Introduction
No doubt this nation has suffered greatly in the recent past and its staying power has been challenged to its limits, chief among them the insurgency of Boko HaramBoko Haram will soon know the strength of our will and commitment to rid this nation of terror we shall spare no effort until we defeat terrorism (Buhari cited in Associated Press, 2015b)).
The above quotation is from the first speech of the newly elected President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari. Buhari knew exactly what he was saying, when put tackling Boko Haram as the first issue of his agenda (Associated Press, 2015b)). But what exactly is Boko Haram? Which is its ideology and how does it perceive its role? Which are its tactics? Which are the counter-terrorism measures taken against it and which is these measures’ legitimacy and effectiveness? All these questions are aimed to be answered in this paper.
Boko Haram Ideology and Perception of Role
The Boko Haram organization, whose official name is “Jama atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda a Waati Wal Jihad” (i.e. people committed to the Prophet’s Teaching for propagation and Jihad), was founded in 2002 by the fanatic Muslim preacher Mohammed Yusuf, in Maiduguri, which the capital of the Borno northeastern province (Walker, 2016; Comolli, 2015). The basis of Boko Haram is situated in the territories, which once formed the Bornu Empire. The organization is widely as Boko Haram, which is translated as “Western education is forbidden” (Amnesty International, 2015; Comolli, 2015).
The reasons that set a fertile ground for the establishment of Boko Haram can be found in the social gap between the country’s North and South regions, the diversity of the ethnic groups and spoken languages, the English Colonization and the until recently military dictatorships among others (more details in the Appendix) (Ngyah, 2016; Asuelime, David and Onapajo, 2015; Evans, 2015).
The organization began as a Sunni sect, which supported the imposition of shariah, while in 2009, influenced by the positions of over-conservative positions of Wahhabism, became a Salafi-jihadist organization (Comolli, 2015). This ideology of radical Islam has much in common with Afghanistan’s Taliban and its fans are enemies of the Western thought, culture and education (Byman, 2005). It has to be noted that the execution of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in 2009 by the Nigerian security forces contributed to the radicalization of members of Boko Haram. Year 2009 was also the year when Boko Haram began its first terrorist attacks (Smith, 2016).
Essentially, Boca Haram opposes the westernization of the Nigerian society and the concentration of the country’s wealth in the hands of the mainly Christian elite. Additionally, Boko Haram members oppose anything they perceive as “influenced by the West”, including elections and secular education (Amnesty International, 2015). Besides, the name Boko Haram itself is not accidental, since behind its interpretation the whole ideology of the organization is underpinned. Boko Haram members believe that education is a sin, since it spreads Western standards and Christian values (Walker, 2016; Comolli, 2015).
The organization initially labeled itself as an ally of al-Qaeda, but has since then declared its commitment to the objectives of the jihadists of the Islamic State (Walker, 2016; Comolli, 2015). However, Boko Haram still has strong ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as with Afghanistan’s Taliban, and al-Sebab in Somalia. In Somalia in particular, Boko Haram’s personnel is trained, which is then introduced and participates in the Holy War of Islam with the ultimate aim of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2015).
Though Boko Haram’s motives are not clear and the real intentions of its leadership remain largely unexplained, its influence in the Nigerian population is linked to various factors such as economic marginalization of northeastern Nigeria, the lack of employment opportunities for young people, the reaction of traditional societies to the forces of modernization and, perhaps above all, the inability and indifference of the Nigerian government to protect the local population (Weeraratne, 2015).
Boko Haram Organization and Tactics
As already mentioned previously, the 2009 execution of Boko Haram’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf in combination with the Nigerian police’s decision to arrest Boko Haram’s members and seize its weapons, was the causation for the initiation of the organization attacks (Comolli, 2015). In 2009, Abubakar Shekau, who is considered as one the most hardcore and extreme Islamists assumed leadership of the organization and became head of the Council of Elders (i.e. Shura), contributing to Boko Haram’s radicalization (Amnesty International, 2015).
Nonetheless, it has to be noted that Shekau was not followed by all the supporters of Yusuf. In the present times it is believed that Boko Haram is divided into 3-6 factions, which have been in different occasions in the past either in cooperation or collision. The exact number of Boko Haram’s soldiers is unknown. They are estimated to at least 15,000, though it is likely that there are much more (Amnesty International, 2015).
