Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) refer to a group of several neurodevelopment syndromes that havedisorders having a poorly understood etiology. Mental The term ASD has been used by several mental health professionals use the term ASD to represent not only classic autism but also Asperger syndrome, Rett syndrome, CDD and PDD-NOS (NHS 2012)—disorders that refer to syndromes that share the same impairments (Romero-Munguia 2013).HYPERLINK "http://en.plagiarismdetect.com/plagiarism/index/8c2ae26f5e9428176d21bb1f0bea960009307af6/25242?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ablockabove.com%2Fwhy-fluency" \t "_blank"Romero-Munguia 2013). These are autistic disorder, Asperger syndrome (AS), and pervasive developmental disorder – not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), also known as atypical autism (NHS 2012). ASD is characterized by developmental impairments in communication, social, and mental functioning alongside restricted stereotyped or repetitive behaviors (Beacher et al. 2012). People with ASDautism have impairedmarked impairment into social interaction that lead to restricted as well as impaired ability to distribute and share common experience with otherspeople (Brielmaier et al. 2012). On another note, their mode of communication is impaired regardless if it is verbal or non-verbal. In this case, their language development seems to be delayed and can be used inappropriately in the form of pragmatic contexts. Decoding of vital communication signals including emotional facial expressions and prosody are interrupted (Baron-Cohen 2009). Those suffering from ASD tend to have repetitive behavior to compensate for their lack of ability to interpret incoming events, and do not show attention to tasks that lie outside of their field of interest (Gil et al. 2012).
Three theories namely “theory of mind,” “ central coherence,” and “executive function” were are introduced to describeexplain the indicators of ASD (Romero-Munguia 2013). Meanwhile, “. However, the empathizing-systemizing” and “the mnesic imbalance” theories are the only ones that attempt to address all the core triadic symptoms of autismASD (Romero-Munguia 2013). This research intends to analyze the validity of each cognitive theory, and its limitations in explaining ASD. Studies of known experts in these disorders will be examined with emphasis on the tests they conducted to support their stance.
Theory of Mind
The theory of mind (ToM) of autism was introduced by Baron-Cohen and his associates. It provided a cohesive intellectual explanation for the major social and the verbal and nonverbal symptoms in ASD (Baron-Coehn 2001). ToM refers to the ability to surmise the totality of intellectual states that generates actions. These mental states include but are not limited to desires, imaginations, emotions, and beliefs. In short, having a theory of mind denotes the ability to cogitate on the substance of one's own and other's mind. Difficulty in understanding other mind is a core cognitive feature of ASD (Baron-Cohen 2001). Such deficit may underlie the social, communicative, and creative abnormalities that are indicative of the condition since a theory of mind is essential for normal development in each of these three regions (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997).
The ability to develop ToM develops from infancy through childhood and into adulthood. It forms the foundation for the acquisition of language, social and behavioral skills of children. Theory of mind includes the skill to realize that the symbols produced in one'sone’s mind is not necessarily a replica of reality, and that other people may hold different symbols. ToM is involved in all areas of daily living and social interactions, and at the same time underlies the capacity to follow directions and understand socially based data. ToM also triggers the skill to influence and deceive others.
Baron- Cohen (2001) started the study by identifying between mental and physical entities on account that this distinction is a fundamental basis of ToM. Thisthe theory of mind. The test for this distinction required the subjectschildren to listen to stories in which one character is having a “mental experience,” while another character is having a “physical experience (Baron-Cohen 2001).”. The subjectschildren were laterthen asked to telljudge which of function each offunctions the two characters can perform. Whereas normal children three to four years old can easily make these judgments, thereby demonstrating comprehensiontheir good grasp of existential distinction between mental and physical entities,objects and events, those with ASDautism were found to be incapable of doing somaking such judgments (Baron-Cohen 1989a). In another test first designed by Wellman ad Estes (1986), the subjects were asked what the brain is for. Normal children, three to four years old, already knew that the brain is responsible for mental operations, while some were already aware that it has physical functions too. On the contrary, children with autism failed to cite any mental function of the brainbran (Baron-Cohen 1989a).
