The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 has become a pivotal event in the history of the United States since 1929. During 13 days of the crisis, the world balanced on the brink of the wide-scale nuclear war and observed the development of this conflict with bated breath. In order to convince the reader how critical this moment was for the history and future of the world, I will describe the background and development of this event and analyze the actions of both sides of the crisis: the USA and the Soviet Union.
Background
In 1967, the New York Times article saw the inconsistency in actions of the Soviet Union, claiming that deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba was a strange move, considering détente in relations of the two superpowers (cited in Allison 691). However, this statement does not reflect the events that took place in 1961-1962 and preceded the crisis.
First, even before John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as President of the United States in 1961, he approved the plan of the CIA to use the Cuban exiles, who opposed Castro and fled his rule, in invasion at the Bay of Pigs and to overthrow Castro’s government. The invasion failed and all the exiles were destroyed or captured by the Cuban military. Despite the anticipation of Kennedy’s advisors, the invasion did not cause a public revolt against Castro’s rule (Foner 1042).
This fiasco and further economic embargo and numerous failed attempts of the CIA to assassinate Castro only strengthened the friendly relations between Cuba and the USSR. Later, in November of 1961, President Kennedy approved Operation Mongoose. Its primary goal was to harm the Cuban economy and Castro’s rule by destruction of crops, oil storages, and port. Assassination of Castro also was a part of the plan (Stern 16).
The escalation of relations between the USA and the Soviet Union was also present in the other part of the world, Europe. During the meeting of Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna in June, 1961, the Soviet leader’s aggressive, bellicose behavior convinced the American president that the response to the Soviets in Cuba and in Europe, had to be adequately harsh (Stern 18). Later in the summer, the Soviets built the Berlin Wall, which made a proverbial “iron curtain” to feel even more real and harder to destroy.
On the other side, having witnessed the aggressive policy of the USA toward Cuba and deployment of the American missiles in Turkey, on the border of the USSR, the Soviet Union felt obliged to protect its ally in the Western hemisphere and balance the American nuclear power, so close to the Soviet boundaries. In these circumstances, the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba seems to be a relevant and adequate response to Kennedy’s politics, at least, from the Soviet point of view. Thus, the ex-president Johnson’s comment, cited in the same 1967 article of the New York Times, that “mutual antagonism [of the USA and USSR was] beginning to ease” fails to stand up to scrutiny (cited in Allison 691)
In other words, the situation that led to the Cuban crisis was caused partially by Kennedy’s bellicose politics toward Castro’s regime, and partially, by Khrushchov’s wish to defend Cuba and his decision to demonstrate to the world the nuclear power of the USSR and counterweigh the US Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.
U-2 that discovered and took photos of the Soviet missiles, flew upon Cuba on October, 14, 1962. This was unexpected, because about one month earlier, on September 19, the US Intelligence Board came to the conclusion that the Soviets would not deploy missiles in Cuba (Allison 704). On the morning of October 14, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy appeared on ABC TV, claiming that no proof existed for the USSR’s nuclear presence in Cuba. Kennedy disclosed this information to the American public only on October, 22, stating that “the purpose of these bases, can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. ” (Stern 22).
Before making this public announcement, Kennedy and his advisers – the ExComm (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council) had to make a crucial decision – how to respond to the deployment of the Soviet offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. The reaction of the US leadership to the presence of the adversary’s warheads in just 90 miles from Florida would have defined not only the future relations of two superpowers, but the world’s future as well. It could have led to nuclear disaster or could have mitigated the confrontation. The ExComm tapes that recorded the meetings of Kennedy and his advisors represent an invaluable primary source that allows to investigate the decision-making process under utmost pressure and stress and gives insights into crisis management skills of president Kennedy.
The ExComm considered six main variants of action. First, doing nothing (after all, the USSR could strike the USA from its own territory before); as Secretary of Defense McNamara stated, "it makes no great difference, whether you are killed by a missile from the Soviet Union or Cuba." (Allison 714). The angered president would not accept this course of action seriously. Second, diplomatic bargaining, favored by UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, that may have included withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey, closing of Guanatanamo base. The third option was a “surgical” air strike, supported by “hawks” and, initially by the President. Later, it became clear that the air strike cannot be precise enough to destroy all the missiles and prevent the response of the Soviets and Cubans. Besides, Robert Kennedy raised the ethical issue of performing the surprise air strike that may have killed innocent civilians. Choosing between direct military attack and full reliance on diplomacy, JFK decided on a naval blockade, as “a middle course between inaction and attack” (Allison 698). This move demonstrated the USA’s readiness to defend its interests and, at the same time, gave the Soviet leader more time for deliberation and decision-making.
As history shows, this decision was justified and balanced response to the USSR’s aggression, followed by the behind-the-curtains bargaining with Khrushchov. As a result, the Soviet leader agreed to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, while Kennedy assured that they would not attack Cuba and would remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey (Foner 1042).
In conclusion, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 has been an event that defined the human history for years to come. Have the events developed in another way, our generation may have not existed at all. This crisis taught us that mistakes made in the international relations in the atomic era may have enormous incalculable costs. Or put into McNamara’s words, “we all make mistakes. In our daily lives, mistakes are costly, but we try to learn from them. In conventional war, mistakes cost lives, sometimes thousands of lives. But if mistakes were to affect decisions relating to nuclear forces, they will result in the destruction of nations. ” (cited in Blight and Welch 811).
Works Cited:
Foner, Eric. Give me liberty!: An American history. 3rd Ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010. Print.
Stern, Sheldon M. The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. Print.
Allison, Graham T. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”. American Political Science Review 63(3), (Sep., 1969): 689-718. Web. 27 Sep. 2013.
Blight, James G. and Welch, David A. “Risking “The Destruction ofNations”: Lessons of The Cuban Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States”. Security Studies, 4(4), (1995): 811-850. Web. 11 May 2015.