Finally, the financing of the organization comes among other ransom to release hostages (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism), as for example in the case when $3.15 million were asked in 2013 to free seven French hostages (Cocks). The organization also uses funds from sympathizer communities, but this source of income can only be limited, in a country with such extreme poverty such as Nigeria - especially when speaking about the even poorer North. Also, a large part of the organization’s revenue of thought of originating from introducing and marketing drugs in Africa, as well as participating in smuggling tusks (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014).
Within five years, the action of Boca Haram spread to neighboring countries (Niger, Chad and Cameroon) costing the lives of about 10,000 people and forcing nearly 1.5 million to flee their homes. In the more recent years, Boko Haram unleashed murderous attacks with an almost daily frequency (Smith, 2016). In 2014, attacks escalated to over 230 forays and bombings, which killed at least 4,000 citizens. The actual numbers of killings are probably higher. Finally, in early January 2015, Boca Haram went on a showdown, occupying the military base in the town of Baga, in which the multinational force set up to fight against it was located (Amnesty International, 2015).
It has to be noted that Boko Haram’s targets are civilians by 25%, followed by the police (22%), enterprises (16%), government facilities (11%), religious centers (10%), military bases and other facilities (9%), and education premises (7%) (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2014).
Extremely violent attacks, bombings (often with suicide bombers), mass abductions of children and women, as well as burning and destruction of schools accompanied by teachers’ and students’ killings, tortures and forced marriages of women and girls to their members, and finally confinement of civilians in specific houses from where they can only exit after permission summarize Boko Haram’s tactics (Associated Press, 2015a)).
During these unexpected and brief attacks (using hit-and-run tactics), Boko Haram soldiers enter communities with motorcycles, cars and trucks. They proceed to “door-to-door” of the civilians, who they order to gather. Then they either shoot all the men, who are of draft age, or simply target those who are believed of having connections with the government or the military. Very often they abduct single women and girls, as for example in April 2014, when 276 schoolgirls kidnapped by the state’s Chibok secondary school for girls (it has to be noted that a huge amount of these girls are still missing) (Amnesty International, 2015).
Finally, and according to the UN, an increase-shock was recorder, in 2015, in the number of children used by Boko Haram, as suicide bombers. More specifically, one in five Boko Haram suicide attacks is carried out by children. Attacks in Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad are executed especially by suicide bombers, leading to the rise of child suicide bombers’ attacks from 4 in 2014 to 44 in 2015. It is believed that boys are forced to attack their own family to prove their allegiance to Boko Haram, while the girls used for attacks are often drugged and then tied with explosives. Most suicide attacks are recorded by children, many as young as eight years. This policy change reflects the loss of territory in Nigeria from Boko Haram (UN News Service Centre, 2016).
Counter-terrorism Measures against Boko Haram
The former Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, seemed to have for many years been “washing his hands” for the deaths of thousands of people in the northeastern provinces of Nigeria, presenting them as the unfortunate result of a fanatical uprising for which the government did not bear the slightest responsibility. However, the Chibok abductions mentioned previously shifted the spotlight of international publicity over to Jonathan and his government, revealing not its only impotence, but also analgesia (Associated Press, 2015a); Comolli, 2015).
Reactions to the particular incident were extended beyond the borders of Nigeria with Barack Obama along with other Western leaders, who had been so far silently observing Boko Harm’s actions from remote, felt compelled to express their sympathy. The governments of the US and Britain had also offered to help. However, Nigerians were reluctant during Jonathan’s presidency to accept such offers, since they were consider as a violation of their sovereignty. The US had been flying unmanned aircrafts (drones) from neighboring bases in Niger since 2012, but the Nigerian government had rejected US requests for similar flights from the Nigerian territory (Hammer, 2016).
Meanwhile, the Nigerian army, and Although Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the northeastern provinces in 2013, failed miserably to defeat Boko Haram. In fact, the army, which had since 2009 formed the Joint Military Task force (JTF) (with the participation of Army, Navy, Air force and the Police) (Maiguwa, 2016; Solomon, 2015), committed atrocities against civilians, thus, strengthening its sympathy for Boko Haram’s rebels, who remain extremely popular among the young Muslims of the North (as explained the country’s poorest region).
The army was vehemently criticized for its reaction in an attempted escape of suspects of Boko Haram involvement from a camp in 2014. According to hospital sources, about 500 people were killed, mainly by soldiers. Similar human rights violations by the Nigerian army made Western governments reluctant to participate in the conflict due to the fear of being considered as accomplices (Asuelime, David and Onapajo, 2015; Smith, 2016).
