Introduction
Many philosophers have identified various branches of egalitarianism. One such branch is the luck egalitarianism philosophy, which recognizes distinctive interpretations and critiques. Elizabeth Anderson formulates a distinctive branch of egalitarianism that opposes luck egalitarianism, namely the democratic equality philosophy. This essay will first delineate the main points of Anderson’s opposition to luck egalitarianism and democratic equality. After this review, there will be applied an insightful analysis of the presented principles, which will be opposed. For a balanced presentation, there will also be provided a response to the identified objections.
Section 1
Elizabeth Anderson is one of the major critics of the luck egalitarianism. This philosophy suggests that individuals were deprived by equality by a cosmic injustice that left them impaired in various ways (Anderson 289). The cosmic injustice, in Anderson’s understanding, refers to the bad luck that people have not because of their life choices or because of their own wrongdoings, but because they were born with poor native endowments (Anderson 288). They argue that for reaching equality there should be eliminated the brute luck that generated the inequalities. On the other hand, Anderson believes that, aligned with the equalitarian political philosophy, there should be eliminated the oppression.
My understanding of oppression is that it represents the action carried by one person to intentionally harm another person. In such case, the principle of equality, as implying freedom and equal respect, is violated. This is why Anderson’s argument that equalitarian justice implies the elimination of oppression seems justified.
In fact, the elimination of oppression is one of Anderson’s main counterargument for the luck egalitarianism or equality of fortune. The philosopher argues that luck egalitarianism departs from the principles of equalitarian justice, which implies the end of oppression, as its negative aim (Anderson 288). Similarly, pursuing the positive aim of the equality justice, which is to ensure equality to others, she rejects the luck equalitarianism morally deserving principle (Anderson 288-289).
Accordingly, by exerting their freedoms, people can explore various aspects of life, as their capabilities (or states functionings) allow them. The nature and extent of capabilities is nevertheless conditioned by the “personal, material and social resources available” (Anderson 316). Nevertheless, Anderson indicates that through their capabilities, everybody is free to evade from the oppressive and exploitative treatment that they claim to endure (Anderson 315).
As an extension of the democratic equality that opposes luck equality, Anderson advances the distinction between equality and inferiority. This philosophy states that people make claims based on their equality, not inferiority to others (Anderson 289). This implies the condition of equal respect, freedom and the distribution of resources for securing equality. However, as Sartre indicates, freedom is not something that is conditioned by another person (“Existentialism Is a Humanism”).
Anderson states that equal respect and freedom are the fundamental values and aims of citizens when constructing a state. Nevertheless, she also indicates that aligned with the democratic equality’s principle, nobody can force individuals to use their opportunities in a certain direction for maintaining their equality (Anderson 289).
Section 2
There are many aspects that can be argued regarding Anderson’s criticism to luck equality. While luck equality, as coined by its supporters, has its flaws, which Anderson rightly punctuates, she nevertheless issues biased and incomplete assumptions. The mere principle of eliminating the oppression is arguable, as it does not explain what oppression is and how can it be eliminated while assuring an abuse – free society.
Supporters of luck egalitarianism hold that in an ideal luck egalitarian society all people are equal, apart of those whose voluntary actions or faulty conduct make them responsible for their own misfortune and inferiority (Anderson 288). Based on this principle, those who are inferior to others, but not due to their faulty conduct or voluntary actions, should be given more resources. These resources should be taken from the ones superior to them, creating like this the basis of equality. At this point, Anderson’s democratic equality argues that all citizens are equal, because they all have freedom. Freedom allows them to make claims based on their equality virtue, not because they are inferior to others (Anderson 299).
Therefore, Anderson suggests that in order to claim something from someone, the claimant should be and is equal with the one from which he claims. However, this reasoning is unsupported and irrational. If one claims something, it means that he does not possess the thing he claims. By claiming something from somebody, it means that the claimant addresses his claim to the person who possesses what he desires, but does not own.
