Response Paper #1
At the Bendix Windsor facility, the occupational health and safety issues concerned asbestos dust. The facility produced and assembled a variety of auto parts including starter drives, brakes, and cylinders. Prior to become the Bendix plant, the building was used as a horse barn. It had poor ventilation and lighting. There was asbestos dust in the air due to shaking of filter bags which was done by hand and dust settled on the equipment. The asbestos was contained in the brake parts that the plant manufactured. Operators were exposed to high dust concentrations and the creation of dusty conditions. Workers were either completely unaware of the presence of asbestos or unaware of the dangers of asbestos.
Why did Bendix choose not to implement these changes and instead close its Argyle and Prince Road plants?’ Did Bendix intentionally transfer the risk and cost of occupational injury and disease to its workers?
Although Bendix claimed the closure of the plants were not associated with the asbestos, it seems many have inferred that it was the reason. Bendix claimed it was no economically feasible to continue operations but it seems that the pressure from the union and the actual true fact that the asbestos dust was causing cancer in its workers were more accurately the reason for closure. I do believe that Bendix intentionally transferred the risk and cost of occupational injury and disease to its workers because it did not want to face the cost of cleanup or health care of the workers inflicted with asbestos cancer.
In your opinion, did the union properly balance the economic needs and health and safety concerns of the workers?
Yes, I believe the union properly balanced the economic needs and the health and safety of the workers. There was no way that the union could have expected Bendix to close its plants as a result of pressure to improve working conditions relating to asbestos dust. In 1974, after an employee refused to work in unsafe conditions at Bendix, a collective agreement was reached the company agreed to take reasaonble measures to prevent occurrences of unsafe conditions. When tests consistently returned safe samplings from the government, the union expressed concern that the testing was not occurring during regular working conditions. The union pressured the company to make changes regarding the dust emissions. In 1977 negotiations, the union asked for a health and safety rep to work full time as well as more containment and cleanup of asbestos, and the company agreed only to the cleanup and containment requests. As a result, a strike ensued until a safety rep was appointed. The union continued its pressure on the company for changes and reported that three workers died from asbestos related death to the Workers Compensation Board. The company denied the allegations. The union was adamant about it allegations and the company was firm on its safe readings performed by the government. Eventually, workers became concerned about losing their jobs and the union had to back off from the pressure on the company and was only asking for the factory to be cleaned of the dust. In 1980, another employee had cancer associated with asbestos and the tension between the union and company rose. The union again mounted pressure upon Bendix to change the conditions. Instead of attempting to compromise, the company unexpectedly announced the closure of one plant and shortly after, the closure of the other.
Works Cited
Storey, Robert and Wayne Lewchuk. "From Dust to Dust to dust: Asbestos and the Struggle for Worker Health and Safety and Bendix Automotive." Labour/Le Travail (2000): 103-140.