“First-order test”stests have to do with the acceptance that different people may notcan have similar opiniondifferent opinions about a similar scenario (Baron-Cohen 2001). Wimmer and Perner (1983) found that non-ASD children, four years old, can follow how different individuals might think differently about the world. They also noticed that when interpreting stories, even five year olds could tell what the characters could be thinking in a given situation. However, children with autism had difficulty shifting their perspective to decide on the thoughts of another person. They were only able to reportInstead they simply reported what they themselves know (Leslie and Frith 1988). Children with autism also failed the “second-order false belief tests (Baron-Cohen 1989b),” which required understanding that Sally thinks Mary thinks the ball is in the first basket, but both Sally and Mary are wrong (Alic 2009). In an experiment by Talwar and colleagues (2007), they learned that among children in elementary age, the skill to keep subsequent statements conform to an initial lie intensifies as they get older and that this is reflected in their scores in the “second-order false-belief tests (Baron-Cohen 1989a).”
Difficulty in the acquisition of ToM tends to explain the key indicators major symptoms of ASD, particularlyespecially the impairments in communicatingsocial reciprocity and relating to others, therefore presenting ancommunication, thus providing integrated account of the “cognitive systems”mechanisms that might have triggered the underlie several behaviors that typifydefine it (Tager-Flusberg 2007). However , the universality and uniqueness of ToM does not universally apply to all five disorders that fall under ASD. It also fails to explain impairments in autism is questioned, as well as the “way by which this theory could account for the earliest manifestations” of ASDautistic symptoms (Tager-Flusberg 2001). Furthermore, while Also, ASD is generally defined based on deficits in social and communicative processing, and repetitive behavior patterns,patterns. ToM does not cover these areas nor deal withdoes it explain some of the strengths that are typical of children with ASDautism (Tager-Flusberg 2007).
Most studies examining ToM in ASDautism placed emphasis on the developmentstransition that occurtakes place at the age of four, when children characteristically recognizeunderstand false belief. SuchThis limited standpoint seemedappeared to lessen a multifaceted social and mentalcognitive advancement to unconditional aptitudecategorical capacity indicated by the result ofpassing or failing a single test, hencethus supporting the thought that ASD could be describeddefined as the deficiencyabsence of a ToM. Yet in all experiments that have been performed,conducted, there are autistic subjects that passed the second-order false-belief test. Similarly, there are evidencesresearch has shown that older children with otherdifferent disorders failed this task, which demonstratedprovided evidence that the absence of ToM isdeficits are not commonuniversal and uniquespecific to ASDautism (Tager-Flusberg 2007).
Executive Functioning
“Executive functioning” (EF) is a collectiven umbrella term for tasks that include planning, effective memory, self control, consciousness, intellectual flexibility, and for the instigation and overseeing of action (Hill 2004). p. 26). While experts agree that EF problems do not have the tendency to produce ASD, they see the possibility that the level of difficulties in EF could haveplay a strong impactsignificant role in the development outcomes of children with autism, which incorporates social skills, adaptive behavior, and academic success. Others who have closely worked with autistic individuals noticed that they fail to doassociate some things on of their own because they struggle to regulate theirinability to achieve independence with enduring difficulties in regulating behavior and to adaptadapting to change (Howlin et al. 2000). Therefore, whether poor EF is essential in the emergence of basic ASD traitsemergency of core autistic features or is a merely an outcome of abnormal functions consequence of a early atypical input from another cognitive mechanism duringsystem, it has the early stage of life, it is likely to cause developmental impairments totendency to put a child with autism. at risk for poor developmental outcome.
