At present, the consensus view among social scientists reflects the idea that human races are socio-cultural constructions, but the persistence of the notion of a biological reality behind “race” is undoubtedly enduring both in popular culture and among scientists. Garner (2009) offers a sufficiently elaborate explanation for the misconception of race as a biological and genetic reality. A closer look at the socio-cultural reality behind “race” will reveal not only socio-political narratives that systematically re-inscribe racial categorization, but also the commercial and technological themes behind the socio-cultural concept of “race”.
Garner (2009, pp. 1-5) emphasizes the reality that the lines between the diversity of definitions of racism are blurring at a rapid pace, making it nearly impossible to provide a rigid definition. Modern science showed that even though the biological argument behind the concept of race proposes that different groups of people have more shared genetic material than genetic distinctions, new genetic studies demonstrate the invalidity of that claim. It is equally vital to take into consideration the various social, medical, geographical reasons that explain the few differences in genetic structure between individuals. In his book, Garner (2009) offers two examples that help strengthen his argument: sickle cell anemia, which, far from being primarily a black populations’ disease, is in fact strongly associated with malaria which explains the geographical location of the disease; IQ testing—it is important to acknowledge the fact that there is a wealth of cultural and social class-related aspects that influence the definition of what we currently measure as intelligence. Racial theories revolving around intelligence appear to be nothing but the relics of a racist past.
He concludes that recent genetic studies illustrate the absence of distinct groups within the human race and that the individuals are the main source of variability and not races or nations. A race whose definition is based on skin color considerations is a distinct biological entity in as much as a nation is one—in both cases the definition is dependent on shared histories (Garner 2009, pp. 1-5). In addition to that, he explains how our definitions of race are determined by our social realities and the physical traits that define races in one social context change in a different one. The interpretation of physical characteristics is not a strict instrument based on indisputable facts of distinction between races, but a set of social imperatives. That is exactly the reason why, Garner argues (2009 p. 3), the idea of race (in the United States) is relative and fluid; race does not reflect an objective reality and, as a result, in cannot be considered an independent variable.
Scholars like Silverstein (2005 cited in Garner 2009, p. 3) consider that race is a cultural contrastive category created in a given context and assumed as natural and taken for granted. This is not a new idea and sociologists have argued that the notion of race is a social construct for a long time, in addition to recognizing that the concept’s existence has real implications for social dynamics. The manner in which social resources are distributed is highly dependent on what we currently define as “race”. In fact, when the notion of “race” was first used in the 18th century to explain the differences observed between humans like skin color, the concept could have been easily replaced by a different one, as it was not essential to the ideas that explained the above-mentioned distinctions between humans (Banton, 1998).
The notion that race is the result of social relations and thought and not reflective of an objective reality that corresponds to a genetic or biological truth is one of the essential Critical Race Theory tenets (Delgada 2012, p.8). Certain physical characteristics that belong to individuals who share the same origin, like hair texture and skin color are only a small segment of their genetic “portrait”. These traits seem insignificant in comparison to higher-order characteristics like intelligence, behavior and personality (Delgado 2012, p.9).
Rattansi (2007 pp. 94-95) identifies a stronger form of classical/old racism in the belief in the existence of different biologically-defined races that can be hierarchically categorized based innate inferior and superior traits and skills. He also identifies a scientific version of classical racism (the claim of the innate superiority of a certain racial group over another) that uses scientific language and methods to support various theories about racial inferiority. What is presently beyond doubt for many researchers is the emergence of a more subtle type of racism that dismisses biology-based arguments in favor of issues related to ethnicity and culture—frequently referred to as “racism of cultural difference” or “neo-racism”. Biology was equally used in the cultural space to support racist arguments claiming that it was unnatural that Asian, black and white populations could ever live together peacefully.
A debate on new racism is worth pursuing primarily because of its promise to reveal the intricacies of contemporary definitions of racism without making the mistake of pursuing strict definition for racism or non-racism. Moreover, it illuminates the obscure ways in which racism can be combined with various social practices and beliefs to create novel ideologies that, in fact, hide racism (Rattanasi 2007, pp. 95-96). In a similar vein, Foucault argued that the notion of race was a “biologized conception of the abnormal” (Falzon 2013, p.487) working for a set of mechanisms of exclusion, sustained by a wide network of power relations. Treating it as an objective reality only conceals the manner in which they help create modern subjectivity. Instead, an awareness of the power play involved in the process reveals the strategic roles they play within power dynamics (Falzon 2013 p. 487-488).
