The Impact and Effects of Power Politics of United States, China, & Japan Arising from South China Sea Conflicts on the Sovereignty and Socio-Political Fabrics of Philippines
Introduction
The South China Sea (SCS) is a partly enclosed body of water that connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is marked with several island attributes which are grouped into four island bodies-- the Pratas or Dongsha Islands in the northeast, the Paracels or Xisha Islands in the northwest, the Spratlys or Nansha Islands in the south, and the Scarborough Shoal or Zhongsha Islands to Paracels' southeast (Hayton, 2014). It is teeming with marine and coastal resources and is believed to have diverse abundant hydrocarbon reservoirs. Several countries are laying claims to the South China Seas, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan (Kaplan, 2014). Apparently, China is the biggest and most powerful of these countries, and it has already instituted and strengthened its absolute control over Paracels and Hainan Islands in the SCS. This paper critically analyses the power politics involved in the SCS dispute and its impact on the sovereignty and socio-political realities of the Philippines.
China has asserted full jurisdiction over majority of the disputed sea by basing its claims on an ancient authentic Chinese map showing a nine-dash line that spreads out and covers the coasts of Brunei and Malaysia. China sees the strengthening of its claim over the SCS as highly instrumental to its national security and territorial solidarity. However, from the perspective of the other less powerful and smaller Southeast Asian countries, particularly the Philippines, this is a threatening expansionist campaign of China towards a major strategic area with prospective economic riches (Buszynski & Roberts, 2014). The restoration of the SCS Islands from Japan after the Second World War has further reinforced the claim of China over the SCS Islands, counting Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal. After the defeat of Japan at the conclusion of the Second World War, China reclaimed the four SCS island groups through the Potsdam Proclamation and Cairo Declaration (Beckman et al., 2013)-- documents that demanded the abdication of the entire Japanese military during the Second World War.
The Philippines turned up as a claimant of maritime rights and territorial ownership in the SCS only quite recently. It was only in the 1930s that the Philippines realised the importance of Spratlys, yet did not in any way make an attempt to question China's jurisdiction until the latter part of the 1950s (Hiebert, 2015). However, in the 1970s, the Marcos administration got hold of a testimony handing over most of the Spratlys and numerous others in the neighbouring area to the Philippine government. In 1978, the Philippine government officially proclaimed the islands as part of the Philippines' Kalayaan island group. The Philippines has taken on different attempts to strengthen its possession and sovereignty over Spratlys (Wu, 2013). In particular, it sustains a continued military presence. The country has also initiated a continuous attempt to involve foreign firms in oil and gas exploration activities in the disputed area. Furthermore, it has been attempting to expand the number of its civilians on the disputed area as a means of legitimising its sovereignty, and somehow, discouraging military advances from other claimants.
In 2012, China pushed the Philippines into an uneasy, brief deadlock at Scarborough Shoal making use of fishing and civilian tankers. Throughout the standoff, China firmly defended its position and imposed its control and sovereignty over the disputed area and its accompanying rights and resources. Immediately after the civilian tankers of the Philippines and China pulled out from the disputed area, hence putting an end to the stalemate, China positioned paramilitary and military troops in the SCS (Hayton, 2014). It carried out specific steps to further bolster its right to use oil and marine resources in the disputed territory; reinforce its authoritative power over the disputed territory; and took no notice of the hard remarks from Japan, the U.S., and other states.
The 20th century witnessed the Philippines enduring the merciless colonial occupation of Japan and the U.S., two of the most powerful imperialist countries in the world. Under the Aquino administration, Japan and the U.S. are once again vigorously working towards their imperialistic ambitions. As the U.S. government daringly moves forward its goal of enclosing China, the Philippines is being prepped as the springboard for another world war (Baviera, 2014). For several months, China and the U.S. have been involved in an escalating rhetorical battle over China's territorial demands in the disputed areas of the SCS. The conflicting points of view of the U.S. and China are brought about by wholly divergent regional and national policies and strategies.
On the global arena, China depicts the SCS dispute as basically a matter of sovereignty, whereas the U.S. emphasises the prerogative or right to navigate. The U.S. has been the unchallenged hegemon in the Pacific Rim since the post-Cold War period, supported by its allies, specifically South Korea and Japan (Hiebert et al., 2014). At the same time, though, China has been rising as a prospective regional power, and the SCS has become the key battleground. A fundamental goal but usually unspoken part of the U.S. national policy is to strengthen and sustain global hegemony at sea. By gaining control or power over the seas, the U.S. gains the capability to position military forces across the globe and to ensure the safe movement of American goods.
