2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
P1. The Global financial crisis of 2008
Severe distresses within some financial markets during 2007/08 resulted in international financial crisis following Lehman Brothers filing for the chapter 11 on 15th September 2008. As an end result, the globe has in recent times experienced the most horrible economic performance ever since the 2nd World War. This crisis emanated from the American market for the housing. The house prices were highest in the year 2006 and subsequently dropped beyond 30 %. This happens to be the greatest decline ever since 1930s on a national level across the US. The household debt increased drastically over the ancient times decades as well as during the final phase of that boom that is called the sub-prime lending, meaning lending to the low earning borrowers, increased quickly. During 2007first half, losses from the sub-prime mortgages uncovered great weaknesses within financial markets. The BNP Paribas, as an example, was pushed to freeze redemption of three funds which were invested within structured products. Market for the products had stopped to function, hence making it not possible to value them. The counterparty risk that is between banks increased sharply. Interbank rates, which are the rate of interest which banks loan to one another, soared. From an averaged about twenty basis points over the treasury bills (TED-spread) within the Euro Zone as well as about 40 within US, this spread increased to 100 base points in Euro Zone as well as almost 200 in the US during the early phase of the crisis. The liquidity troubles within the market strained central banks into offering liquidity in many forms. But, problems as well as losses persisted to rise during the drop of 2007 as well as in the month of December and the central banks of five key currency areas declared coordinated measures that were designed to tackle pressures within short-run funding markets. At the begging of spring in 2008, the problems within the short run funding market led to the nationalization of the Northern Rock at UK. In the US, a very harsh liquidity shortage in Bear Stearns during the month of March provoked JP Morgan Chase toward agreeing to purchase the Stearns in a transaction that was facilitated by US authorities (Berkmen 7).
The losses within the US market of housing caused a market confidence in the two enterprises sponsored by the government, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to vanish and consequently US government itself had to obtain control of these enterprises by 7th September. After one week, on 15th September, the Lehman Brothers took action and filed for the chapter 11, leading to an international loss of self-confidence in the whole financial system. The TED-spreads increased to an extraordinary level, the credit financial markets froze and asset prices were plummeted. The institutions requiring cash were forced to sell in a fire sale costs, pushing the asset prices still lower, pushing for more asset sales. A fierce circle for asset price depreciation commenced (Adrian & Shin 5).
The names and the list of the failed or the almost failed huge financial institutions got longer and even longer: Fannie Mae, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Freddie Mac, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, several Icelandic banks, Fortis, ABN-Amro, Hypo Real Estate, RBS etc. The governments had to be involved in with many rescue operations so as to avoid a meltdown for the whole international financial system (Claes 2).
Causes
Low inflation as well as low rates of interest
The very last decades were featured by an abnormally high level of the macroeconomic stability. A steady growth that combined with a stable and low inflation was experienced across majority of the highly developed economies.
High risk taking
The rise in debt demand was not harmonized by increase in the bank deposits. Thus, banks were to find funding elsewhere. The Financial institutions hence built up liquidity risks at a great scale.
The failure to tackle financial cycle
Majority of central banks, especially US Federal Reserve, careful thought that they ought not to respond towards the rapid increase in credit as well as prices of asset. This approach had its base on a perception that they were not in a position to identify asset price fizz, while if they were in a position, it could be very dangerous to strive to reduce it – though they could lessen the deflationary impact in the economy as a result of fall within the asset prices.
Financial innovations raised complexity
The rising use of originate as well as distribute model for lending meant also that lenders had less incentive in applying strict controls of credit as loans were all expected to stay only on the lenders’ balance sheets just for short time.
System-broad risks underestimated
Developments within the financial markets in over the past twenty years in some aspects had twisted the financial system to be more vulnerable towards market shocks.
In a financial market that was stable, banks used not to take full account for any potential spill-over impact of failure for counter-party towards the other financial system.
Whenever financial markets experienced broader disruption, the participants of market over-compensated, for instance, stopped to lend the creditworthy counterparties.
Inadequate management of risk
The Financial institutions depended very much on the data from recent past as an indicator for the future performance of the market.
