“Bismarckian Strategic Policy, 1871-1890,” in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. Successful Strategies: Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 214-240.
In this essay, I will argue the legacy and the leadership qualities of Otto Von Bismarck, the German ruler who was an influential and successful statesman in the modern nation-state system era. In the watch of Otto Von Bismarck, the Prussia expanded in the power and influence. He was also involved in the creation of Germany through a series of sharp and limited battles but the country remained in peace for over twenty years thereafter. All the authors who wrote about Bismarck always had some political axe to grind; they all wanted to show that the leader either was a success or a failure (Marcus 215). Bismarck himself took pains to forswear and explicit responsibility for the outcomes of his decision and policies. He repeatedly stated that “one cannot possible make history” while addressing many people who admired his leadership. It is learned from the case of Bismarck that success in the near term may well translate into a future failure, because the circumstances that contribute to the former are apt to change in ways no one can anticipate. It is also learned from the case of Bismarck that politics is a thankless job because everything depends on chance and conjecture (Marcus 217)
Vaevictoribus: Bismarck’s Quest for Peace in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870- 1871,” in Williamson Murray and James Lacey, eds. The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 177-207.
The Franco-Prussian War prefigured all the wars of the twentieth century although it did not entirely fulfill the paradigm. The war which was between the traditional European states did not last beyond the major battles and sieges in September and October of 1870. The war is known to have been totalized; whereby victory comes in crushing the will of the nation and not defeating the enemy forces. What helped wage the war is the trust that the Prussian king had towards Bismarck (Marcus 178). If the war had perceived, a lot of Germans and French would have massacred themselves to death. But Bismarck intervened and helped end the war. Moreover, the war would have brought the other European powers into war. It is only Bismarck who possessed political fortitude and strategic insight to assert the primary of politics over military concerns. He reached out to his French counterparts and strived for an end to what could have become a catastrophe to Europe. Assuming the war did not end, Bismarck’s diplomacy in ensuing era depended less on the threat of war than on artful persuasion and persistence (Marcus 180). He worked assiduously to convince other European powers that the existing constellation of power was the most advantageous and that all stood to lose the war.
Marcus Jones, “Strategy as Character: Bismarck and the Prusso-German Question, 1862-1878,” in Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey, eds. The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 79-110
Germany is situated at the heart of Europe. Europe cannot live without its heart. Bismarck played a significant role in ensuring that there is peace in Europe. He ensured that all battles were resolved before they worsen. It is deplorable of the false picture that people have created of Bismarck in the in the world. Bismarck had unique skills at creating trust in the world, directly the opposite of the current world (Marcus 80). In real sense, his great gifts were diplomacy of the highest degree and moderation. His decisions and policies established the groundwork for the most important geopolitical events of the twentieth century, and his principal creation, a German nation-state at the heart of Europe. Bismarck was a man of puzzling contradictions and vast ambitions. He had a grandiose sense of his own importance and his career presents each new generation with a fresh set of problems and perspectives (Marcus 84).
Works Cited
Marcus Jones, “Strategy as Character: Bismarck and the Prusso-German Question, 1862-1878,” in Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey, eds. The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 79-110
“Vaevictoribus: Bismarck’s Quest for Peace in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870- 1871,” in Williamson Murray and James Lacey, eds. The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 177-207.
“Bismarckian Strategic Policy, 1871-1890,” in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. Successful Strategies: Triumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 214-240.
