Modern governments have grown large excessively. Aspects of developments such as individual freedom and economic expansions that have been enhanced since a long time go keep showing their glimpses in the modern society. Such an understanding has brought the world into the belief that the economic beliefs, human trajectories on concepts, prudential strive for the future were once pressed from all the corners of the world in a similar pattern. The world, however, began to diverge from its pieces with Europe considered as the most significant divergence in historical accounts. Little has however been exposed as to why some of the divergences actually happened. With a great sense of specificity, this paper explores the input of scholars: Frankopan and Fukuyama to answer some of the critical questions of how and why Europe diverged from the rest of the world.
Fukuyama believes that there are a lot of reasons why Europe could diverge from the rest of the world. Fukuyama goes deep into an understanding that political, economic and social endeavors might have masked the core of the reasons why a popular continent such as Europe to diverge and stand out differently among other regions of the world (Fukuyama, 12). Politically, people believe that Europe must have been the epitome of political ideas. Thus, it is a staunch belief that the stronger political maturity that Europe experienced before its peers might have been a palatable platform to explain the divergence. Astonishingly, Fukuyama argues that key aspects of politics such as democracy and a huge combination of the elements that account for the characteristics of the modern state were inexistent in China in the third century B.C, a lot of centuries before they even emerged in Europe. Could somebody be lying about the origin of modern political paradigms?
Normally, early societies would assist the world into exploring unified grids of expression. Instances of political growth should, for example, bear their roots from the deep relations with the early societies such as Mesopotamia, Meso-and South America among other documented early places. That, however, is not the case. Only Greece and Rome stand out in expressing the ancient forms of world’s popular trends. Most parts of Europe are not recorded as popular to unity in performance at the feet of other early societies. Fukuyama roots this disjointed unity in the world of early societies in his conclusions about the origins of political order, an occurrence considered by many other world trend critics as the actual origin of the European divergence (Fukuyama, 20). In as early as the fifth century, the Greek began giving directions to the rest of Europe when they developed political institutions that are critically similar to the institutions available in the world today. Paramount among the divergent institutions of this early period was the egalitarian nature of Greek politics that opened avenues for participation in the election of rulers. The Greeks further introduced the concept of citizenship at this early age and synchronized the characteristics of egalitarianism with citizenship to come up with what seemed like modern democracy. Simply, the 5th-century invention of “classical republicanism” is considered to be the primary root of Europe’s divergence as emphasized by Fukuyama.
The political enlightenment that saw Europe through the political institutions that emerged in Greece and Rome could be a reputable explanation of why Europe must have begun their divergence in the 5th century. Little explanations, however, meet the large institutions that were desired to meet the thresholds necessary for managing politics in larger national grids and not smaller geographic segments like was the case with classical republicanism. Both Fukuyama and Frankopan believe that China might have played a central role in this political maturity. China, in its earlier society, had developed institutions that not only manifested a great sense of modern political institutions, they had the desirable institutions that were necessary for the management of larger populations that could not be copied from what Greece and Rome provided. After their divergence, Europe outsourced key compositions of their democratic institutions visible today out of many political regimes that were already available. Simply, Europe foresaw the future of the world before earliest societies. Europeans employed their sharp vision into the future to come up with highly synchronized political platforms to affect their otherwise visible desire of leading the world. As opposed to popular understanding that the 17th century was monumental to European divergence, it was only a period that saw an extensive emergence and application of the rule of law and the state law that were evidently paramount elements of modern democracy.
As opposed to Fukuyama whose major understanding of European divergence is majorly anchored on political regime changes, Frankopan believes that religion might have been the major reason for the great divergence. In his deeper understanding of the trends of divergence, Fukuyama states that religion was a critical divisive factor in the early society. (Frankopan, 112) asserts that in as early as 300 AD, the world had already established its religious order. Most regions of the world started grouping their populace according to different religious orientations. During the same period, the dynasties in China were highly shaped and the Chinese were steadily spreading their religious authority over to neighboring societies. Development of Islam in the early society of Mesopotamia and as well marked the genesis of religious divergence (Frankopan, 115). By the beginning of 4th century, the world was much oriented religiously and regions were only steered towards religious dominance. Persia and Rome led the way into leading the world into religious dominance, a move that culminated with the synchronization of politics and religion to steer then world into a new regime of religious rule. In his assertions, Frankopan states that Europe was prudent on its path to religion, this is explained by the fact that it is the Europeans that uniformly supported singular religions to steer their political and economic institutions in these early centuries as other regions of the world lagged behind in the same (Frankopan, 117).
Frankopan as well attributes religion to have been the primary factor behind some economic endeavors that further led to the great divergence. With the emergence of religion, the entire world established differences within their ranks which they would synchronize to unite the world economically as it opened more economic gaps as well (Fukuyama, 102). Different forms of religions were indulged in different forms of production thus trade and creation of wealth. Through religious ties, people would easily effect trade of what they had for what they did not have. On the same note, (Fukuyama, 403), notes that development in religion led to an unprecedented development in varied production that eventually led to economic proficiency in the world. Fukuyama puts more emphasis on divergence through trade through archeological evidence that inspected quality in the historic trade between the early societies of Kushan, Sasanian and a range of European cities. The great divergence only came with the realization that some regions of the world produced and created more wealth better than other regions.
Fukuyama and Frankopan open a greater understanding into the great divergence. From their inputs, there are no proper records of when European divergence began. However, the fourth century indicates a great period for the immature stages of divergence. It is, however, notable that divergence was not drastic. Chronological occurrences of events in different places led to the gradual and almost unforeseeable divergence. Political endeavors, religion, as well as progress in economic fronts, contributed majorly to the divergent trends. It is as well worth noting that Europe outsourced most of its institutional components from different parts of the world, especially China to come up with more sophisticated institutions while leaving behind traditional societies that stuck to their traditional forms without the input of externalities.
Conclusion
The late 18th and early 19th century could be critical to great divergence as is seen in the books of history. The great divergence was however not abrupt as indicated by these historical accounts. Aspects of civilization are rooted deeply into ancient Qing China and through history to the emergence of capitalism. The age of discovery, the emergence of colonial empires, the industrial revolution, commercial revolution, the scientific revolution and the age of enlightenment, which are monumental to the divergence bear their roots into diverse beginnings. In as much as Fukuyama and Frankopan could be short in giving chronological evidence, it is apparent that their arguments make sense to most unanswered questions on European divergence.
Work Cited
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order: From Pre-human Times to the French Revolution. New York: D & M Publishers, 2011.Print