The agents of credit rating failed to assess risks
Failure of credit rating agents as well as investors to completely evaluate or even understand financial risks for the new products that are complex contributed to that crisis.
The remuneration systems used to spurred risk taking
The financial institution practices regarding compensation which reinforced the lax underwriting as well as excessive taking of risk also had been contributing to that financial crisis.
Banks regulations on circumvented capital demand
One perceived benefits for securitization used to be that risks used to be moved from the banks to the other sectors of a financial system. Thus, to some level the banks could be able to avoid some capital ratio policies so as to reduce the capital amount that they were demanded to hold.
Procyclical conditions of credit
The systemic risks all are built over given period of time. During the upturn, the banks were very confident and they eased the credit conditions. During the downturn, converse happened. The movement between the credit conditions as well as economic cycle is known as pro-cyclicality, because it amplifies that cycle. The nature of pro-cyclical regarding risk-taking within the financial markets hence resulted to banks becoming more leveraged and more extended during good times, resulting to making the whole markets very vulnerable to change in a sentiment.
Government policies decreased credit control
The government policy in some nations had been focusing on raising the home ownership. In the US, for example, the need to raise the standard of homeownership resulted to huge increase of the sub-prime mortgage lending, that later resulted to the crisis.
No one was responsible or understood the system-broad risks
In US as well as the EU, supervisory frameworks were fragmented but lacked sufficient efficiency and coherence.
Lack of international coordination and harmonization
Regulatory systems across individual nations could not maintain the pace for the internationalization of the credit markets as well as growth for the international banking.
Supervisors could not understand the risks or even that banks overlooked capital requirements
The other inherent issue which proved as significant was the arbitrage regulatory which imperfect regulation for the banking contributed.
Governments guarantee for financial system
Prior to that crisis, the market participants alleged that there used to be a hidden guarantee from the governments that incase systemically significant institution could fail; governments could use the public funds so as to save such an institution. (Adrian & Shin 8).
P2. The audit report lag
General
Audit delay refers to the number of the days beginning the end of a firm’s fiscal to when the auditor’s report is issued (Ashton et al. 659). The study by Afify (65) provided empirical evidence in relation to ARL of the companies that are listed on CASE in year 2007, by identifying impact of the CG traits on the ARL. The analysis on the companies showed that the mean of the ARL is over 67 days. ARL for every one of the 85 sampled firms ranged from minimum 19 days interval to maximum 115 days interval and the Egyptian listed firms take an average of about two months. Results further indicated that the board independence, existence of he audit committee and the duality of the CEO have a significant effect on ARL. However, ownership concentration is not significantly related to ARL. Further, three control variables had a significant effect on ARL. The three include company size, profitability and industry, but a type of the auditor was not found to have significant association with ARL (Afify 2009)
When making plan for their work, normally they assess and collect audit evidence at a point whereby its view on financial statements, the auditors ought to consider the risk of the material misstatement because of fraud or even error (AICPA 5). A responsible auditor undertakes audit planning so as to obtain a reasonable degree for certainty the absence or presence of the material misstatement for financial statements because of error and fraud. If the financial statement presented reflects a heritage, then the auditor has got two alternatives: to either express an adverse or qualified, or even to withdraw (Mustapha & Che-Ahmad 425). Thus, if the auditor who is responsible for the auditing standards then do not detect at all any distortions in the financial statements content, they are responsible because of obtaining a reasonable assurance in that the materiality for misstatements was well observed (Bamber & Schoderbek 15; Myers, Myers, & Omer, 783). Further, the management is responsible for line preparation as well as presentation of a financial statement as well as the dimension of detecting and preventing anomalies within a good organization as well as proper functioning for the accounting and the internal system control (Nicolae & Ionela 142; Munro, & Stewart; 385). The care needed in those two practices results to the lag.
During the crisis
An element that is pertinent to the studies on the audit lag involves availability of the personnel. Knechel & Payne (67) found that use of the less experienced employees associates with longer report delays. In the same manner, Behn et al. (70) found that lack of sufficient personnel both at client and the audit firm have hindrance on shortening the reporting times. The personnel sufficiency issue could have been critical during the study’s period. There is also emphasis on time pressures as stemming from the SOX implementation as well as the liability increase fears among the auditors.
