In his article, ‘Are the Shia Rising?’, Maximilian Terhalle advances the argument that nothing could be further from the truth. He asserts that what is being termed as the ‘Shia rise’ is a phrase that was coined by various political players in the Gulf Region so as to enable them achieve their own selfish political interests. He however notes that while the role played by the Shia in the gulf region has increased significantly in the latter half of the last decade, this was not attributable to any goals of seeking political power.
On the contrary, Terhalle argues that there are three factors which could be used to explain the prominent role that Shias have assumed in the Persian Gulf over the last six years. The three factors are: the reemergence of Iran as a major player in the geopolitical landscape of the region after the ouster of Saddam in Iraq and the fall of the Taliban, increased levels of awareness among the Shia as a result of democratization process spearheaded by the United States in countries whose populations largely followed Shiat Ali and the reducing influence of the power of the United States in Iraq coupled with Iran’s increasingly belligerent attitude in dealing with mounting international pressure against its nuclear program. Terhalle thus contends that the claims almost exclusively made by the Sunni Arabs that the Shia are rising lack any truth in them. He asserts that on the contrary, the claims are used to advance vested political interests by capitalizing on sectarian prejudices. Put plainly, the claims that the Shia are rising are nothing but a hoax meant to stroke passions of the Sunni and in the process escalate their differences with the Shia, a scenario which favours the political status quo.
Terhalle’s central argument is that what is being termed as the ‘Shia Rise’ in untenable, unsustainable and unattainable. He premises his argument on the fact that there is lack of political and religious cohesiveness in what has been conceptualized as a homogenous Shia bloc which has Iran as its main driving force. In further advancing this argument Terhalle breaks down the political and religious components that clearly reveal that the alleged Shia rise is a fallacy.
On the political front, he notes that there are four principal factors which limit the so called Shia Rise. These are domestic politics, economics, nationalism and international politics. On domestic politics, he contends that the outlook of the revolutionary Shii aspiration has solely been shaped by the nature of the domestic politics of the countries in the Gulf region and not by the pronouncements, political or otherwise of the leaders of Iran. He cites the example of Saudi Arabia which has successfully managed to accommodate the Shia population in the face of strong opposition by conservative religious leaders who regarded the Shia as rejectionists. The government of Saudi Arabia recognized that the Shia deserve a space and have a role to play in the domestic politics of the country.
On the international politics front, Terhalle argues that the dynamics of international politics have served to reduce the influence and spread of Iranian Shiism. With regard to nationalism, Terhalle advances the argument that Shias put their allegiance to the state before their allegiance to any religious division or classification. In other words, despite their religious affiliation and spread across various countries in the Gulf region, the Shia still retain a very strong sense on nationalism in the countries in which they belong. As such, they have always sought to put national interest first before other considerations, religious or otherwise. On the economic front, Terhalle advances the argument that Iran’s limited role as a player in region’s business has served to limit the influence of Shiism. Most of Iran’s trade is with countries outside the region. Terhalle has persuasively used the four factors (domestic politics, international politics, nationalism and economics) to highlight the fact the alleged rise of the Shia is fallacious.
While some have tried to argue that there are fundamental differences between the Shia and the Sunni Muslims, my personal position is that there is a common strand that cuts across both groups. The common strand is that both are Muslim groups. To that extent, there is more that unites them as compared to what divides them. This common strand must be used to strengthen integration and interaction between both the Shias and the Sunnis. All concerned persons must seek to ensure that they do not use or fall victim to narrow minded political interests whose main aim is to create differences where none existed and subsequently use these differences for their own selfish gain. At the end of the day, whether one is a Shia or a Sunni, the shared religious practices far exceed any differences. Indeed, both Shias and Sunnis read the same Quran, worship the same God and share the same prophets. It is thus incumbent upon all Muslims, whether Shia or Sunni to cease judging each other on the basis of who is more Muslim or less Muslim. This is an undesirable activity which can only serve to the detriment of both Shias and Sunnis.
References
Broadhead, P., & Keown, D. (2007). Can Faiths Make Peace?: Holy Wars and the Resolution of Religious Conflicts. London: I. B. Tauris.
Pearl, L. (2007). Theocracy. New York: Marsall Cavendish.
Terhale, M. (2007). Are the Shia Rising? Middle East Policy, 69-83.