If one possesses something that another person desires but does not possess, the first is advantaged, and the other is disadvantaged. From the luck egalitarian perspective, the first is superior and the other is inferior. From a democratic justice perspective, the second is oppressed, because he does not possess what he desires, and other(s) can give. The first becomes the oppressor solely if he does not allow the second to have what he desires. Hence, if the claimant’s claim is not met, this means that the egalitarian society failed to support the principles of democratic equality.
Anderson’s democratic equality refers to human relations. Namely, it implies the assurance that through equalitarian justice the oppression of the weaker ones should be erased, by the stronger ones. The mere indication that a society is built by citizens driven by the fundamental values of equal respect and freedom is unproven. In her theory, freedom and respect for each other assure the extermination of oppression. But freedom and respect are not only abstract notions, but also subjective concepts. Freedom and respect are aspects that are distinctively enjoyed by individuals. However, the democratic justice, as envisioned by Anderson does not ensure that some enjoy more freedom and respect than others. Singer (13) indicates that freedom leads to achieving a state of well – being for people with diverse capabilities. However, Anderson suggests that the state of well-being that one achieves is the result of one’s optimization of his/her capabilities (Anderson 316). Hence, freedom is a capability. With this idea in mind, there can be further stated that the level of freedom varies from an individual to another. Just as capabilities differ from person to person, similarly, the freedom to achieve a state of well – being is not the same for all. Hence, the equalitarian justice is disputable, because the same level of freedom is not guaranteed for everybody. Furthermore, in Anderson’s democratic justice philosophy, nobody can tell another person how she should make use of her opportunities or judge her responsibility or lack of responsibility (Anderson 289).
One counter-criticism to Anderson’s democratic justice as opposed to luck egalitarianism is the concept of respect. The principle justice cannot be determined by the invocation of the ideal of respect. Respect is an attitude of acknowledging one person’s wishes and liberties and agreeing with them, supporting them and not confronting them. This concept, however, is not related with the democratic egalitarianism or with the egalitarian justice, nor does it enforce or weakens the luck egalitarianism. Respect is not related with any aspect of equality, because it represents a manifestation of human relations. In other words, equality can occur in the absence of respect, as long as individuals acknowledge what is right. For instance, I can be disrespectful towards my new colleague because I do not personally like her. Nevertheless, my moral judgment impedes me to make a bad referral of her when I am required by superiors, because I know that this would be wrong.
Section 3
In response to my objection, it could be argued that everybody knows what oppression is: both the oppressor and the one who is oppressed. Therefore, there is no need for a clear definition of the concept. Even so, the lack of a clear definition does not make imply that suggesting the elimination of oppression is wrong. In fact it is aligned with the principle of democratic equality, because it aims for the eradication of any source of injustice that fosters inequality. Oppression answers complies both injustice and inequality, hence impeding democratic equality.
Regarding the principle of respect, Singer (13) argues that this concept does defend and support the principle of equality. The philosopher argues that people should be treated with respect in terms of their interest, not in terms of their luck. As such, he offers the example of an intellectual man and an imbecile, who both have the same needs (hunger), hence, both equally need to be fed (Singer 13).
Therefore, the argument according to which the concept of respect is not related with the democratic egalitarianism can be counter argued. If the respect to one’s interests (or needs) guides our action, that means that we are capable of democratic equality. As we exert the principles of democratic equality, namely equal respect, freedom and a consideration for one’s capabilities, we can guide our actions in a just manner. For instance, imagine that both the intellectual and the imbecile are hungry and I can provide them nourishment to only one. I should consider the capabilities of both when making my decision and I should choose to feed the imbecile, not because I pity him (Anderson 306). I would choose the imbecile because I know that he does not have the same capabilities as the intellectual to assure his nourishment. In doing so, I exert respect for both the imbecile, acknowledging his impairments, but also for the intellectual, acknowledging his capabilities.
Works Cited
Anderson, Elizabeth, S. What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics. 109(2): 287 – 337.
Sartre, Jean – Paul. Existentialism Is a Humanism. [Online]. February 2005. Available from < https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm>. [Accessed 1 June 2016].
Singer, Peter. “All Animals Are Equal” in Tom Regan and Peter Singer Animal Rights and Human Obligation. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1989. Print.
