Calvin Stark tested positive for HIV in 1988 and received counseling on the infection which included a discussion of engaging in future safe sex, risks associated with the spread of the disease as well as the important of informing sexual partners of his infected status. Stark continued to engage in sexual practices in disregard of his counseling advice, as a result, a physician who had treated Stark issued an order for Stark to discontinue his practice. This order was issued according to a Washington State law which allows physicians to protect the health of others. Stark refused to cease his actions so the physician reported Stark to law enforcement who charged him with three counts of second degree assault according to Washington State law. State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1992).
Stark’s attorney filed a motion to suppress the physician’s testimony and other information obtained during the investigation as the information was confidential and should not have been disclosed. These motions were denied and Stark was found guilty of all counts. Stark received a sentence of 120 months on count I and 43 months each on counts 2 and 3. Stark appealed. State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1992).
Issue
Did the physician violate Washington Statute when he presented information of Stark’s HIV status to prosecutors? If so, should the physician’s testimony been admitted into testimony?
Was there sufficient evidence concerning the required elements of assault to convict Stark?
Was the statute that allowed for Stark’s conviction unconstitutionally vague?
Was Stark’s sentence improper?
Was Stark properly charged under the assault statute?
Rule
The confidentially provision of the law is intended to protect the privacy and dignity of individuals diagnosed with HIV. It does not preclude the protection of public safety.
Sufficient evidence exists when a trier of fact can find elements of the crime exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
A statue is not unconstitutionally vague just because an individual cannot determine with exact certainty when his or her actions become prohibited under the specific law.
A sentence is improper if it is not supported by the record or clearly excessive. A sentence that is exceptional must be imposed for reasons that are substantial and compelling. Future dangerous is not a factor for justifying an exceptional sentence in cases that do not involve sexual offenses.
General and specific statute rules that allow a more specific rule to prevail over a more general rule only apply to statutes that concern the same subject matter.
Application
The physician notified the prosecutor of Stark’s failure to abide by the cease and desist order and the prosecutor used the information to file criminal charges against Stark in order to protect the health and safety of the public from further actions by Stark. State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1992).
Assault requires the element of intentional infliction of bodily harm. Stark contents that he did not intentionally inflict bodily harm and there is no evidence showing that he did. However, there is evidence that Stark is HIV position, that he engaged in sexual conduct with others while HIV positive and that he admitted to engaging in sexual conduct with others while HIV position. State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1992).
Stark claims that the statute the assault statue is unconstitutional vague because it does not specifically define the conduct that is prohibited; specifically, the statute does not state that transmitting or exposing HIV is a crime. The statute does allow an individual to understand criminal conduct and that engaging in conduct that can result in another contracting HIV is criminal. State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1992).
Imposing an exceptional sentence required the presence of substantial and compelling justifications. The court relied on future dangerousness to find this justification yet the court has previously head that future dangerous is not a factor for justifying an exceptional sentence in cases that do not involve sexual offenses. Also, there is no evidence that the victims have contracted HIV. State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1992).
Stark claims that the specific rule concerning the cease and desist of his behavior should prevail over the general assault law. However, this only applies to laws that are similar in subject matter. The two laws of which one is criminal and the other civil do not concern the same subject matter. State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1992).
Conclusion
The physician’s disclosure of information was not improper.
There was sufficient evidence that Stark intended to cause bodily harm.
The statute was not constitutional vague
The sentence imposed upon Stark was excessive.
Stark was appropriately charged under the criminal assault law.
References
