Introduction
One of the most common strategies of criminal defense attorneys when representing a defendant who has an unusual condition such as a mental abnormality, is to argue either that regardless of their actions, they are nevertheless not responsible for the crime or that they never had the capacity to commit a crime. The reason that criminal defense attorneys can make these arguments is that criminal law recognizes a number of unique situations where otherwise criminal conduct should not be subjected to a determination of guilt and the offender should be exempted from the crime (LaFave, 2000). These arguments, which are known as defenses, if proven generally lead to a finding of not guilty for the defendant.
One basis for such a defense is that if the offender suffers from an abnormal mental or physical condition at the time that the crime was committed, that condition may have affected his mental state to such a degree that he did not have the necessary mens rea to be found guilty of a crime (Samaha, 2014). An alternative basis for such as defense is that the imposition of punishment does not serve a purpose of the criminal law. Although a primary purpose of criminal law is to convict and punish offenders, there are a number of theories on what purpose punishment should serve. To be sure, four of the more traditional theories of punishment argue that its purpose is to either: prevent offenders from wanting to repeat their criminal acts, restrain and isolate offenders so that they do not have the ability to commit further crimes, deter others from acting in a similar criminal or deviant manner, and, lastly deliver society’s retribution on the offender for the harm or damage that he has caused and inflicted on the community. (LaFave, 2000). Despite these tendencies of criminal law, there are a number of circumstances where the conviction of an offender would neither adequately satisfy the purpose of punishment. In other words, there are situations where an offender may be guilty of the crime, but punishing them for their commission is useless because it is neither likely to prevent or restrain him from reoffending, nor deter him or others from committing the same crime, nor provide a retribution that society finds satisfactory. Two of the most common defenses that rely on these bases are the insanity defense and automatism.
The Insanity Defense
The insanity defense, as mentioned, seeks to exempt or excuse certain offenders from a finding of guilt because, at the time that the crime was committed, s/he suffered from an atypical mental condition. Under criminal law, this atypical mental condition is defined as “being insane”. However, insanity as it is used in criminal law, should not be confused with how it is used in a psychological or psychiatric context (Samaha, 2014). Legal insanity refers to the whether or not an offender’s acts satisfy an essential element to every crime, namely the mental state or mens rea. That is to say, a person who is legally insane is one whose atypical mental condition at the time that the crime was committed resulted in them not having the necessary state of mind or intent to perform a criminal act (M’Gaghten). In other words, because of their mental condition, the offender either: could and did not know what they were doing was wrong; or even if they understood that their actions were wrong, nevertheless could not control themselves from act.
Naturally, simply claiming that an offender is legally insane does not automatically result in the granting of an insanity defense. Indeed, in order to successfully argue insanity, a criminal defense attorney must provide proof that the offender had an atypical mental condition. Accordingly, courts have established several tests that can be used to analyze the evidence offered and make a determination of whether the offender is indeed legally insane.
The oldest and most widely used test for insanity, which is known as the M’Naghten Rule, was established after an 1843 British case in which the offender Daniel M’Naghten killed Edward Drummond, the secretary to the Prime Minister Robert Peel (M’Naghten’s Case [1843]). At trial, M’Naghten’s defense attorney successful persuaded the jury that he was insane by showing that at the time that he shot Drummond he could not tell “right from wrong” (M’Naghten’s Case [1843]). Accordingly, under the M’Naghten Rule, an offender will be deemed legally insane if at the time of that the crime was committed he suffered from a mental illness or “disease of the mind” that negatively affected their ability to reason to such an extent that they are unable to know the nature and quality of their actions or tell whether their actions are right or wrong (M’Naghten’s Case [1843]).
In the 1887, Parsons v, State, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted an alternative test to the M’Naghten Rule, that became known as the Irresistible Impulse Test. In finding that the defendant, the Alabama court held that when there is a question of the offender’s sanity, the proper question to ask is, at the time of the commission of the crime, was he “afflicted with a disease of the mind” (Parsons v. State [1887]). If he was, then the next question to ask is as a result of the disease, did the offender lose “the power to choose between the right and wrong and to avoid the act in question” (Parsons v. State [1887]). If the answer, was in the affirmative then, the court held, the offender may not be legally responsible for his actions. Accordingly, under the Irresistible Impulse Test, a person will be found legally insane if their mental abnormality at the time of the crime caused a lack of ability in them to control their actions or conform to the requirements of the law.