During as well as after GFC, many regulators, investors, as well as market participants claimed that the auditors were properly not fulfilling their task as watchdogs by the fact that they were not offering what they perceived to be adequate warning in audit reports prior to companies filing for bankruptcy (Sikka 870; McTague 3; Woods & Humphrey 120).
Financial system requires increased transparency regarding too many aspects. First being that some players of financial market, like hedge funds, play a key role in the mediation, though are not held by the strict rules concerning reporting. The establishment of the regulations regarding their activities as well as how to make report could reduce volatility at times when the market situation worsens (Nicolae & Ionela, 140).
Marshall, Geiger & William (62) wanted to study and investigate whether the auditors’ going-concern modified opinion (GCO) choices were less likely following the beginning of the latest Global Financial Crisis. (GFC). They realized that, after taking control of other factors that related to the GCOs, propensity of the auditors to give a GCO proceeding to a bankruptcy considerably increased following the start of GFC. Additional tests shows similar outcome when there is a separate examination for clients of Big 4 as well as non-Big 4 organizations, suggesting that both sized organizations significantly raised the probability of giving a going-concern modified opinion (GCO) towards a consequently bankrupt client following the launch of GFC (Leventis, Weetman & Caramanis 47; Lin, Pizzini & Mardhan 303).
Reporting the fact that an auditor has important concerns regarding a continued viability for their client may only exacerbate the already hard time for any financially struggling firm (Kida 511). But, it is during exactly those period when the users searches for an auditor for help in evaluating a continued viability for the firm. In that circumstance, many commenters contended that many businesses had already filed claims of bankruptcy without having yet received an earlier going-concern modified opinion (GCO) from the auditor following the start of GFC than instantaneously before it started (Woods et al. 150; Sikka 870).
With respect to a possible change in reporting behavior of auditor surrounding GFC, previous research indentified that considerable changes within the total United State business or even legal environment (which includes enactment of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, or Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) has association with major changes in the GCO reporting choices (Francis & Krishnan 143; Fargher & Jiang 59; Geiger & Raghunandan 190; Geiger, Raghunandan, & Rama 28).
In two studies that are related of the Australian auditors making report concerning decisions surrounding GFC, Xu, Fargher, Jiang & Carson (25) as well as Xu, Fargher, Carson, & Jiang (330) found that the GCOs significantly rose in Australia following the start of GFC.
PCAOB was very concerned about the GCO reporting throughout the time of GFC to the extent it gave the Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 3, stressing auditing risks that were coupled by that moment`s economic situation resulting from the deteriorating general economic circumstances, including realization that many companies than normally might be going through prolonged negative (-) financial outcome, or be on default for the loans or even other financial as well as business agreements, would be ultimately unable to carry on as a concern. The Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 3 did encourage auditors concerning the awareness of this likelihood and stressed requirements for SAS No. 59 as well as auditor’s responsibilities of reporting within the existence of ongoing concern’s uncertainties.
A major changes on the Australian audit situation in the recent time has been the several significant lawful actions that are brought against the auditors for passing opinions on a misleading report. With all the changes, there was increased pressure for auditors to deliver the going concern report and need to take more time to identify the risks that could affect the same (Knechel et al. 71).
P3. Audit lag
Why the lag is expected to be longer during the period
The GFC, as well as all the organizational failures led to increased criticism for the audit as a profession as well as increased pressure on the auditors to make improvements on the audit quality. Sikka (871) has raised questions regarding auditing practices since auditors failed to issue going-concern opinions or modified audit opinions for banks that shortly thereafter were revealed to have financial issues. Thus, GFC led to even a greater need for the auditors to center their attention on appropriateness of the going concern assumption. The reduced prospects of growth, decreased liquidity, as well as an impaired capability to refinance the debt or increase new funds may increase the business risk to an extent that the raised risk to continue like a going concern, also this ought to be reflected within an audit reports (Weil 4).
