults who provides for and cares for everyone and everything in the Soviet Union. It is obviously a piece of propaganda. It is not about any particular event, but instead discusses the feelings the poet has when he sees Stalin at public events and describing the inspiration Stalin gives him. This source reveals two things about the nature of Stalin's Russia. Firstly, heavy censorship and strict requirements were imposed on writers and artists of the period before the work could be published or made public. The absurd level of glorification of Stalin, the grand titles and the repetition of “all, thanks to thee” (Advienko, 328) are clear examples of the tone required to get work published. The second area of Stalin's Russia that this source exemplifies is the cult of personality: both how it affected people and how it was put into practice. “We are the contemporaries of the man who never had an equal in world history” (Advienko, 328). The Russian public were bombarded with these kinds of images and rhetoric about the benevolence of Stalin and the idea that he had made all of Russia better and stronger. This method of saturating Russian culture worked – the adulation that Stalin received through the arts gave him a mystical and heroic status in the minds of the Soviet people. This particular source is not especially useful in its insights into human nature. However, it might be used to demonstrate how propaganda in large quantities can influence a large number of people – no matter how absurd it is. This source exploits the human desire to see something greater than themselves, a godlike father figure who cares for them all as individuals - a desire which is strongly prevalent throughout human culture and throughout human history. As for A. O. Advienko the source shows that even creative artists – for financial gain or public status – are in certain situations prepared to compromise their art in order to succeed. Unusually, in this source religious ideology is prominent, although it is applied in a secular fashion. Political ideology is not overtly referred to in this source, but is clearly implied since the cult of personality was firmly based on Stalin's ideological commitments to rapid industrialisation and the collectivisation of the land. This source is clearly completely unreliable because it consists of hyperbolic praise of Stalin and was written as propaganda to reinforce Stalin's cult of personality. It can only be trusted to provide us with an example of the nature and the output in the arts on the Stalinism. This source completely omits any notion that there is any kind of hardship in Russia: “I shall be eternally happy and joyous, all thanks to the great educator Stalin” (Advienko, 328).
The fifth source is Yevgeny Yevtushenko's “Literature as Propaganda”. This is an extract from the poet's autobiography, addressing the topic of censorship in Stalin's Russia. He is discussing the state of the arts under Stalin and the limitations the writers worked under. He also writes of the effects of the cult of personality on the arts as well as the relationship between Stalin and Lenin. Like Kopelev, Yevtushenko provides an autobiographical personal account and personal justification of his behaviour in the Stalinist period as part of an autobiography. This source is an explanation and a way to tell the public the truth, from Yevtushenko's perspective, about what happened in that period. Such autobiographies were for a time the easiest way for those in the West to learn about Russian culture, given the secrecy of the Soviet archives and all the suspicions of the Cold War era. Yevtushenko may be motivated by financial considerations (he is a world famous poet), but also by a personal motivation to justify with hindsight, what he and his contemporaries did. This passage suggests that Stalin's Russia was culturally impotent and sterile. The official standards imposed on artists prevented the questioning opposition that intellectuals in any society might have posed and poetry and art were stifled by both the threat of what happened to those who did not produce acceptable poetry and by the stifling of the imagination caused by the Cult of Personality. The cult of personality actually did convince many intellectuals: Yevtushenko quotes a contemporary film producer who admits, “I was absolutely sincere. I thought all this was a necessary part of building communism. And then I believed Stalin. Stalin was a strong and vivid personality” (Yevtushenko, 329). This, combined with the manipulation of revolutionary history to ensure that Stalin was linked with Lenin, an essential figure in socialist history and the hero of the revolution, is also important in this source. This oft-repeated connection between Lenin and Stalin was essential in establishing a cult of personality and the veneration of Lenin continued even after Stalin’s death, as Krushchev’s secret speech demonstrates. The cultural stagnation of Stalin’s Russia is lamented by Yevtushenko as lacking “human warmth” and characterized by the “corruption of the human spirit” (Yevtushenko, 330). In terms of human nature, this passage is suggests that even well-educated intellectual human beings can and will succumb to propaganda and that this will, if opposition is not allowed to run alongside, reduce the capacity for real creativity and art. This source discusses policies that have a clear ideological motive – by ensuring that the arts praised Stalin and communism this added to the Soviet culture of propaganda and enhanced the cult of personality that Stalin relied on. It also reduces the amount of potential opposition from intellectuals, a group the often poses a threat to dictatorial regimes. As an autobiographical piece, this extract is clearly subject to personal bias. However, Yevtushenko is a clever man with a global reputation and is not attempting to put himself in a very favourable light or to make excuses for his behaviour. He discusses opinions of the cultural scene under Stalin in a manner that is corroborated by actual examples of creative work from the time. He does, however, have a tendency to present opinion as fact.
In conclusion it can be seen that Stalin used a variety of methods to ensure that opposition to his policies. He used the legacy of Lenin to establish his credentials as leader and used both communist ideology and Russia’s centuries-old tradition of backwardness to justify the rapid modernization of Soviet industry. He carefully built a fanatical following through appeals to Marxist ideology and by means of the cult of personality backed up by rigid and stifling censorship. These fanatics were used to enforce the terror and tyranny that his rule relied upon to commit appalling atrocities in the name of “socialist progress”.
Works Cited
Advienko, A. O. “The Cult of Stalin”. Page 328 in
Kopelev, Lev. “Terror in the Countryside”. Pages 324 -327 in
Stalin, Joseph. “Elimination of the Kulaks”. 1929. Pages 323 -324 in
Stalin, Joseph. “The Hard Line”. 1929. Page 322 in
Yevtushenko, Yevgeny. “Literature as Propaganda”. Pages 328 – 330 in