Several theorists propose that progress in EF occurs through the “development of the prefrontal cortex” (Diamond 2006) and the “strengthening of prefrontal representations” in a manner that is dependent on experience (Greenough at al. 1987). This however was opposed by Miyake et al.and associates (2000), who suggest that development of attention control in children, or the ability to focus on a task and ignore irrelevant stimuli, is the basis of conflict in EF. Ruedasource HYPERLINK "http://en.plagiarismdetect.com/plagiarism/index/4d694cb154614feed69ac5866166ae2701354d6d/25242?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC3420556%2F" \t "_blank"of conflict in EF. Rueda et al. (2004) demonstrated significant advances during the preschool period in the “central attention network, which includes alerting, orienting and his peers (2004) demonstrated significant transitions in children in preschool age in the “central attention network,” which includes alerting, familiarizing, and attentional executive attention processes.” Developmental changes in attention are thought to provide children with greater executive control over their actions. On this notion, rate of progress in EF should be calculated by developments in “attentional capacities (Hill 2004).”
Recent progress in understanding EF development triggered the examination of individual differences in EF as a probable source of the diversity in outcomes in ASD. EF is directly related to another aspect of neurocognitiveneuro-cognitive development known to exist atypically in ASD, which is a theory of mind. Many studies report strong correlations between individual differences in ToM and EF tasks, while setting aside the effects of chronologicalage and mental age,IQ, in normal childrenpreschoolers and toddlers (Carlson et al. 2004). Several theorists suggested that the skills to monitor one's actions and to act by choice are vital for judgingreflecting on the behaviormental states of the self and other; hence, ToM is a result of EF (Moses 2001). Other research found that “early EF” skills are predictive of “later ToM” butother, HYPERLINK "http://en.plagiarismdetect.com/plagiarism/index/4d694cb154614feed69ac5866166ae2701354d6d/25242?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fpmc%2Farticles%2FPMC3420556%2F" \t "_blank"hence ToM is a result of EF (Moses 2001). Other research found that early EF skills are predictive of later ToM but early ToM skills are not the other way aroundpredictive of later EF (Hughes and Ensor 2007), supporting the notion that EF is critical to transitionaldevelopmental changes in ToM.
In order that executive function can be accepted as a cognitive account of the primary symptoms of autism, difficulties in EF must be a universal trait of ASD; that is, they must be a characteristic of each autistic individual (Hill 2004). To date, a number of researchers have found that their tests of EF have not identified impairments in subjects, although this does not automatically denote that the universality of EF in autism can be disqualified. Still, EF cannot be considered a diagnostic indicator for ASD due to the fact that it is also found in neurodevelopmentalneuro-developmental disorders besides autism (Hill 2004).
Central Coherence Theory
ASD is characterized by specific inconsistencies in the processing of information at different levels in autism (Frith 1989). Normal individuals appear to do this by drawing together data to build higher-level of interpretation, usually by compromisingoften at the expense of attention to or memory for details (Frith 1989). This tendency is identified by Bartlett (1932) referred to this tendency as the “drive for meaning,” and that which Frith (1989) coined as the “central coherence (CC).” Example is the tendency to recall the general idea of a story, but quickly losing the actual surface form (Frith and Happe 1994). Another is the ability of ease with which individuals to quickly getrecognize the gist ofcontextually appropriate sense of the many indistinct words used in daily conversationsspeech (Frith and Happe 1994). Individuals with ASD were hypothesized to show weak CC, which means that they do not objectively process “featural and local information,” and fail to obtain the essence or see the big picture in everyday life (Happe and Frith 2006). This “processing bias” was evident in early work on “verbal memory,” showing little benefit from context, and precise rather than corrected repetition (Happe and Frith 2006). Shah and Frith (1983) evaluated ASD and non-ASD individuals in terms of their visuo-spatial skills. They observed that the ASD group performed better than the non-ASD group in disembedding, and showed greater dependence on adjoining objects in extracting patterns (Happe and Frith 2006).