In the neighbouring seas of China, the U.S. global power clashes with the surfacing regional demands of China. Beginning in the 1980s, China has gone through a transformation from a secluded, self-reliant outsider to a leading exporter. This has compelled the Chinese government to re-evaluate its maritime weaknesses and threats. China is not capable of defending its national economy anymore without defending the maritime courses it requires to sustain its industrial system and to secure trade (Buszynski & Roberts, 2014). The South China Sea is a core maritime route, with its value raised by its rich natural marine and coastal resources (e.g. natural gas, fisheries). China's claim of sovereignty and ownership in the SCS provides the Chinese government a certain extent of stronger security. With neighbouring countries incapable or hesitant to defy China's claims, and the U.S. unwilling to exercise force or coercive measures to hinder China's expansion, the Chinese government is disturbing the established global balance of power unhindered.
However, China is anxious about a particular event in the South China Sea dispute-- Japan's involvement. Recently, Japan helped the Philippines perform search-and-rescue operations, flying aircrafts over portions of the SCS. Japan is also helping the Philippines expand and maintain its aircrafts and ships. And, more importantly, the U.S. and Japan have made an agreement to perform collaborative policing of the South China Sea (Beckman et al., 2013). Apparently, Japan has its own interests in the SCS dispute. Being a small country with scarce natural resources, the economic survival of Japan can merely journey over the seas. Thus, China's aggressive actions in the SCS, after its forceful operations in the East China Sea, convinced Japan that there has been an actual transformation in the balance of power within the Asia-Pacific region and that Tokyo has to defend its interests (Kaplan, 2014). Even though China has hinted that it may agree to a continuous U.S. involvement, it has also declared that it definitely cannot agree to Japan's involvement in the SCS dispute, asserting that Japan has no acceptable or legal interests or rights in the South China Sea.
The Legal Basis of the SCS Dispute
Scholars of Asian geopolitics are already widely aware of the legal dispute filed by the Philippines questioning the maritime claims of China in the SCS. In 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) declared that it had prerogative over the Philippines' major claims, repudiating China's declaration that the dispute embodied a territorial conflict outside the jurisdiction of PCA (Wu & Zou, 2016). The territorial claims of China over the SCS features rest in exploration and discovery, international treaty, and an expansive history of uninterrupted utilisation and control. On the other hand, the Philippines anchored its claims primarily in the three evidence mentioned in the decree of 1978 (Wu & Zou, 2016, p. 20):
much of the above area is part of the continental margin of the Philippine archipelago.
these areas do not legally belong to any state or nation but, by reason of history, indispensable need and effective occupation and control established in accordance with international law, such areas must be deemed to belong and be subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines.
while other states have laid claims to some of these areas, their claims have lapsed by abandonment and cannot prevail over that of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds.
Indeed, the SCS dispute is a monumental arbitration in international law due to the legal issues to be resolved, the parties concerned, and the nonattendance of one of the parties from the arbitration.
It is especially paramount that China be subjected to international arbitral proceedings for the very first time regarding maritime rights and ownership and associated legal concerns. As stated in its formal declarations, China will neither agree to nor take part in the arbitral proceedings. Yet, in spite of the absence of China, the arbitral proceedings can still press on based on specific guidelines stated in The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Wu & Zou, 2016; Hiebert, 2015). Nonetheless, the Tribunal is mandated to prove that the Philippines' claims are firmly based on law and fact and that it has power over the dispute before declaring its decision.
Even so, there is a great likelihood that China will simply turn a blind eye on the outcome of the arbitration, as indicated by continuing discussions among Chinese policymakers. The actions of the Philippines surprised China. China is in no way ready to deal with the SCS disputes by means of legal channels. Chinese foreign policy experts do not believe that the arbitral proceedings are about legal disputes between China and the Philippines at all (Kaplan, 2014). Numerous of them fiercely argue that the U.S. has been profoundly involved in the process, and that the Philippines brought the dispute to PAC to politically coerce and anger China.
