Introduction
Before this case of Mapp v. Ohio, it was inadmissible in a federal court of law to use evidence that had been obtained in violation of the 4th amendment, if federal officers had obtained that information. On the other hand, in a state court, law enforcement officers – whether federal or state - could take evidence seized in violation of the amendment and present it to the state courts. As a result, someone could be prosecuted criminally in state courts based on evidence acquired in breach of the 4th amendment. Mapp v. Ohio is a benchmark case that led to the Supreme Court ruling that evidence uncovered in violation of the 4th amendment is not considered admissible in cases in the state court (Madden, 2015). This paper analyzes the investigative efforts, actions, and procedures undertaken by law enforcement while building the case against the defendant in the Mapp v. Ohio case. It also discusses what the officers did wrong that resulted in the ruling in favor of Mapp, the defendant, despite the presentation of evidence to the court.
Summary of Case
On May 23rd, 1957, the Ohio police officers were searching for Virgil Ogletree, a bombing suspect, for questioning. Virgil, who used to work in the same illegal business of racketeering as one Dollree Mapp, was believed to have been involved in the bombing of a rival racketeer’s house three days earlier. Based on an anonymous tip, the Ohio police officers were led to believe that Virgil was hiding in Mapp’s house (Price, 2010). They were also informed that Mapp had illegal betting slips and equipment in her home. Three police officers went to Mapp’s house and requested that they be allowed in. However, under the advice of her lawyer, Mapp declined to let them in without a search warrant. According to Price (2010), the officers left, but one remained, keeping an eye on the house.
After a few hours, the police officers came back in increased numbers and knocked on Mapp’s door. When Mapp declined to answer, the officers forced their way into the house. Mapp demanded to see the search warrant and grabbed it from the officers but before she could view it, the police officers struggled with her until they managed to take it away (O'Brien, 2014). The piece of paper was never seen again, either by Mapp or the courts of law. Moreover, the police officers never introduced it to the courts as a piece of evidence throughout Mapp’s proceedings.
Before the police officers continued their search of Mapp’s house, they handcuffed her, stating belligerence as the basis (Benner, Bird, & Smythe, 2012). On continuing the search, the police officers found the suspect as well as other illegal items in the house. They uncovered some illegal betting slips and a few adult content (pornographic) pictures and books in a footlocker in the basement of the house. Mapp claimed that the obscene items belonged to a previous tenant who had left them behind. She was arrested and prosecuted for knowingly being in the possession of the obscene books and pictures and was sentenced to seven years behind bars.
At Mapp’s trial in the Ohio court, she was convicted of possessing the pornography. She appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court and argued, unsuccessfully, that her 4th amendment rights had been violated in the search (Earl, 2013). She, therefore, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Her appeal argued that her 4th amendment right against unreasonable searches had been violated and that the unlawfully acquired evidence should not be used against her. Jones (2012) states that the court agreed that criminal evidence had to be obtained lawfully with a search warrant stating, "Based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of lewd and lascivious books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home. . . ." In 1961, the high court made a 5-3 decision in Mapp’s favor, ruling that unlawfully obtained evidence cannot be used in state courts. This ruling marked the official establishment of the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule and 4th amendment
Designed to prevent law enforcement officers from violating people’s fourth, fifth and sixth amendment, the exclusionary rule allows courts to exclude evidence presented to the court upon proof that the evidence was obtained in ways that contradict a constitutional provision, such as coerced confession or through an illegal search (Re, 2014). The rule enables defendants to challenge the prosecution’s evidence by calling upon a pre-trial motion in an attempt to suppress the admissibility of then evidence. Furthermore, evidence derived from an illegal event may be excluded as well, a scenario known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine (Brown, 2015). An example is when the police illegally search a house and find an illegal substance. If the house owner confesses to owning the illegal substance, the confession may be treated as fruit of the poisonous tree attained from the illegal search, and may be excluded.
What they did wrong
According to Fried, Bennett, Matz and Lamoureux (2011), the police officers were wrong to storm into Mapp’s house without a genuine search warrant. The fact that they did not allow Mapp read the “warrant” is questionable as to what exactly it was that they were claiming to be a search warrant. What makes it even more suspicious is when Mapp snatched the so-called warrant in an attempt to read it, the officers struggled to snatch it back from her. Begs the question, if it were indeed a genuine search warrant why did they not let her read it? Moreover, the fact that the “warrant” was never presented in court as evidence by the prosecution also makes it clear that the police indeed had no legal permission to storm into a citizen’s house to search the place. Mannheimer (2015) argues that since Mapp had the backing of the constitution to protect her rights, the court had to render the evidence inadmissible.
Conclusion
I agree with the court to make the evidence inadmissible. The court made the right decision because in doing so, it gave a little bit more protection to the individual citizens of the United States. Moreover, it put more pressure on the law enforcement (and the entire government in general) to act more professionally and comply with the constitution. This decision is imperative to citizens of the United States as it helps protect their privacy especially now that technology is advancing at a very high speed. Although the advancement in technology may also be beneficial to fighting crime and terror, the government could also take advantage and abuse the constitutional rights such as privacy of its citizens.
References
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Brown, A. (2015). Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows: A New Method to Consider the Fourth Amendment Implications of Mass Surveillance Technology. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 66(1), 261-292.
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Fried, C., Bennett, A., Matz, J., & Lamoureux, T. (2011). On Judgment. Lewis & Clark Law Review, 15(4), 1025-1046.
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Mannheimer, M. Z. (2015). The Contingent Fourth Amendment. Emory Law Journal, 64(5), 1229-1292.
O'Brien, M. J. (2014). "Widespread" Uncertainty: The Exclusionary Rule in Civil-Removal Proceedings. University Of Chicago Law Review, 81(4), 1883-1929.
Price, P. J. (2010). Mapp v. Ohio Revisited: A Law Clerk's Diary. Journal of Supreme Court History, 35(1), 54-70. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5818.2010.01230.x
Re, R. M. (2014). The Due Process Exclusionary Rule. Harvard Law Review, 127(7), 1887-1966.
