The continuing environmental risk of deep-water drilling even after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico stems from the stubborn failure to learn the lessons from the past. Boesch argues that the US has failed to enact legislation that would reduce regulatory oversights that contributed to the blowout. This is underscored by the obsession of private oil firms on the profit-making technologies as against safety and environmental compatibility of offshore drilling. Sophisticated technologies have been developed to extract oil, but little has been done to bolster the capacity to prevent and/or rapidly contain deepwater blowouts. Despite the government’s suspension of offshore drilling pending the institution of safety measures and BP’s investment in research into the environmental effects of the 2010 spill, Congress has failed to enact laws to raising liability limits, dedicate sustained funding for research, environmental monitoring and assessment. Five years on, Davenport (2015) reports one such regulation by the Interior Department, geared at tightening requirements for blowout preventers. However, environmental experts argue that the BP spill stemmed from systemic oversight failures at the firm/government levels. Kayyem takes a closer look at how newly discovered oil can affect communities economically and culturally. Focusing on Barrow, Alaska. The author notes the boon it can cause in terms of economics, but also how previously isolated populations deal with the changes of modernity. In this paper, I argue that indeed there has been a failure to act on important lessons from the Gulf of Mexico accident, and this is part due to the power of oil companies in Washington.
Boesch asserts that the US Congress has either been slow or failed to enact legislation that would codify important findings of various investigations into the Gulf of Mexico accident. Having been part of the President’s Panel that wrote an important report into the accident and future of offshore drilling, Boesch reiterates that the report did find that explosion was due systemic deficiencies in oversight and the absence of a comprehensive risk-management system. I agree with this position entirely. I think the blowout preventers are a convenient scapegoat for oil firms to run away from their failure to lay enough emphasis on environmental safety. The wealth of resources and technologies developed in the exploration and extraction of oil/gas from the under the sea and the shocking lack of similarly sophisticated risk-mitigation strategies.
Both Boesch and Davenport show that some good has come of the crisis, but the changes have been overly artificial as against addressing the core causal factors behind the accident. For instance, in order to address the confusion in the wake of the Deepwater blowout, the US Department of Interior suspended offshore drilling operations, until after important safety requirements had been met. Similarly, Davenport reports the enactment of legislation to tighten the requirements on blowout preventers. However, it is true that these measures avoid the elephant in the room i.e. the failures on the part of the oil firms to accord safety and environmental friendliness of their operations. There is a patently low investment in safety and/or environmental sustainability, as well as the systemic failures that resulted in the accident in the first instance.
Lastly, both Boesch and Davenport show that partisan politics and other interests are responsible for the US government’s cold feet in implementing important regulatory/legislative framework. Donald Boesch blames the wider debate on the desirability of offshore drilling for the failure to enact meaningful laws on environmental protection and safety. On the other hand, Davenport reports that the Interior Department has implemented aggressive offshore gas and oil oversight and regulation in US history that have made the practice safer. However, it rightly argues that blowout preventers are a last resort. It is similar to investing in state-of-the-art airbags in the case of a car accident, instead of working to prevent the accident in the first place. I strongly feel that the reluctance to address the systemic failures and firm-level oversight is because of the political influence that these companies have on the US politics. Politicians are afraid of acting lest they offend the powerful oil lobbies and instead choose to tackle minor side issues.
Kayyem does a microcosm study to show that major oil drilling projects extend well beyond national politics and deeply into the community. The author focuses on Barrow, Alaska. The article recounts the difficulties many major oil companies have in accessing and drilling in remote destinations like Alaska. However, when they do go through with the process, it can be likened to a “gold rush,” where people and money are poured into the local communities. While in terms of material wealth this can be beneficial it can also overwhelm local communities that been primarily isolated and in the case of Barrow, have existed exclusively on more antiquated economic endeavors like whale hunting. Local Alaskan politicians worry that the community will be overwhelmed by the economic influx. The article is particularly compelling in that it shows that the affects and reaches of the oil companies, potential spills, and its economic aspects all have much more of an effect than those chronicled by national media sources. It also does very interesting parallels to how Alaska is so similar to the wild west of American history. It is dangerous, unknown and offers the promises of wealth. Thus, the battle over these areas with oil affects real communities and real individuals and belies a story that focuses too heavily on politics and big businesses.
It is evident that the Gulf of Mexico oil spill was caused by systemic failures in oversights as well as failures in the regulatory frameworks on the same. The accident could still have been prevented with blowout preventers, but these are not solutions. Further, even with the new regulatory and safety measures that have been undertaken, important causal factors behind the accident and risk inherent in offshore drilling are yet to be addressed. The under-investment in research and development of safety technologies is telling of the actual attitude of oil firms towards the environment. I feel that in this industry, we can never be too safe. We must invest more, and legislate to prevent the repetition of the same. These sorts of battles will continue to play themselves in communities like Barrow, Alaska.
Works Cited
Boesch, Donald. Deep-water drilling remains a risky business. 19 April 2012. Web. 17 June 2015.
Davenport, Coral. New Sea Drilling Rule Planned, 5 Years After BP Oil Spill. 10 April 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/us/new-sea-drilling-rule-planned-5-years-after-bp-oil-spill.html?_r=0. 17 June 2014.
Kayyem, Juliette. Under Melting Ice, a Jackpot. March 22 2012. Web. 23 June 2015.