Similar, were the violations and atrocities conducted later by the Civilian Joint Task Force, which was established to recover the military’s credibility, and which gave power to civilians to provided information on potential Boko Haram-involved compatriots. In particular, during the acting of the Civilian Joint Task several innocent people were arrested, tortured and even killed without trials (such acts have been, however, never accepted by the Nigerian government as facts) (Maiguwa, 2016).
Corruption, Nigeria’s major problem, was another reason why military advisers kept distances. Nigerian soldiers claimed that their commanders were embezzling the majority of their wages, thus, leaving them with little incentive to fight a well-equipped guerrilla movement knowing mountains and forests (Smith, 2016).
Things were made even worse by the arrest of two leaders of the protests that took place to condemn the government’s analgesia on the kidnappings, which was ordered by the president’s wife, Patience Jonathan, who curiously enough accused them for participation in Boko Haram and misrepresentation of facts in order to discredit the government. The government’s attempt to distract the public instead of focusing on facing the Boko Haram issue with responsibility, once more, depicted its impotence (Kendhammer, 2016).
Given the low level of operational readiness of the Nigerian army, assistance from other States to address Boko Haram became necessary, especially when the organization is increasingly closely linked with international terrorism, which in turn expands its action with main representative the Islamic State of Jihadists. This foreign assistance was provided an opening since 2013, when Boko Haram was declared a terrorist organization by the US State Department (Labott and Botelho, 2013), and since 2014 when similar recognition of Boko Haram came from the UN (Nigeria news, 2016).
Indeed, in 2014 a joint plan for tackling extreme Boko Haram leaders was decided by the five African states of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin, during a summit hosted in Paris by French President Francois Hollande. The agreement stated that these five countries would share information on Boko Haram’s activities, cooperate in the protection of their borders and act in concert to address the organization. At the same time, Western powers agreed to provide part of the information they have available to these African countries. Hollande, however, did not specify what kind of information would be offered (BBC News, 2014). Finally, the particular summit in combination to other successive summits/ discussions led to founding of a Multinational Joint Task force in the fight against Boko Haram, which is supported by the UN (Associated Press).
At the same time, the international outcry for the Chibok abductions, contributed so as for the Nigerian government receive billions of dollars in the form of foreign aid and military support. In particular, Britain has played a leading role in supporting the efforts of the Nigerian authorities against Boko Haram. Britain’s Department for International Development has sent help about € 1 billion (£ 860 million) to Nigeria, aimed at creating political stability in the country (Coughlin, 2016a)). Meanwhile, the US has provided respective assistance of $ 2 billion (Coughlin, 2016b)).
However, much of the responsibility for the failure to address Boko Haram is also to be attributed to the newly elected leader of Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari, who during his election campaign claimed that he was to gather forces to face the threat of Boko Haram (Comolli, 2015).
Nonetheless, once he received the power, Buhari turned out to be not so enthusiastic to face Boko Haram, reaching as far as to claim that the organization was no longer a serious threat to Nigeria. He made this incredible statement despite the fact that the country continues to face terrorist Boko-Hara inspired attacks, including the abduction and murder of a high military officer who was abducted just hours after Buhari had issued a statement claiming that the Nigerians enjoyed improved security (Coughlin, 2016a)).
This behavior was accompanied by concerns that rather than face Boko Haram, Buhari is more concerned of establishing his former dictatorial ways. Western aid officials are concerned that Buhari uses the money originally sent in the fight against Boko Haram, to launch a persecution campaign against his political opponents (Coughlin, 2016a); Coughlin, 2016b)).
Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Counter-terrorism Measures against Boko Haram
The legitimacy of the above mentioned Multinational Joint Task Force is derived by the Africa Union (AU) Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), whose member come from the affected by Boko Haram countries (Maiguwa, 2016; Perry, 2014).
On the other hand, the Civilian Joint Task Force, which was the Nigerian method of fighting against Boko Haram, had no power derived by legislation. However, it was provided with the official illegitimate power to capture, and interrogate potentially Boko Haram-involved civilians. The Nigerian military’s credibility was even further damaged by the accusations against it and against of the Civilian Joint Task Force in respect to the atrocities mentioned above, as well as for its inability and unpreparedness in respect to the mitigation of Boko Haram’s attacks (Maiguwa, 2016).