The third test, known as the Durham Rule, was established in the 1954 case Durham v. United States. In the case, the defendant, who had a history of being committed to mental institutions, was nevertheless found guilty of breaking into houses despite his reliance on the insanity defense. In pointing to the inadequacies of the two prior tests for insanity in cases such as this one, the court held that unless the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that either: (1) the offender was not suffering from a mental disease at the time of the crime or (2) that the criminal act was not the result of the mental defect the defendant was not suffering at the time of the crime then he must be found not guilty by reason of insanity (United States v. Durham [1954]). Accordingly, under the Durham test, a person is legally insane if they can simply show that they suffered from a mental defect at the time of the crime.
The last traditional test of insanity was drafted as part of the Model Penal Code by the America Law Institute (ALI) in 1962 as a means of simplifying the confusion of options that resulted from the prior three tests. Known as the Model Penal Code Test, it states that in order for a person to be declared legally insane, they must show that at the time of the crime, they must have been diagnosed to be suffering from a mental illness and was either unable to appreciate the criminality of their conduct, or unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law (LaFave, 2000).
B.) Application of the Insanity Defense to Alf’s Case
An application of any of these four tests of insanity to the facts of Alf’s case show that none are applicable. First, Alf does not suffer from an abnormal mental condition. Rather he suffers from a rare blood condition that can cause severe blackouts. In other words, there does not seem to be any link between his blood condition and his inability to tell right from wrong, or his ability to control himself to conform with the law. Second, even if a “black out” can be considered a mental condition, there is little to suggest that it is a condition that negative affects a person’s mental state. In other words, there seems to be no connection between blacking out a being legally insane. While it might be possible for him to argue that the blood condition created a mental defect that he experienced at the time that he killed his girlfriend, as required under the Durham Rule, but he would need to provide specific evidence showing how the defect was created. More importantly, however, is the fact that the Durham Rule is only available in a very limited number of jurisdictions. Accordingly, even if he were to find the evidence and expert testimony showing that the blood condition created the mental defect, if he is not in a Durham Rule jurisdiction he is unlikely to succeed in this argument. It is most likely, that most courts would view the blood condition as a purely physical condition that may, but at present has not been proven, affect the offender’s mental capacity.
Accordingly, arguing insanity would be very difficult to prove in Alf’s case. Indeed, such an argument will most likely fail under current theories of insanity. Nevertheless, assuming that Alf was able to successfully persuade a court that his blood condition caused him to be legally insane, he would not be acquitted in the traditional sense. That is to say, he would not be released. He would remain under the control of the state. The state, however, would not seek to impose a criminal punishment on him. Doing so, for reasons as discussed above, would serve no viable purpose of criminal law. Instead, a guilty by reason of insanity generally lead to the commitment of the offender to a mental institution for treatment.
A.) The Automatism Defense
Automatism, in its simplest form, refers to unconscious or semi-conscious behavior. The defense of automatism is similar to the insanity defense in that its focus is on showing that the offender lacked the capacity to effectively perform a criminal act as required by the law. In addition, automatism seeks to show that although a criminal act has been committed, the offender should nevertheless not be punished because punishment would serve no legitimate purpose of the criminal law. Having said that, automatism and insanity are quite different in most other areas.
One the one hand, the idea underlying the automatism defense is that because the offender committed the act while he was unconscious or semi-conscious, he could not have developed the required mens rea or mental state that is necessary to show that he intended to perform the criminal act and had the knowledge of circumstances to actually complete the act. In essence, the offender was asleep and his actions were the outcomes of an automatic mental state that he had not power to resist (Howard, 1962). On the other hand, and unlike the insanity defense, automatism further argues that the behavior was involuntary. Accordingly, even if it can be shown that the offender had the necessary mental state to commit the crime, the automatism defense allows an offender to eliminate the other essential element of all criminal acts, namely the actus reus or guilty act. To be sure, under the basic theory of criminal law, the offender’s guilty act must be voluntary in the sense that it must be a conscious exercise of the offender’s will (need attention) in order to accomplish project tasks.