As it would be anticipated during the period of greater economic uncertainty, it`s found that proportion of an audit reports that contains modifications that are related to the going concern matters increases (Basioudis & Francis 150). Particularly, rates of modification rose from 12 percent during the period of 2005–2007 to 18 percent to 22 percent during the period of 2008–2009. It’s observed that firms within the materials, financial, as well as industrial division were actually the most probable to have been given a report that was modified (Bean 10). It’s found that the effect of GFC has narrowed, as showed by the fall in the rates of modification during the 2009 last quarter (Ashton 662).
(Xu et al., 26). Finally, a research on Australia carried out by Xu et al. (329) indentified that auditors had a higher propensity of issuing going-concern choices during the 2008-2009 in comparison to 2005-2007.
The study by Ashton, Willingham & Elliott (280) researched audit delay with reference to 14 variables that describe those companies including their auditor as well as several interaction types between the two parties (Abbott 6). Univariate analyses on the sample indicated that the audit delay could be significantly longer in companies that receive audit opinions that are qualified, are in industrial opposed to the financial industry sector, not traded publicly, have fiscal year-end different from December, features weak internal controls, applies less complex technologies in data-processing and are relatively greater in amount of the audit work to be performed after the year-end (Abbott 822; Breeden 10; Balsam, Krishnan & Yang 83; Dowling & Moroney 60; Gul, Jaggi & Krishnan 132; Spekle 107; Prawitt, Sharp & Wood 190; Prawitt et al. 1260).
Works cited
Abbott, L., Parker, S., Peters, F. and Rama, V. “Corporate governance, audit quality, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Evidence from internal audit outsourcing.” The Accounting Review, 82 (2007): 803–835.
Abbott, L. Parker, S., and Peters, G. “Serving two masters: The association between audit committee internal audit oversight and internal audit activities.” Accounting Horizons, 24 (2010): 1–24.
Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. Audit fee reductions from internal audit-provided assistance: The incremental impact of internal audit characteristics. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29.1 (2012): 94–118.
AICPA. Understanding the Entity and Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement. SAS No. 109. New York, NY: AICPA.
Ashton, R., Willingham, J. and Elliott, K. “An empirical analysis of audit delay”. Journal of Accounting Research 25 (1987 Autumn): 275–292.
Ashton, R. Graul, R. and Newton, J. “Audit delay and the timeliness of corporate reporting.”Contemporary Accounting Research, 5 (1989 Spring): 657–673.
Adrian, T. and Shin, H. “Liquidity, Monetary Policy and Financial Cycles.” Economics and Finance: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 14.1, 2007.
Afify H. "Determinants of audit report lag", Journal of Applied Accounting Research, 10.1 (2009): 56 – 86
Ashton, H., Willingham, J. and Elliott, R. “An Empirical Analysis of Audit Delay.” Journal of Accounting Research, 25.2 (Autumn,1987): 275-292.
Balsam, S., Krishnan, J., & Yang, J. “Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 22, (2003): 71–97.
Bamber, M. and Schoderbek, P. “Audit structure and other determinants of report lag: An empirical analysis.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 12 (Spring): 1–23.
Basioudis, I., & Francis, J. “Big 4 audit fee premiums for national and office-level industry leadership in the United Kingdom.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 26.2 (2007): 143–166.
Bean, C. “The Great Moderation, the Great Panic and the Great Contraction.” BIS Review 101/2009.
Behn, B. K., D. L. Searcy, and J. B. Woodroof. “A within-firm analysis of current and expected future audit lag determinants.” Journal of Information Systems, 20 (2006): 65–86.
Behn, B., Choi, J. & Kang, T. Audit quality and properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The Accounting Review, 83.2 (2008), 327–349.
Berkmen, P, Gelos, G, Rennhack, R and Walsh, J. “The Global Financial Crises: Explaining Cross-Country Differences in the Output Impact.” IMF Working Paper 09/280. 2009.
Breeden, R. “Testimony: Oversight Hearing on Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised By Enron and Other Public Companies. U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. (February 12). 2001. Web. 15, 2016. http://www.banking.senate.gov/02_02hrg/021202/breeden.htm
Bronson, S., Hogan, C., Johnson, F. and Ramesh, K. “The unintended consequences of PCAOB Auditing Standard Nos. 2 and 3 on the reliability of preliminary earnings releases.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, (February 2011): 95–114.