The South China Sea Narratives: the U.S., China, and the Philippines
The U.S. is publicly criticising China for defaulting on its previous commitment to not make the dispute a military contest. Alongside the European Union, the United States has disseminated the narrative that China has to abide by the resolution of the arbitration case filed by the Philippines to PAC against China as regards the maritime conflicts. In addition, the U.S. claims that China is seeking control over the disputed areas to partly hinder a massive U.S. barricade of the coastal zone of China in case of an armed conflict (Wu, 2013). If China keeps on aggravating the SCS dispute, the U.S. would pursue more vigorous involvement.
However, according to Austin (2016), in his article for The Japan Times, a commentary in The Australian newspaper misinforms readers by reporting that “the U.S. has watched with increasing alarm as China has asserted its claims to more islands and other land masses in the South China Sea, including among the Spratlys and Paracel island chains” (Austin, 2016, para 16). But the truth is China has not laid out another claim to any SCS island since the latter part of the 1940s, prior to the ascendancy of communism (Austin, 2016; Hayton, 2014). It seems that in spite of their apparent mutual interrelationship, neither China nor the U.S. is eager to work together so as to prevent another global war. To a certain extent this is the prevailing narrative shaping Western opinion of the relationship between China and the U.S. in East Asia.
Meanwhile, the latest moves of China in the SCS demonstrate the narrative of history as predestination. As explained in this narrative, the steps taken by China in the SCS mirror its progressive continuation of its recognised and legitimate importance and position in the region. In addition, China views the steps taken by The U.S., such as its latest 'right to navigate' claim, not as a controlled act to maintain global maritime standards but as an act to continue the long-lived attempt to defend its dominion and prevent China from regaining its legitimate position (Kaplan, 2014; Beckman et al., 2013) in the global order.
The Philippines has firmly opposed the speed and magnitude of China's building of synthetic islands in the SCS, which cover thousands of recovered land and airstrips. The Philippines views these actions as remarkably hostile, threatening, and intrusive (Maohong, 2012). In 2013, President Aquino filed the Philippines' opposition to the territorial advances of China to a U.N. Tribunal and has many times compared China to the Nazis for its aggressive and hostile actions in the SCS. The Filipinos, according to the latest survey of the Pew Research Centre, were the most anxious about the SCS disputes among other Asian peoples (Moss, 2016). Nevertheless, despite the negative image of China disseminated and promoted by the current administration, the Filipinos still regard China favourably.
The Future of the Bilateral Relations between China and the Philippines
In spite of the on-going South China Sea dispute, China and the Philippines are still engaged in a variety of confidence building programmes to alleviate or resolve the conflict between the two nations. China and the Philippines are in fact taking part in a yearly consultation assembly that creates an opportunity to discover means of enhancing and strengthening their relationship especially in the face of the SCS dispute (Hiebert, 2015). Moreover, both countries communicate and interact in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Hiebert et al., 2014). The Philippines is all-inclusive, intensely encouraging the participation of China in the ASEAN.
In order to collaborate and co-operate for a stronger Sino-Filipino relations, both countries also boost the interaction among senior officials, military officers, and diplomatic representatives. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) even proposed a stronger and more intensive military interaction and communication between China and the Philippines to realise key security policy objectives, such as promoting a strategic dialogue between the two countries (Beckman et al., 2013). However, the Philippines must not ignore the likelihood that the Chinese government, having seen and experienced the outcomes of its current actions and policies regarding the SCS, may choose to respond to such problematic diplomatic issues in an innovative and bold way, such as severing its economic ties with the Philippines. For instance, the current Chinese leadership expresses profound reluctance to compromise.
Jejomar C. Binay, one of the presidential candidates in the upcoming Philippine election, declared the substantial economic value of China for the Philippines to justify his campaign for a moderated approach to the sovereignty conflict in the SCS, an approach centred on the chosen strategy of China-- mutual or joint development. In fact, several economic experts warn the Philippines to be wary about its growing relations with Japan and the U.S. in order to avoid the risk of infuriating China (Cook, 2015). Rogier van den Brink, the key economist for the Philippines at the World Bank, explained that the Philippine economy is strongly tied to China. He claimed that China has a greater impact on the Philippine economy than the U.S., European Union (EU) states, and other economic and trade partners of the Philippines.