In particular, the Nigerian government’s choice to fight Boko Haram has been mainly limited to attacking it via military forces, and not to additional, maybe more effective, preventive measures. Indicative of this is the fact that the government has been funding the establishment of new Muslim schools, where the teaching of religious intolerance may serve in providing Boko Haram with new members. Inability to prevent Boko Haram’s attacks is also evidenced by the government’s tolerance in the preaching of religious extremism (Maiguwa, 2016).
Similar lack of effective treatment on behalf of the Nigerian government has be indicated by its justice system, where the unlawful, clumsy and corrupted judiciary has failed to effectively collect evidence, and prosecute actual Boko Haram members and not falsely condemn innocent civilians (Maiguwa, 2016; Perry, 2014).
The effectiveness of Multinational Joint Task Force is only natural to be deterred by the above Nigerian government’s reluctance to prevent rather than treat the Boko Haram threat (Perry, 2014).
Conclusions
Boko Haram, which is based in Nigeria, i.e. the most populous country in Africa, but also the richest, since it is the largest oil producer on the African continent, is an organization, whose action-attacks extend to the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad instigated by an ideology where the Western education is considered sin. Boko Haram’s aim to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, has led to the intensification its activity in recent years, which include the kidnapping girls from schools, bomb attacks in strategic government facilities and bodies, suicide bombers and country officials’ killing among others.
Boko Haram’s expansion and effectiveness seems to have been enhanced by succeeding governments, which seem reluctant to mitigate Boko Haram’s actions via preventive and legitimate measures. Instead, its governments seem to find military forces the only effective measure. Hopefully, the recent global intervention with the subsequent Multinational Joint Task Force establishment will facilitate combating Boko Haram, which is gradually yet consistently posing not only an African but rather a global terrorist threat.
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Appendix: Understanding the Reasons that created a Fertile Environment for Boko Haram’s Establishment
In 1903, the Sultanate of Bornu and the Sokoto Caliphate were conquered by the British colonialists, who attempted through education to spread Christianity, not only in the particular region, but throughout Nigeria, which had become part of the British Empire and became independent in 1960 (Ngyah, 2016; Asuelime, David and Onapajo, 2015).
Essentially Nigeria, while being one single state in terms of administration, it was socially divided into two parts, i.e. the poor Muslim North and the rich Christian South. From 1966 and until 1999 with the exception of a short period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Nigeria was ruled by military dictatorships, a fact that contributed to the escalation of social and religious tensions. Tensions climaxed in the 1980s in Kano, the largest Northern city, where Islamic fundamentalists of the Yan Tatsine organization pioneered in demonstrations, which were suppressed by the state security forces, though with a very heavy toll. At least 4,000 people were killed with some raising this number to 10,000 (Ngyah, 2016).
The size of the social gap between the north and south created fertile ground in the Nigeria’s northern part for Islamic fundamentalist sermons, while after the country’s independence not few were the influential voices that expressed strong opposition to Western education of the British colonialists (Asuelime, David and Onapajo, 2015).
On the other hand, Nigeria is the best example of what economists call the “paradox of plenty”. Although Nigeria is the 7th oil producer in the world, over 30% of its population lives below the poverty line (Asuelime, David and Onapajo, 2015; Evans, 2015).
The country’s main export products are oil and natural gas, resources which have allowed Nigeria to dramatically increase its commercial activities and, of course, revenue. 80% of these revenues go to the government’s needs, 16% to cover operating costs and 4% to investors. But, according to World Bank estimates, endemic corruption results in only 1% of the population benefiting from the 80% of the energy-related revenues (Evans, 2015).
In addition, the 2005 agreement with the Paris Club (Club de Paris), which provided for the deletion of the country’s bilateral external debt in exchange for a share in its energy revenues, committed another portion of the particular proceeds (Asuelime, David and Onapajo, 2015; Evans, 2015).
It also noteworthy that Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is based on the energy sector more than it should, leaving the state infrastructure not related to energy production in an inadequate condition. Nigeria at the same time does not take advantage its rich human capital, which almost half are young people aged 14 years (Evans, 2015).
Furthermore, when talking about Nigeria one should bear in their minds that it is a country with over 250 ethnic groups and 512 languages. The official language of the country is English, as a colonialism inheritance, while much of the population speaks French as a consequence of the influence of neighboring countries, which have adopted the French, also due to colonialism (Asuelime, David and Onapajo, 2015).
All these factors were the ones that led to the radicalization of sections of the population in northern Nigeria, which saw armed resistance against the rich Christian south, as the only means to obtain what they considered they were deprived of (Ngyah, 2016).
