Terrorism can be simply defined as the use of fear by whatever means to achieve a political objective and therefore includes not only the violence and bombings but also other areas such as cyber terrorism. Following this definition then terrorism can be traced throughout human history with numerous theories used to explore their formation and networking. Due the prevalence of Radical Islamic terrorism in the recent years, a closer examination is necessary to determine the growth and development of these networks. Therefore, in this paper, we shall explore the cold war terrorist networking theory with a comparison with the present terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda and their growth.
The cold war terrorist networking theory mostly operated on a balance of terror. Firstly, the cold war was strictly bipolar in nature with the United States and USSR being the players accompanied by numerous allies. Both sides had clear, well-defined ideologies, and their conflict was mainly conducted in proxy states and by other state actors. Even when some conflicts escalated into full-scale wars such as in Korean, Vietnam and even in Afghanistan, the principle actors were keen to avoid open conflict. This was due to the deterrence effect of the nuclear weapons that both USA and USSR possessed. The concept of deterrence in the cold war was horrifyingly simple; any direct aggression was to be met with massive retaliation of nuclear bombardment, enough to wipe out either country several times over. Therefore, terror the cold war was marked by a clear, well-defined enemy and balanced by the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction.
Even the terrorist networks in the Cold War era that were state sponsored had their actions primarily governed by the strategic interests of the sponsoring nations. The states involved were mainly the proxy nations of either USA or USSR, for example, the Mujahedeen of Afghanistan, who received training and arms from the USA and her allies. Nonetheless, the sponsoring nations historically reigned in the terror groups to avoid escalation of their activities and in the cases where it suited their interests. For example, Syrian support of Palestinian groups and the Hezbollah was used to halt their interference with the peace process of the 1990s that Syria had interests. Iran halted most anti-United States terrorism in the Gulf region to avoid escalation of the terrorism leading to US-led attacks and sanctions. It becomes evident that an escalation of conflict was actively avoided due to the possible disastrous outcomes for the nations involved and the even the entire humanity in the worst case scenarios.
When comparing the cold war terrorist theory and the present day Qaeda like terror groups and networks several major differences emerge. First, the present-day terrorist networks and groups are diffuse and lack a centralized control or locus as in the cold war Moscow or Washington DC. While the cold war had clear soldiers, bases, installations, and ships among others that were, clearly identifiable the terrorist groups have shown remarkable ability to hide within the civilian populations of their respective country and only emerge to conduct their activities. The present day terrorist groups and networks are also distinguishable from the cold war terror on the fact that they lack a “price too high to pay” due to their root in pure ideology. The USSR and the USA had civilian populations to lose in case a nuclear conflict arose, and even the leaders had their interests such as the power to maintain. On the other hand, Qaeda like networks have demonstrated a willingness to pay any price due to their ideologies. Suicide bombers are a perfect demonstration of this; they are all too willing to pay for their war regarding human lives.
There are two primary observations arising from the contrast of the two. The methods of dealing with USSR cannot apply in dealing with Qaeda and other terrorist groups. This is because deterrence only works with a party that considers the threat a too high price to pay. Most terror groups in the present day are ideologically motivated and even glorify death and destruction, actually turning the threats such as death into a reward for the groups. This model of networking for terrorism has been termed as “inspiration without command”. Here the networks such as Qaeda have shown that even with the destruction of their command structure they still operate in decentralized units throughout the globe. The different terrorist units have shown that they only share a common name with different agendas and manifestations. They are motivated by religious fanaticism as opposed to political objectives. Deterrence, therefore, does not operate against the terror groups as it would have operated in the cold war. In fact, the terrorist groups have been proven to push for retaliation by countries such as the United States as a recruitment tool. Considering that the retaliatory strikes often carry a cost in collateral damage and death of civilians, the resulting anger provides terrors groups with an effective recruitment tool.
The key difference between the Cold War terror and modern day terrorism was the racial reduction in the threat level and dangers of escalation. The controversial calculation in “Tragic but Distinguishable Postwar States,” by Herman Kahn clearly established this key distinction. The possible American deaths in the possible nuclear war arising from the cold war would have been two million for a “small war,” in the case of a total war involving carpet bombing of the North American continent , it is plausible that the casualties could have been total loss of life and the continent rendered unlivable for a few millennia. On the other hand, the worst terror attack on the United States, 9/11, resulted in less than 3,000 deaths. The total deaths globally resulting from terrorism from 1970 to 2005 is less than 4,000 while excluding Israel, Iraq, and the terrorists. When all deaths resulting from terrorism throughout the 20th and 21st centuries the number still falls below a million deaths. The figures by Kahn, despite their controversial nature highlight a major difference between cold war terror of escalation and the current day terrorism. In fact, Kahn argues that the amount of resources dedicated to fighting terrorism is irrational considering the insubstantial threat of terrorism.
In conclusion, there are significant defenses between the cold war terrorist networks and the present day terrorist groups such as Qaeda. The differences all stem from the nature of the organizations and the costs of both. For the cold war, terrorism mostly served the interests of states and the threat of mutually assured destruction served as a balance to terror. The cold war had clear ideological differences and all parties identifiable. On the other hand, modern day terrorism is with a regions fanaticism that is diffuse and with an absolute wiliness to escalate the conflict. The modern day terrorism is, therefore, hard to regulate, balance or halt with the threat of a deterrent such as attacks. Finally, the modern day terrorism has less at stake than the cold war. In the cold war, it is arguable that the entire human species was at the risk of annihilation either in the direct nuclear war or in the aftermath of the war.
References
Hamilton, N. B., & Gray, D. H. (2012). Decentralized Terrorism: Ramifications for a Centralized International System. Global Security Studies, Spring, 3(2), 23-42. Retrieved from http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Hamilton%20Decentralized%20FINAL.pdf
Kenney, N. A. (2012, January 23). Terrorism: How it is Unlike the Cold War. Retrieved from University of North Carolina: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_01-03/essay_2and3/essay2_kenney.html
Levine, D. K., & Levine, R. A. (2006). Deterrence in the Cold War and the “War on Terror". New York: UCLA. Retrieved from http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/inimical.pdf