Shah and Frith (1983) also set off to look at the assumed perceptual impairments. They usedsued 20 autistic children, with mean age of 13 and “non-verbal mental age” of 9.6, and 20 normal children aged nine as subjects. The children were given the Embedded Figures Test, slightly modified to adapt to their level. The test required the subjects to identifyinvolved spotting a hidden figure concealed inamong a bigger logical picture.larger meaningful drawing. The autistic children scored higher than the other group, 21 out of 25. They were easily able to pick ease and speed with which the autistic group picked out the hidden figure, which indicates study indicated their acumen inrapid style of locating tiny objects and in discerning even the littlesttheir immediate discovery of minute changes in familiar arrangements (Shah and Frith 1983).
CC in children with autism was also demonstrated using the Block Design subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales (Frith and Happe 1994). The test required breaking up of line drawings into plausible items, so that each part can be used to rebuild the original drawing. The drawings are marked with structural features, and the difficulty which most individuals experience with this task is induced by the problems in disintegrating the whole design into the constituent blocks. Autistic individuals showed superior performance in this test compared to other people their age because of their superior general spatial skills (Frith and Happe 1994). Shah and Frith (1993) suggested, on the basis of the CC theory, that the advantage shown by autistic individuals is due specifically to their skill to see parts over wholes. They presumed that normal individuals, but not those with autism, would benefit from pre-segmentation of the designs. Weak CC is viewed as addressing the featuresaspects of ASD that other theories have overlookedneglected, such as “areas of talent, super-acute perception, and lack of generalization (Happe and Frith 2006).” While weak CC presents significant advantages in tasks were preferential processing of parts over wholes is helpful, it cannot be expected to suit tasks that entail processing of individual information in terms of global context. One example is the recognition of faces, which appearsseems to implicateinvolve both “featural and configural mechanismsprocessing (Tanka and Farah 1993).”
Empathizing-Systemizing Theory
The empathizing-systemizing theory (E-S) tacklesexplains the social and verbalcommunication impairments in ASD in connection with deficiency in empathy, while explaining the areas of strength in connection with advanced ability to systematizeskill in systemizing (Baron-Cohen 2002). Most people believe that ToM is only a cognitive elementcomponent of empathy in that it is constrained at identifying mental states of the self and others (Baron-Coehn 2009). However, ToM fails to address second component of empathy, which is the ability to demonstrate appropriate emotional reaction to the thoughts and feelings of another person (Davis 1994).
On a test performed by Baron-Cohen (2009), results showed that individuals with autism spectrum conditions scored lower on the empathy quotient than the normal group. As per the E-S theory, ASD is best explained not just in connection with reference to below average empathy but also withto a second psychological factor, which is systemizing. Systemizing is either standard or above standard in individuals with ASD (Baron-Cohen 2006). It is the discrepancy between empathizing and systemizing that determines if an individual is at risk of developing ASD. Systemizing is the skill to evaluateanalyze or institute systems. Since a system is based on rules, people identify the rules that preside over the system when they systemize in order that they can predict how the system will work (Baron-Cohen 2006). Examples of systems are mechanical, numerical, abstract, natural, social and motoric. In all these cases, a person systemizes by observing structures and rules (Baron-Cohen 2006).
In one study, children with ASDautism performed above the level that is expectedthan one would expect for their age on a Physics assessmentphysics test (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). In another experiment using systemizing quotient (SQ), it was found that childrenpeople with “high -functioning autism” and Asperger syndrome score higher on the SQ than the normal population (Baron-Cohen et al. 2003). They also score above average on a test of discoveringidentifying how a Polaroid camera operates,works, even though they found it hard to perceive the thoughts and feelings of other people (Perner et al. 1989).