Garner’s claims are supported by the data produced by the Human Genome Project and human genome variation research (Barnshad, 2004, Burchard 2003, Cooper 2003, Foster 2002 cited in Royal, 2004). This new evidence has forced us to at least acknowledge the need for a paradigm change in our understanding of “race”. Current biological models of ethnicity and race-based categories are unable to contain an individual’s uniqueness and, most importantly, the universality of mankind that is obvious in the light of new information offered by research on genome sequence variation and molecular anthropology. This new generation of knowledge begs for a reformulation of the framework that contains the various assumptions regarding biological groups.
Similarly, Sloan (2013) makes a point of the fact that race has ceased to be an efficient concept for understanding variability in the 21st century and that we seemingly live in a post-racial era. Nonetheless, race continues to be used as a mechanism to categorize people into various groups in order to identify and classify them. What is more, some genetic scientists attempt to naturalize the concept of race because they see it as a fast way to explain human variation (Sloan, 2013). Hacking suggested that humans’ propensity to distinguish individuals by race is the result of an “universal human kind module” (Hacking 2005, p. 116).
DeSalle, a geneticist and Tattersall, a physical anthropologist (2011) state that there is nothing out of the ordinary about the racial variation observed within the human species and that it is the result of normal evolutionary processes that also characterize other organisms in our environment. The explanation is that the distinctions that we can notice within our species are random effects and that the evolutionary process is not a problem of fine-tuning, like previously thought. More specifically, genetic variation findings support the theory according to which anatomically modern humans evolved first on the African continent where they accumulated genetic diversity. After a small sub-set of the population left Africa, they experienced a population bottleneck which resulted in modern populations inhabiting the rest of the world. Our species, therefore, has a common origin (Jorde 2004).
Naturally, not all scientists seem to agree on these conclusions. Just before the Human Genome Project was completed in 2003, the renowned evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr declared that those who consider that there are no human races are simply ignorant of modern biology (2002, cited in Sesardic, 2010). In fact, Sesardic dismisses any deconstructive arguments as fashionable attempts that burden the biological notion of race with implausible claims. However, his discourse becomes unreasonable as soon as he mentions supposed psychological differences among racial groups, such as differences in IQ which have clearly been proved to be a moot point. In addition to that, he cites the incidence of criminal activity as being higher among people belonging to certain races.
In reality, like Garner suggested, a wealth of data implies that “racial” group distinctions in intelligence are purely social in origin and can, therefore, change with different social interventions and circumstances. Heritability has been erroneously used to suggest a genetic basic to explain group differences in intelligence quotient scores, although it is obvious that just one general intelligence factor is insufficient for offering an accurate explanation for modern cognitive science, when there is a diversity of cognitive abilities (Fish, 2013, p. xxii).
Admittedly, there is much racialized narrative that is still active, even among those who participate in the mapping of the human genome. Traditional race-based categories continue to influence the thinking and work of the scientists who are developing, for instance, the DNA repositories that continue to be categorized using ethnic and racial identifiers. Moreover, clinical scientists base their assumptions regarding risks and needs associated with certain health predictions and conditions on racial cues. The pharmaceutical industry is developing drugs based on racial categorization. What also reinforces the biological conceptualization of race is the now popular genetic-ancestry industry, which also depends on governmental regulation concerning their claims and the accuracy of methods utilized to identify ancestry (Sapp, 2012). All these trends in science re-introduce biologically-based concepts of race into public consciousness (Koening 2008, p. x).
Many of the conventional claims concerning the idea of different races within the human species can now be classified as anomalies in a Kuhnian sense. Sociologists, like Garner, and scientists are now aware that social discourse and ontology are more explanatory of the justification of “racial” categories than biological theory (Kaplan, 2012). Within a framework with increasingly more incoherent and unviable elements, one could conclude that a paradigm shift is inevitable. As we move beyond the vestiges of our tribal past, the amassing of new compelling scientific evidence will perhaps, one day, result in the biological deconstruction of a social construct that has been embedded into our collective psyche for a considerable amount of time. Thanks to scholars like Garner, an increased awareness of the various motivations and themes behind our subjectivity will, perhaps, distance us from the illusory idea that notions like race are requisite values whose content and interpretation must remain unchanged (Falzon, 2013).
References
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