Background
Christopher Millea a Marine who participated in the first Gulf War suffers from a post-traumatic stress disorder accountable to his involvement in the war. He has developed a situation of suffering unpredictable pain attacks and exhaustion. These situations have necessitated frequent work time off on short notice. Since 2001, Millea had been working for a tri-state commuter rail road, the Metro-North. Millea applied for special leave in 2005 under the FMLA for special leave, an application that was approved by Metro-North granting him sixty days of intermittent leave for the year 2006 (LexisNexis, 2).
Events leading to the lawsuit
Millea was under the supervision of one Earl Vaughn with whom he had developed a strained relationship. While working in the storeroom in the summer of 2006, Millea engaged in a heated phone conversation with Vaughan which ultimately culminated in a panic attack, s feature that he frequently experiences whenever he is under stressful conditions. He left to see his doctor without directly notifying Vaughn his supervisor but preferring to notify him through Lead Clerk Gareth Sullivan. The notification though indirect was timely. The following day, he extended his FMLA leave by not reporting to work and by once again preferring to use Sullivan as his indirect communicator to Vaughn (LexisNexis, 2).
Since the internal policy at Metro-North requires that anyone taking an unforeseeable FMLA leave notifies their supervisor beforehand, Vaughn decides that Millea did not follow the right procedures and informed the company’s payroll department to record Millea’s two day absence as non-FMLA leave. An official investigation of Millea by the company led to a formal Notice of Discipline being placed on his file for a year, an incident that necessitated him to take a lower paying position as a custodian janitor. In this position he would at least not be under the supervision of Vaughan of whom they had a strained relationship that was not considered healthy in all aspects.
The Court’s Decision
As the complainant, Millea argued that at no time did he violate his employer’s internal leave policy as he indirectly communicated through Sullivan. Millea in his case argued that the company’s policy regarding FMLA leave violates the regulations of implementing the same law. He summarized three of his claims with the first one stating the company’s interference with his rightful ability to take leave. Secondly, he stated that the retaliation by the company against taking his leave was unjustified as he was even forced to update his FMLA certification, having a formal notice of discipline placed on his employment file, being forced to take a lower paying job, subjecting him to heightened managerial surveillance and a tactical delay by the company to approve him to take the lead custodian position. In the third claim, Millea stated that the company facilitated intentional infliction of emotional disorder on him. Millea had placed a request to the court to charge the jury in application of the ‘materially adverse employment action’ (LexisNexis, 3).
In answering these claims the company claimed that it had enough justification to record Millea’s leave absence as non-FMLA leave as he had without doubt violated or overlooked the valid internal leave policy of the company. The company also stated that the claims of intentional infliction of emotional disorder was not done intentionally and thus could not qualify to a case of IIED as Millea claimed. The company responded to the retaliation claims too by insisting none among the claims of retaliation was directly linked to Millea’s use of the FMLA leave and the claims were neither adverse materially.
On its part, the court decided that it would not determine the case on the basis of ‘materially adverse employment action’ as requested by Millea but would narrow the definition of ‘materially adverse’ on which it would rely on (Employment Law Institute, Pennsylvania Bar Institute. 18th annual Employment Law Institute, 26). It gave the reason that the case was involved the FMLA while not the Title VII. In claims of interference, Millea won his case while Metro-North won its case on retaliation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Recommendation
Thus the employer should take into account the overall circumstances surrounding such situations to avoid conflicting positions by distinguishing when law applies and when facts are taken into account. It is also important for the employer to understand the flexibilities of the FMLA and how it applies under different conditions. The employer should also learn that offering sixty days leave is not just satisfactory enough according to the FMLA and does not imply that the employer has completely played in full their obligation to the law. Similarly, the employer should ensure that everyone within the company or organization who handles matters of complying with the leave laws at federal and state levels have enough knowledge of all requirements of the said laws. Otherwise it would place a great burden on the company in justifying actions taken by its personnel’s handling these laws (LexisNexis, 6).
Works Cited
Employment Law Institute, Pennsylvania Bar Institute. 18th annual Employment Law Institute. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2012. Print.
LexisNexis. "CHRISTOPHER MILLEA, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, -v.- METRO-NORTH RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant." N.p., 8 Aug. 2011. Web. <http://www.impactlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Millea-Ruling-Lexis-version.pdf>.