The E-S theory is valued for explaining both the social and non-social aspects of ASD (Baron-Cohen 2009). Social and communication deficiency is marked by below average empathy, whereas narrow interest, restricted behavior,behaviour, and resistance to change are marked by average or above average systemizing. The reason is that when systemizing, it is easiest to keep everything steady, and change one thing at a time. E-S theory also helps characterize the unique profile of ASD. Individuals with ASD show the disassociation between empathy and their superior systemizing drive. Further, it allows seeing individual differences in autism and AS, rather than seeing their impairments as categorically distinct (Baron-Cohen 2009).
On the other hand, E-S theory is criticized for presenting limited evidences, although it does make predictions; forpredictions. For instance, it predicts that we should anticipateexpect individuals with autism to prefer predictable over unpredictablyunpredictable activity, or patterned over un-patterned data (Baron-Cohen 2009). Also, E-S theory may only be applicable to “high-functioning” individuals with ASD (Baron-Cohen 2009).. This suggests how much more difficult it is to test empathy and systemizing in “low-functioning” individuals with ASD (Baron-Cohen 2009).
Mnesic Imbalance Theory
The mnesic imbalance (MI) hypothesis suggests that all triadic symptoms of ASD may be explained by cognitive disorders attributed to the disparityimbalance between a malfunctioning “procedural memory” and a well-relatively maintained “declarative memory (Romero-Munguia 2008).” To further explain the statement, the majority of ASD symptoms may be noted as attempts to make upcompensate for the deficiency in “lack of procedural learning skill (Romero-Munguia 2008).”. But because some autistic children are able to repeat statements they heard a long time ago word for word, which confirms their excellent rote memory, Kanner (968) asked if excessive information is, in one way or the other, responsible for the development of ASD. On the other hand, contemporary scholars suggested a memory deficit in autism (Goldberg 1987), which should make it difficult for individuals with autism to retain information. Another proposed that each skill pertains to a different type of memory, and therefore did not contradict that of Goldberg in 1987. One type is called the “declarative memory,” which allows individuals to “consciously remember facts and events,” while the other is termed “procedural memory,” which enables individuals to perform actions automatically (Robertson 2004).”
Hermelin and O’ConnerO'Conner (1970) suggested that children with ASDautism store information without the thought required for its use in verbal communication. They have taken into account the likelihood of a deficient abstract memory. Also, Goldberg (1987) inferred that hyperlexic children with precocious ability to read words and numbers or those with other mentalsavant syndromes have “procedural memory” that are not working well, althoughbut their “declarative memory” is undamaged. These are what many experts use to explain the restricted behaviors and the inability of children with ASD to manipulate information. Additionally, Gustafsson (1997) trusted that “procedural memory” normally consists of vital features, but that it contains both relevant and insignificant details in individuals with autism, for example, the color of the tiles in any bathroom. However, this proposal does not follow the inherent nature of “procedural memory (Gustafsson 1997).”. To the contrary, an imbalance between procedural and declarative memories describes the symptoms of ASD based on the disposition of memory, even in children without “islets of ability (Mostofsky et al 2000).” This notion is in harmony with data from numerous experiments. In one of these experiments, using the Serial Response Time Task (SRTT), which is a type of procedural learning task, results implied that acquisition of procedural knowledge for individuals with high-functioning ASD is not good (Mostofsky et al. 2000). In an evaluation of the skill to identify words from among a given list in the test, subjects with autism appeared to have better declarative memory than normal individuals (Beversdorf et al. 2000).
In order to assess the potential effect of a defective “procedural memory” in the psychological and behavioral functioning of autism in childhood, declarative and procedural memories were studied in ASD and non-ASD patients with diverse receptive-expressive language disorder (Romero-Munguia 2008). It was found that receptive language of the subjects was below the level expected for their age. However, the lack of procedural memory and the positive correlation between ASD symptoms and “declarative memory” gains statistical relevance only in the group with autism (Romero-Munguia 2008). This implies that autism is not caused by defective “procedural memory,” but by the imbalance between the two types of memories. This interpretation was also supported by Ullman (2001) who assumed that mental lexicon is affected by “declarative memory.” Moreover, the somewhat involuntary nature of the responses of children with ASD to instrumental motions performed by others indicates that “gestural responses are a measure of procedural memory (Frith 1989).” Another study that used the Autism Behavior Checklist showed the same result. The subjects with ASD scored significantly higher than the non-ASD group (Romero-Munguia 2008). However, there is still a need to investigate further on the applicability of the mnesic imbalance theory to the aspects of language that are based on declarative versus procedural memory.