The earliest case to establish the automatism defense was the 1879 case Fain v. Commonwealth. In the case, the Kentucky Appellate Court overturned the conviction of the defendant based on its finding that he suffered from bouts of sleep-walking for most of his life. According to the court, ample evidence had been presented that tended to prove that when a person is sleep-walking they are for all intents and purposes unconscious. As a result, they “do not enjoy the free and rational exercise of” their understandings. Accordingly, they cannot be held liable crimes, such as homicide (Fain v. Commonwealth [1879]). Similarly, in the 1960 case Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, the U.S. Appellate Court for the Third Circuit held that “black-outs” as a result of an epilepsy attack can serve to sever the criminal liability of a defendant based on the theory that while blacked out, the offender’s acts were not the conscious exercise of his will (Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith [1960]).
As with the insanity defense, simply arguing automatism does not necessary result in it being granted. To be sure, a grant of the automatism defense similarly requires that at the time of the crime, the offender suffered from automatism. Some conditions that have been found to cause automatism in offenders include not only the aforementioned sleep-walking and epilepsy but also concussions following head injuries, hypoglycemia, emotionally and mental disorders such as schizophrenia, as well as lack of sleep and even post-traumatic stress disorder (Sobelove, 2000).
It is important to note, however, that an incident of automatism that is the product of a voluntary action, will generally invalidate defense. For instance, if an offender knowingly forces himself not to sleep so that he can achieve the level of unconsciousness that is necessary to commit a crime and avoid liability, then the defense will be denied the chance to respond. Furthermore, simple knowledge of the condition that might lead to automatic behavior might also be a reason to deny the defense. For example, if the offender knew that taking certain medications would result in them engaging in dangerous or criminal behavior, might be cause to deny the automatism defense.
B.) Application of the Automatism Defense to Alf’s Case
An application of the automatism defense to facts of Alf’s case suggest that he has a good chance of success. First, he suffers from a blood condition that can cause black-outs. As help in the Smith case, health conditions that cause black-outs can indeed provide the reasonable basis for a successful automatism defense. The only issue that might raise a concern under this theory of the case would be if Alf knew that he had a tendency to engage in dangerous behavior when has one of his black-outs.
Second, even without the argument of the blood condition related black-outs, the evidence surrounding his girlfriend’s death unambiguously shows that it was the result of automatic behavior. To be sure, the fact that the evidence shows it was done while he was in a state of unconsciousness and “totally unaware of his actions” is the definition of the automatism defense.
Lastly, the fact that Alf was prescribed powerful medications to counteract the effects of his blood condition and that the medications might be the cause of his unconsciousness s a further argument in support of automatism. However, the fact that he took twice the prescribed amount the night of the murder might be sufficient to invalidate an automatism argument based on the medications. As might a showing that he knew it would be likely a double dose would cause him to act criminally.
A successfully automatism defense would, unlike the insanity defense, result in the outright acquittal of Alf and his immediate relief if he was being held in custody (Fulcher v. State, [1981]). Alternatively, it might result in a finding of involuntary manslaughter or the unintentional killing of his girlfriend.
Alf’s automatism defense would not be affected if he was charged with murder as opposed to manslaughter. The reason that there would be no effect is because the basis of the defense is not actually based on the specific elements of a particular crime but rather the fundamental elements of all crimes. Indeed, as mentioned, automatism focuses on disproving either the mens rea or mental state prong of all crimes or the actus reus or voluntary act of all crimes. That is to say, since a conviction of murder and manslaughter both require a successful showing that the offender committed a voluntary act while having the required mental state or intention, the automatism defenses attack on either element is as applicable in the case of murder as it is in the case of manslaughter.
References
American Law Institute (ALI). Model Penal Code 1962.
Cahill, M.T. 2012. Defining inchoate crimes. Ohio State Criminal Law Review 9(1), p. 7651.
Fain v. Commonwealth [1879] 78 Ky. 183.
Fulcher v. State [1981] 633 P.2d 142.
Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith [1960] 278 F.2d 169.
Howard, A., 1962. Automatism and Insanity. Sydney Law Review 36, p.1962.
LaFave, W.R., 2000. Criminal Law, New York, West Group.
M’Naghten’s Case [1843] 8 Eng. Rep. 718.
Parsons v. State [1887] 2 So. 854.
Samaha, J. 2014. Criminal Law, New York, Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Sobeloff, A., 1995. Insanity and Criminal Law: From M’Naghten to Durham and Beyond. 41 ABA Journal 15(2), p. 93.
United States v. Durham [1954] 214 F.2d 862.