Bryan-Low, C. “Auditors fail to foresee bankruptcies: In study, many companies were cleared within a year before Chapter 11 filings.” Wall Street Journal, (July 11): C9. 2002.
Carcello, J., Hermanson, D. and Raghunandan, K. “ Factors associated with U.S. public companies’ investment in internal auditing.” Accounting Horizons 19 (2005): 69–84.
Chasan, E. “Going concern opinions on life support with investors.” CFO Journal, (Sept 12), 2012. Web. 15, 2016. http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/12/going-concern-opinions-on-life-support-with-investors/
Claes Norgren. “The Causes of the Global Financial Crisis and Their Implications for Supreme Audit Institutions: RISKREVISIONEN. Stockholm: Swedish National Audit Office. 2010.
Coram, P., J. Ng, and D. R. Woodliff. “The effect of misstatement on the propensity to commit reduced audit quality acts under time budget pressure.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23 (2004):159–167.
Davidson, R., J. Goodwin-Stewart, and P. Kent. Internal governance structures and earnings management. Accounting and Finance, 45.2 (2005): 241–267.
Doty, J. R. “Testimony concerning the role of the accounting profession in preventing another financial crisis.” U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment. Washington, DC, April 6. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 2011.
Dowling, C., & Moroney, R. “Auditor performance variation: Impact of sub-specialty knowledge differences between industry specialists.” Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research, 19, (2008): 59–80.
Dunn, K. & Mayhew, B. “Audit firm industry specialization and client disclosure quality.” Review of Accounting Studies, 9, (2004): 35–58.
Eriksson, C. “The EU Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis Consultant report.” Swedish National Audit Office. 2010.
Fargher, N. and Jiang, L. “Changes in the audit environment and auditors’ propensity to issue going-concern opinions.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 27.2 (2008): 55–77.
Ferguson, A., Francis, J. & Stokes, D. “The effects of firm-wide and office-level industry expertise on audit pricing.” The Accounting Review, 78.2 (2003), 429–448.
Ferguson, M. J., Seow, G. S., & Young, D. “Nonaudit services and earnings management: UK evidence.” Contemporary Accounting Research, 21.4 (2004): 813–841.
Francis, J. and Krishnan, J. “Evidence on auditor risk-management strategies before and after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.” Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, (9 December 2002): 135–158.
Geiger, M. and Raghunandan, K. “Bankruptcies, audit reports, and the Reform Act.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 20.1 (2001): 187–195.
Geiger, M., Raghunandan, K. and Rama, D. “Recent changes in the association between bankruptcies and prior audit opinions.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 24.1 (2005): 21–35.
Ghosh, A. and Tang, C. “Assessing financial reporting quality of family firms: The auditors' perspectives.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 60 (2015): 95–116.
Gul, F., Fung, S. & Jaggi, B. “Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors’ industry expertise.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47, (2009): 265–287.
Gul, F. Jaggi, B. & Krishnan, G. “Auditor independence: Evidence on the joint effects of auditor tenure and nonaudit fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 26.2 (2007): 117–142.
Haldane, A. “Banking on the State.” BIS Review 139, 2009.
Hammersley, J. “Pattern identification and industry-specialist auditors.” The Accounting Review, 8.2 (2006): 309–336.
Henderson, B, & Kaplan, S. “An examination of audit report lag for banks: A panel data approach.” Auditing, 19.2 (Fall 2000): 59-174.
Kanda, D. “Asset Booms and Structural Fiscal Positions: The Case of Ireland.” IMF Working Paper 10/57. 2010.
Kida, T. “An investigation into auditors’ continuity and related qualification judgments.” Journal of Accounting Research, 18.2 (1980): 506–523.
Klein, A. “Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33 (2002): 375-400.
Knechel, R. and Payne, J. “Additional Evidence on Audit Report Lag, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 20 (2001):17-146. 29
Knechel, R., Sharma, D. and Sharma, V. “Non-Audit Services and Knowledge Spillovers: Evidence from New Zealand”. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 39 (2012): 60-81.
