This author, Paul Forage, uses sources that are relevant to the time period he is writing the article and these include books and journal articles touching on previous similar wars in the Chinese history. Further, the author also mentions military manuals and information about some of the commanders he mentions in his work and who played a significant role in the war between Song and Xi Xia. The author has however not expressly mentioned most of these sources relied upon but has effectively highlighted and even expounded on each and every one of them in the footnotes and endnotes. Arguably, these sources stand out in supporting the assertions and arguments made by the author. The main advantage of relying on these sources is that they help one to back up their arguments or points and hence add credibility and authenticity to their original thoughts in their work. However, the main limitation of these sources is that they may not clearly give a proper description of the events that took place unlike primary sources such as interviews with someone who actually took part in the war or had a close relative of theirs having taken part. There may also be biases in the arguments presented in some of these sources. The author has tried to deal with some of these prejudices by giving his own critical analysis of the source. For instance, the author has offered an analysis of the reasons given by the editors of the History of Wars in China as to the explanation for the failure of the Chinese invasion.
On the significance of the war between the Northern and Southern China, the author argues first that the war is a representation of a culmination of the power of the Song Empire over the Xi Xia dynasty. According to him, despite the invasion being unsuccessful in the end, it does not in any way represent military weakness of the Chinese since at a point, they actually came close to totally exterminating and neutralizing the Xi Xia. Therefore, he believes that if the war had extended a bit longer, the Chinese under the leadership of the Shen Zong would have won the war as thy were on the verge of doing so just before they ran out of provisions and were outsmarted by military intelligence. Additionally, it is the author’s argument that the Sino-Tangut war of 1081-1085 or and its outcome had foreign policy significance as it shows the kind of constraints that the balance of power in northern China had on Tangut and its leadership including other tribe like the Khikan and even the Chinese themselves. Moreover, this rivalry for a balance of power and constant wars in north China was important in the subsequent centuries as it “created a competitive, dynamic situation that encouraged innovation, both military and economic, with repercussions far beyond the battlefields in north China.” From the text and language of the article, the most persuasive argument that the author makes to support his thesis is the argument that the cavalier, unintelligent and short sighted dismissal of the strength that the Xi Xia army wielded by the Song commanders such as Chong E, represented a very big error on their part that eventually led to their defeat by the Xi Xia army and the failure to capture Tangut. What makes this argument persuasive is the fact that it supports the author’s earlier in-text observations of the short-sightedness of some of the military decisions that the ShenZong’s army made such as failure to learn from the history of war with the Xi Xia and their military tactics. An illustration of this shortcoming is given by the testimony of emperor before he died at Yongle to the effect that their own mistake had cost them the war. Moreover, the author notes that the strategy of taking the provisions of the enemy and thus depriving them of them of useful supplies to sustain themselves as was used by the Xi Xia army against the Song army was the best in ensuring success. In addition to this, the author argues that another strategy that ensured that the Xi Xia army prevailed against the Song army involved defending the kingdom from within and never attacking Song‘s army and then withdrawing backwards, leaving only scorched earth without any provisions to sustain the enemy.
The article by Forage is based on the period between the tenth and eleventh century when two major Chinese tribes and dynasties, the Song and Xi Xia were engaged in a battle to retain control of the capital of the Tangut. The decision to go to war with the Xi Xia was made after an extensive discussion at the Song court. The planning of the war would then take place at the command of Shenzong to General Chong E and Shen Gua after a discussion of the secret on how best to attack Xi Xia. However, despite initial success of the Song army, they were eventually overpowered by the Xi Xia army due to poor military strategy and deprivation of their essential provisions. The primary military objective of the Chinese invasion of the Xi Xia dynasty was the capture of the Tangut capital.
In conclusion, it may be argued that the author has succeeded in proving his thesis that the Sino-Tangut war between the Chinese Song and Xi Xia had both political and economic impacts on the Chinese tribes and military since it led to innovations in military tactics and also improved the economic agricultural economy of the Xi Xia dynasty due to the success over the Shenzong’s empire. Moreover, through this article, the author has successfully brought out the factors that led to the defeat of the Chinese by the Xi Xia army.
Works Cited
Forage, Paul. "The Sino-Tangut war of 1081-1085." Journal of Chinese Affairs (1991): 1-25. Print.