Van den Brink reported that “the integration with East Asia is quite strong, particularly China. So a shock in East Asia of minus 1% growth will have a negative impact of 0.74% cumulatively on you [the Philippines], and China's part of that is 0.52%” (Visconti, 2012, para 5). China also holds a substantial share of the overall Philippine exports, which, according to the National Statistics Office (NSO), amounts to $642.07 million (Visconti, 2012, para 7). China has an even greater share in electronics, the largest export good of the Philippines. Hence, China was ranked as the third biggest trading partner of the Philippines (Visconti, 2012). Therefore, logically, the Philippine economy would suffer a great deal once China decides to sever its economic ties with the country.
In 2012, China made an appeal to the Philippines to prevent any further tension and fracture in their bilateral relations after a brief stalemate at Scarborough Shoal. Hong Lei, China's Foreign Ministry representative, declared that China is eager to co-operate with the Philippines in exploring gas reserves in SCS. However, Hong's declaration was publicised in the midst of a new surge of cyber attacks on the websites on the Philippine government that allegedly originated from China (Mogato, 2013). In other words, the constructive efforts of both countries to maintain their bilateral relations are currently being sabotaged by recent spate in cyber attacks and hacking against smaller Southeast Asian countries, particularly the Philippines, in the wake of the escalating SCS dispute. PAC's website in The Hague, while engaged in an arbitral proceeding concerning the SCS dispute, was reportedly attacked by a malware originating from somewhere in China (South China Morning Post, 2016). It appears that the bilateral relations between China and the Philippines are increasingly becoming shaky and irreconcilable.
The Implications of the SCS Dispute to the U.S.-China Relationship and the Role of the Philippines and the ASEAN in the Conflict
Numerous scholars claim that the SCS dispute may escalate into a full-blown global war between China and other claimants-- a war, numerous believe, that would inevitably involve the U.S. Experts say that the U.S. may be forced to enter into an armed conflict or military confrontation against China if U.S. military activities in the designated Chinese exclusive economic zone incite a hostile, aggressive response from China. However, based on the current responses of the U.S. to the issue, it seems that a global war is highly unlikely. In fact, the U.S. is adopting a varied approach that is intended to prevent the exercise of force, lowering the possibility of clashes and misunderstanding among claimants, and encouraging China to take on a less hostile and aggressive approach to the SCS dispute (Kaplan, 2014). Regarded a vanguard nation in the SCS conflict, the Philippines fully embraces the efforts of the U.S. to counterbalance the disrupting global force of China as this implies continuing U.S. involvement in and support for the region.
Most definitely, a major new development in the SCS disputes is the involvement of the U.S. Some Chinese scholars and observers even claim that ASEAN states have intentionally encouraged the involvement of the U.S. in order to pressure China to enter into a compromise. This belief contradicts the perspective of the Philippines and other Southeast Asian states. Even though the Philippines have been more vigorous in getting the U.S. involved, there is an emerging agreement that events forced the Philippines to seek the help and support of the U.S. (Dor, 2016), Since 2010, the observed hesitation of the ASEAN to take a bolder stance against the growing aggressiveness of China has been a source of disappointment for the Philippines. More particularly, the Philippines has raised opposition to the six-point compromise between China and Vietnam (Wu & Zou, 2016), which it understood as comprising conditions that expressed indifference to multilateral processes of resolving conflict.
Still, the ASEAN is a crucial player in the South China Sea dispute. While the interest of the Philippine and other ASEAN states in involving the U.S. strategically has grown due to China's aggressive actions in recent years, the Philippines is also aware of the fact that even though its objectives and interests may coincide and converge with the U.S., their motives are also not completely similar (Baviera, 2014; Aguilar, 2012). Hence, even though it is a fact that ASEAN is restricted in its capability to have an impact on the more profound national and geo-strategic forces at work in the SCS dispute, it is still crucial that ASEAN states, separately and altogether, keep on pursuing regional-based channels and processes (Hiebert et al., 2014) toward mitigating conflicts and reaching mutually agreeable compromises.
The Philippines in the SCS Dispute: Would it lead to the rise of mass movements?
Nationalism and patriotism fulfil a highly crucial role in the South China Sea conflict. The Philippines is apparently nourished in patriotic sentiment and national pride, which were largely the outcome of a long history of colonisation and oppression. The opposition of the Philippines to the Joint Maritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), due to the fact that it seemed to undermine the sovereignty rights of the Philippines, is a definite expression of nationalism (Wu & Zou, 2016). Hence, does this imply that the SCS dispute would lead to the rise of mass movements in the Philippines and, later on, to the emergence of a new martyr to lead the Philippine cause? The history of the Philippines is rich in terms of heroism, as shown by how the country's national hero-- Jose Rizal-- and revolutionary leader-- Andres Bonifacio-- fought against Western imperialism. However, according to Dor (2016), individual narratives of misery, hardship, and emancipation are much more valuable to majority of the Filipinos than a collective, common narrative of injustice, persecution, and emancipation.