Conclusion
Poor social skills, communication deficiency, and repetitive behaviorbehaviour form the triadic symptoms of autism spectrum disorders. Scholars introduced different theories to explain the presence of these impairments, but none is able to comprehensively address all that is essential to understand ASD.autism. It is apparent that cognitive theories do not provide a full explanation of autism spectrum conditions either because they lack supporting evidences, or that their reasons are ambiguous.
The theory of mind helpshelped explain the nature of impairments of children with autism in terms of their social, behavioral, and communication skills (Frith and Happe 1994). However, ASDautism is not merely aboutlimited to the core triadic symptoms. Other thoughts on the characteristic of ASD alone. Clinical impressions include limited range“restricted repertoire of interests, obsessive desire for sameness, islets of interest, exceptional memorization skill,ability, idiot savant abilities, excellent rote memory, and obsessionpreoccupation with parts of objects (Frith and Happe 1994). All of these non-triad aspects of autism are clearly reported by parents and health professionals involved in the care of autistic individuals, but are not tackled in the ToM..
EF studies and those that reflect naturalistic situations in autism need to be investigated. This could substantiate shed light to the prevalenceuniversality of EFexecutive dysfunction to ASD,autism, and explain howalso to the impact of social aspects of tasks contribute to thethat could cause increased difficulty of autistic individuals in gaining independence.autism. It will also help to provide empirical demonstration of the methods by which different aspects of EF correlate and fractionate in autism, and if this maps clearly onto the patterns seen in normal individuals (Hill 2004). Until EF theorists can prove its universality in all five categories of ASD, EF remains imperfect.
The theory that individuals with autism show weak central coherence appearstends to support the idea thatdescribe both their impairments and superiorthe outstanding skills can be explained byof autism as resulting from a “single characteristic” of perceptioninformation processing (Frith and Happe 1994). CC theory may be used to make sense to a body of experimental work not fully elucidated by the theory of mind. The CC account of autism is still not final and suffers from a certain degree of overextension. It is not clear where the boundaries of this theory should be drawn. The CC theory may benefit from defining the level at which coherence is weak in autism.
Empathizing-systemizing theory posits excellent attention to detail, in perception and memory. It is on account that systemizing entails paying attention to minute details, since individuals with ASD considers that eachdetails. Each detail in a system couldmight be important (Baron-Cohen 2009), like pieces of a puzzle.2009). The E-S theory assumespredicts that the subjectsautistic individual may be able to appreciate a global context whenachieve an excellent understanding of a whole system, given the chanceopportunity to closely observe and scrutinizecontrol all elements involvedthe variables in an object or event.that system. The existence of known talents in mathematics like Jerry Newporttalented mathematicians with AS like Richard Borcherds confirms this hypothesisthat such individuals can integrate the details into a true understanding of the system (Baron-Cohen 2003).
Finally, the mnesic imbalance theory proposes that all triadic symptoms of autism may be explained by cognitive disorders underlyingdue to the disparitymnesic imbalance between a defective “procedural memory” and a well-preserved “declarative memory” justify the existence of the triadic symptoms (Romero-Munguia 2008). In other words, the majority of autism symptoms may be viewed as efforts to make up for the deficits in procedural learning (Romero-Munguia 2008), while the sensory disturbances and other symptoms may be directly explained by faulty procedural memory (Gupta and Cohen 2002). Further empirical studies are required to address the aspects of language that are based on these two types of memory..
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