Krishnan, J., and Yang, S. Recent Trends in Audit Report and Earnings Announcement Lags, Accounting Horizons, 23 (2009): 265-288.
Kwon, S. Y., Lim, C. Y., & Tan, P. “Legal systems and earnings quality: The role of auditor industry specialization.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 26.2 (2007), 25–56.
Lee, H. and Mande, V. “The effect of the Private Securities Reform Act of 1995 on accounting discretion of client managers of Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 22.1 (2003): 93–108.
Lee, H., Mande, V., & Son, M. “Do lengthy auditor tenure and the provision of non audit services by the external auditor reduce audit report lags?” International Journal of Auditing, 13, (2009): 87–104.
Leventis, S., Weetman, P. and Caramanis, C. “Determinants of Audit Report Lag: Some Evidence from the Athens Stock Exchange.” International Journal of Auditing, 9 (2005): 45-58.
Lin, S., Pizzini, M. and Mardhan, R. “The Role of the Internal Audit Function in the Disclosure of Material Weaknesses.” The Accounting Review, 86, (2011): 287-323.
Nicolae Todea and Ionela Cornelia Stanciu. “Auditor Liability in periods of Financial Crisis.” Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, 11.1 2009.
Mande, V. and Son, M. “Do Audit Delays Affect Client Retention?” Managerial Auditing Journal, 26 (2011): 32-50.
Marden, R. & Brackney, K. “Does increased flexibility increase audit risk?” The CPA Journal, 79.6 (2009), 32–36.
Marshall A., Geiger, K. Raghunandan, K. and William Riccardi. “The Global Financial Crisis: U.S. Bankruptcies and Going-Concern Audit Opinions.” Accounting Horizons, 28.1 (2014): 59–75.
McTague, J. Auditors in the doghouse. Barron’s Online, March 19. 2011.
Moroney, R. Does industry expertise improve the efficiency of audit judgment?” Auditing; A Journal of Practice and Theory, 26.2 (2007), 69–95.
Munro, L, and Stewart, J. “External Auditor’s Reliance on Internal Audit: The Impact of Sourcing Arrangements and Consulting Activities.” Accounting and Finance, 50, (2010): 371-387.
Mustapha, M., and Che-Ahmad, A. “Agency Theory and Managerial Ownership: Evidence from Malaysia.” Managerial Auditing Journal, 26, (2011): 419-436.
Myers, J. Myers, L. & Omer, T. “Exploring the term of the auditor–client relationship and the quality of earnings: A case for mandatory auditor rotation? The Accounting Review, 78.3 (2003):779–799.
Prawitt, D., Smith, L. and Wood, A. “Internal Audit Quality and Earnings Management.” The Accounting Review, 84 (2009): 1255 -1280.
Prawitt, D., Sharp, N. and Wood, A. “Does Internal Audit Contribution Affect the External Audit Fee?” Behavioral Research in Accounting, 23 (2011): 187-206.
Sikka, P. “Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors.” Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34 (2009): 868–873.
Spekle, R. Elten, H., and Kruis, Anne-Marie, K. “Sourcing of Internal Auditing: An Empirical Study.” Management Accounting Research, 18 (2007): 102-124.
U.S. House of Representatives. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. February 20. 1985. No. 99-17. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 1985.
U.S. House of Representatives. Hearings Before the Committee on Financial Services. March 13.Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 2002.
Woods, M., Humphrey, C., Dowd, K. and Liu, Y. “Crunch time for Banks? Questions of practice and the scope of dialog.” Managerial Auditing Journal, 24.2 (2009): 114–134.
Xu, Y., Jiang, A., Fargher, N. and Carson, E. “Audit reports in Australia during the global financial crisis.” Australian Accounting Review, 21.1 (2011): 22–31.
Xu, Y., Carson, E., Fargher, N. and Jiang. L. “Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis.” Accounting and Finance, 53.1 (2013): 301–338.
Weil, J. “Going concerns: Did accountants fail to flag problems at dot-com casualties?” Wall Street Journal (February 9): C1. 2001.
