One of the fundamental methods of determining liability in Tort Law is the “but-for” test. According to the test, liability is analyzed by asking the question: but-for the defendant’s negligence, would the plaintiff have been injured or harmed? If the answer is no, then the defendant, and only the defendant, is liable for the plaintiff’s harm. While the “but-for” is a Tort Law fundamental, it sometimes proves inadequate in determining a defendant’s liability. Consequently, Tort Law has developed other means of determining the cause of a plaintiff’s injury in fact.
One of the alternatives to the “but-for” test is the “multiple sufficient causes” test. Under the elements of the test, it is applicable in the situation where the negligent actions of two defendants’ might have been the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. In such a situation, the “but-for” test fails because it cannot confirm which defendant is the cause of the injury. However, by using the “multiple sufficient causes” test there is no need to determine which defendant is liable for the harm to the plaintiff, because both defendants are equally liable. In other words, under the “multiple sufficient causes” test, if each defendant’s actions were sufficient to cause the plaintiff’s injury, the burden of proof moves to the defendants. That is to say, each defendant must show that their actions were not sufficient have caused the harm (Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 2013). If the defendants cannot clearly show that they are not at fault, then both will be found liable for the injury.
Naturally, under the traditional “but-for” test, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant’s actions caused their harm. This burden still exists with the “multiple sufficient causes” test but only to the point where it is reasonable to think that both defendants’ actions were the cause of the harm. What this means is that the burden on the plaintiff to affirmatively prove that they have been wronged, become little more than a formality (Shinn v. Allen, 1998). Plaintiffs can satisfy these requirements with relative ease. Conversely, it would make it harder for a defendant to realize or establish their arguments to the contrary.
In the Battocchi case, by allowing the plaintiff to shift the burden of proof to from themselves to the doctors is that now the doctors must provide evidence that neither of their actions led to the baby Adam’s problems (Battocchi v. Washington Hospital Center, 1990). The details of the case explain that both doctors had conducted actions that might have and most probably did result in the harm of baby Adam; but that based on the circumstances of the procedure were almost impossible to verify, which act, if either was responsible. However, since the doctors cannot provide such clear and unambiguous evidence to corroborate their arguments, they will not be persuasive. On the other hand, the plaintiffs do not need to provide as specific evidence as the doctors. All they need to show is that the doctors actions are likely you have caused their child’s problems.
The fact that Dr. Cohn settled out of court significantly increases the difficulty of Dr. Brady’s case. First, the settlement, removes the possible argument that it was indeed Dr. Cohn’s actions which caused baby Adam’s problems. In other words, the settlement removed any plausible deniability that Dr. Brady may have had to argue that Dr. Cohn’s actions were independently more responsible for baby Adam’s issues. With Dr. Cohn’s settlement, Dr. Brady has the expanded burden of proving that none of his actions had anything to do with the baby’s issues. As the second doctor that was called on to resolve the situation created by the first doctor; a situation that might prove difficult in determining whose actions are the most of the true cause of baby Adam’s life problems.
References
Battocchi v. Washington Hospital Center, 581 A.2d 759 (1990). Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/j9uhh3o
Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 736 S.E.2d (2013). Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/jtcespo
Shinn v. Allen, 984 S.W.2d 308 (1998). Retrieved from https://tinyurl.com/zfmaaeu