These narratives are promoted and instituted by an educational system which instils in children the idea that the history of the Philippines is deeply rooted in the arrival of Magellan in 1521. These schools also endorse the belief that the U.S. is the ultimate role model of the Philippines (Wu & Zou, 2016; Hiebert, 2015; Hayton, 2014). Viewed in this way it is unsurprising that, in spite of a long history of colonialism, oppression, and injustice, numerous surveys show that the Filipino people remain the most devoted supporters of the U.S. in the world. Such attitude underlies what may seem to be a prevailing apathy and detachment among the Filipino people about the SCS dispute.
Although the Pew Survey in 2013 reported that majority of the Filipinos viewed the tension with China as an enormous problem call for action or an immediate, drastic response remains largely absent (Hayton, 2014); as explained by Jose Santos Ardivilla, a professor at the University of the Philippines, “It's not that Filipinos don't care about the West Philippine Sea [another name for the South China Sea], it's just that they know that it belongs to us-- by sheer proximity. They're not immediately affected by it and they have other pressing issues. But they do care about sovereignty and ownership because we've heard that the islands are quite mineral rich” (Hayton, 2014, p. 165). Perhaps, a new leadership would encourage the Filipino people to embrace a national narrative and fight for their country's rights to the disputed South China Sea territories.
Discussion and Conclusions
The South China Sea dispute has radically changed the social, economic, and political landscape of the Philippines, particularly of the areas nearby the disputed territories. Affected Filipino inhabitants and fishing communities are mobilising and working together to deal with the difficulties caused by the SCS dispute. There is also a growing realisation among the Filipino people that an independent foreign policy is needed to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines (Dor, 2016). Popular movements in the country are pressuring the government to prohibit the U.S. from getting involved in the dispute because they believe that the superpower has its own interest in the SCS conflict. They also believe that the U.S. will not allow the situation to escalate into a full-blown war against China (Hayton, 2014). Therefore, what is taking place in the SCS dispute is a motivation for the Filipino people to be actively involved in the defence of the country.
Philippine history is replete with actual stories of Filipino heroes who stepped up and led mass movements against colonisers: Jose Rizal, a middle-class Filipino intellectual, inspired the Filipino mass movement against Spain; Andres Bonifacio, a revolutionary Filipino proletariat, led the fight against Spanish occupation; Luis Taruc, the Filipino hero who led the communist struggle against the Japanese; and, Emilio Aguinaldo, a Filipino military and revolutionary leader, mobilised Philippine forces against the U.S. in the Philippine-American war. Hence, the overriding question is, would the Filipino masses once again mobilise to reclaim what is rightfully theirs-- a share in the resources and sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea?
Sadly, economic survival has made the Filipino masses passive and indifferent to the value of sovereignty and the need to fight for their rights. Such atttitude has largely been the outcome of a monopolist, capitalist, and elitist economic structure. Unlike in the past, the Filipino people of today are more concerned about daily survival than the importance of asserting their rights over the disputed territories in the West Philippine Sea (Mariano, 2012). The deterioration of the revolutionary sentiment among the Filipino people simply strengthened the position of the elite (Dor, 2016) who steadfastly supports foreign powers that, on the surface, genuinely want to help the Philippines win the battle over the disputed territories of the SCS. However, as proven by the long history of the struggle of the Filipino people against different colonisers, revolutionary mass movements must originate from 'below'-- the Filipino masses-- and not from outside forces (e.g. U.S. and Japan) that only seek to further their political and economic interests.
In conclusion, the SCS dispute comprises two narratives-- first, the struggle for territorial integrity and sovereignty between China and the Philippines and other Southeast Asian claimants and, second, the continuing global competition between China and the U.S. for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Apparently, the involvement of the U.S. is not at all benevolent; it seeks to defend its economic and security interests in the region. Unfortunately, the Philippines is being exploited as a 'pawn' to this rat race for global dominion. Thus, the Philippines has a crucial role to play in the eventual resolution of the SCS dispute, whether through bilateral relations with China or through formal arbitration.
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