Substance Dualism and Materialism: According to Descartes
René Descartes’ substance dualism is summed up in the most famous words used by many: “I think, therefore I am.” This is an indication of how he perceived the mind and the body – as two separate entities. His substance dualism can be summed up further in that, the farther the mind is moved away from the senses, the better the mind can understand the truths around its thinking. Thus, it means that, according to Descartes, the mind is separate from the body. In his reasoning, he regarded the material as separate from the mind. This forms the crux of his philosophy. He further created the distinction between mind and body to the point where he regarded the mind as equal to the soul. Descartes’ materialism, therefore, is found in the fact that it has substance, it has dimension, can be measured, and is tangible, even to the point of smelling it and tasting it. Anything material – matter – can be changed, altered, or destroyed. This is completely opposite to that of the mind. Further to this is the fact that one can sum up what the “I think, therefore I am” phrase means: anything your body does can be measured, whereas the mind cannot be measured, therefore it has to be two separate entities.
In light of the discussion thus far, materialism can be divided into Reductive Materialism and Eliminative Materialism. Reductive materialism could be regarded as eliminative materialism as it regards the soul and personal identity as immaterial. However, even though it is difficult to make the distinction between the two, there are explanations for it. It is for this reason that non-reductive materialists have attempted to solve this mind-body difficulty. Reductive Materialism indicates that any mental entity is equal to a material entity. Thus, what one thinks, can be identified in the material world outside of the brain. As Cornman states further, “mental entities have no mental properties.” One could, therefore, deduce from this that the brain can only gain an entity from the material entity. The mental state, therefor, has a corresponding physical state. In short, the Reductive Materialist would make the connection between body and mind, in contrast to what the dualist believes – where the mind and the body can be separated.
Eliminative Materialism deals with the fact that commonsense do not exist. This is in contrast to what Descartes believed, in that ones, the mind can be trusted with all that it perceived. By denying that the mind can perceive things in a material way, such as commonsense, one would be an eliminative materialist. The reality of Eliminative Materialism can be divided into two concepts: that there is only a brain state, and no mental state, and that the reality is that there are mental states, but that these are only brain states. These two concepts are quite difficult to separate, as they seem to be the same concept. Thus, as Ramsey states, it makes the “distinctiveness of eliminative materialism” doubtful. Furthermore, discussing mental states cannot happen, as one cannot reduce mental states to the physical realm. This is especially in light of the fact that commonsense cannot give a true reflection of the inner life. For Eliminative Materialism in particular, therefore, can be restated here, that commonsense is a “hopelessly primitive and deeply confused conception of our internal activities.
The discussion of Dualism and Materialism allows one to follow the pattern around how the mind is perceived by philosophers. It is evident, that both have its plausible arguments. However, one could look at Materialism as more plausible. The reason for this is that, there is a definitive distinction between mind and body when it comes to Dualism. With regard to Materialism, there is doubt as to whether the commonsense aspect, and inner reflection can be completely separate. As Ramsay stated: “distinctiveness of eliminative materialism” is doubtful. Furthermore, Materialism allows for the doubt that there can be correlation between the material and the mind – the mind and the body – as Reductive Materialism indicates. Dualism makes a separation between the mind and the body and, in particular, Reductive Materialism allows the two identities to be a part of each other – that is, the mental, and the physical. An objection to this is in the fact that it would make the brain the only “instrument” that could have mental features.
Substance Dualism and Materialism: Locke and Hume
The philosophical problem of personal identity involves two positions offered by John Locke and David Hume. Both developed their arguments after Descartes.
John Locke speaks of the immateriality of the soul as well as the fact that personal identity has two distinctions – the matter of “the identity of atoms, masses of atoms, and living things.” One might draw the conclusion that, instead of being a dualist, Locke was rather a monist, as he believed in the “unified notion of a man.” His sense of identity was locked into the fact that man was “nothing but a participation of the same continued Life.” This means that the whole person was a thinking and intelligent being. His attempt was to show that substance (matter or spirit) was to be left out of the equation. In his quest to point this out, he in effect defeated his own argument as he stated that man and substance is distinct – that is, separating the notion of man from the notion of self. Further to the discussion are also the views of David Hume. Locke did not agree with the views held by Descartes, especially with regard the separation of the body and the mind.
As with the discussion before, David Hume could be regarded as an eliminative materialist as he denied the fact that there is an ego. Thus, there is no existence of the self. Hume is often seen as a Locke scholar and, hence, followed the same thinking to some extent, but later reviewed his own thoughts. His views revolved around the same notion of personal identity. However, he was confronted with the major issue of Dualism. His solution to dualism was to find a middle ground for the philosophy of dualism that made a distinction between mental and physical properties. His way of dealing with the thinking was to develop an attack on substance, which concluded with the “immateriality of the soul.” Cummins further makes the point that Hume developed an implicit distinction between the physical entities of man and his mental entities. This meant that even though he seemed to develop a monism, it ended up as a dualism, where mind, and the body are separate. The comparison with Descartes can also be seen in the fact that Hume determined that the soul was immaterial. What one must in effect see is that Hume seemed to have been anti-dualist at first (even though Cummins disagrees with this), and secondarily a dualist.
Both these authors have developed their own arguments along the lines of dualism and anti-dualism. Locke was set against the fact that the mind and the body was separate, and Hume regarded the notion of man as a unified being, yet also spoke of dualism as well. The importance for human beings is to note the fact that, especially in philosophy, the mind cannot really be separate from the body. This one could perhaps agree with Locke rather than with Hume and Descartes. Much of what ewe experience, through the senses is through the body, and it does affect the mind. Hence, the more plausible of the two arguments here would be that of Locke. One thing that needs to be added here is the fact that Locke’s view was that of “Minimal Mental/Physical Dualism.”. Thus, one could gather that it is more balanced than any of the other arguments.
Works Cited
“Philosophy of Mind - Dualism - Substance Dualism.” Philosophy of Mind - Dualism - Substance Dualism. Accessed May 26, 2016. http://www.philosophyonline.co.uk/oldsite/pom/pom_substance_dualism.htm.
Cornman, James W., and Keith Lehrer. Philosophical Problems and Arguments; an Introduction. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
Ramsey, William. “Eliminative Materialism.” Stanford University. May 08, 2003. Accessed May 27, 2016. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/.
Churchland, Paul M. Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
Tomaselli, S. “The First Person: Descartes, Locke and Mind-Body Dualism.” History of Science 22, no. 2 (1984): 185-205. doi:10.1177/007327538402200203.
Cummins, Phillip D. “Hume as Dualist and Anti-Dualist.” Hume Studies 21, no. 1 (1995): 47-55. doi:10.1353/hms.2011.0125.
