Introduction
Under criminal law, false arrest occurs when one party holds another wrongfully and takes them to custody against their will. This can be committed by both law enforcement agencies and private persons. It is a crime to restrict wrongfully or limit the personal freedom of another person against their consent (Rix, 1995). Anyone doing this commits a crime of false imprisonment. The remedies available to the victim of false imprisonment depend on the harm caused. In most cases, however, the victims have the remedy of damages.
There is no doubt that Dziuma was falsely arrested, and he was never given a chance to present his evidence. Despite his claims that he had bought the shoes early and left the receipt at home, charges were instituted against him. It is in the court of law that he found an opportunity to air the evidence that set him free. Despite the defendant being the employee of the city, he acted in a manner that was irrational in arresting Dziuma. Upon Dziuma presenting the evidence, the court conditioned the dismissal of the matter over insufficient evidence to sustain a prosecution. However, this was upon Dziuma agreeing that he would waive all the rights he had to sue the complainant.
Normally, a person who has a valid claim of being falsely arrested has legal rights. Such rights include bringing a lawsuit against the party that restrained them. The argument for this is based on the fact that they suffer harm during the period of the arrest (Grounds, 2005). Such harm includes the humiliation caused to them for the imprisonment. The victims of false imprisonment may also suffer physical consequences. Besides this, their reputation in the society will be affected negatively. Subjecting one’s reputation in the society to humiliation may result to defamation (Prenzler & Sarre, 2008). Because of this, the victim has similar remedies to those available in defamation cases.
The above description is relevant in analyzing Dziuma v. Korvettes. In the case study, it is clear that there is an abuse of several rights. It is not in question whether the conduct of the defendants had amounted to false imprisonment and defamation. The question up for determination is whether the pre-agreement in court barring Dziuma from instituting charges of defamation was binding. On the face value, this seems to be the case. However, a close analysis of the situation reveals that individual rights were abused.
In this matter, the lower court erred in law by restricting Dziuma from commencing charges on false imprisonment. In essence, the dismissal of the charge was based on interest of justice and merit. It is unclear whether a court has powers to direct a person to relinquish their rights. In this case, for instance, justice will not prevail if Dziuma is coerced to relinquish his right that is clear. This is wrong as it hinders personal conscience from making decisions. Probably, Dziuma had consented to such an agreement because he felt coerced by the lower court.
In practice, the only way a defendant can voluntarily and knowingly relinquish their civil remedies is through plea bargaining negotiations (Fuller, 2010). The defendant must be given freedom to choose whether to relinquish the rights with a clear conscience. What should be taken into question is whether consent was voluntary and free or as a result of undue influence. In sample case such as that of Dixon v District of Columbia, the court held that the defendant had the right to proceed with a civil action because the consent was achieved through coercive means (Fuller, 2010).
Based on the above analysis, the Appellate Court was right to allow the lawsuit to continue.
References
Rix, K. (1995). Wrongful Arrest, False Imprisonment, Trespass and Assault? The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 6(3), 617-633.
Prenzler, T., & Sarre, R. (2008). Developing a risk profile and model regulatory system for the security industry. Security Journal, 21(4), 264-277.
Grounds, A. T. (2005). Understanding the effects of wrongful imprisonment. Crime and Justice, 1-58.
Fuller, D. W. (2010). Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act. U. St. Thomas LJ, 8, 375.
