Personal Identity
Introduction
Personal identity refers to the conceptual perception an individual develops about themselves as they evolve throughout their life (Swinburne 318). Various arguments are encompassing the aspects of personal identity that depend on the perspective of approach that the perceiver gives when defining the concept. That has led to a variation in the philosophical definitions that various researchers present in what exactly defines one to perceive themselves as the same person despite the multiple evolutions that take place in them. For example, as a person grows, they change in their physique and also in their mindsets. The philosophers present various arguments to explain what exactly leads one to develop the perspectives of personal identity despite such changes being too obvious. The perceptions derive from two broad scopes that are of keen interest, and they are the bodily and psychological views on personal identity. They both have an influence in the way most philosophers perceive personal identity. They encompass the physical and mental constructs on a human being and how that individual can use them to define who they are despite the time effects on the two aspects. The interest is to establish the relevance of the psychological continuity theory to the definition of personal identity.
The first approach to defining personal identity is the bodily view that develops on the perceptions that people have about the similarity of their body in an initial period against the current one. Same body theories emerge from the qualitative dissimilarities in the same human being when considering changes in physical aspects (Sider 8). However, the approaches focusing on the bodily views fail significantly in defining what constitutes as a person’s perspectives about themselves. Sider proposes an example in which God resurrects an individual in future (9). The question is whether the person will still be the same despite the fact that their body has rotted in the ground. For example, the theory would imply that an individual fails to be the same if they lost an arm since their body changes. The implication is that the earlier person had an arm, and losing it changes their identity in the current time. The bodily perspective is untrue implying that there is another aspect that defines the personal identity of that person that is not their body.
The Memory Continuity Theory and Personal Identity
The second approach to defining personal identity is the memory continuity theory whose proposal is that a person remains the same if and only if they remember every part of their past (Swinburne 321). The indication is that a person’s identity develops from their ability to remember the details of their past experiences. However, the theories fail to define the exactness of the concept of memory and how it affects the individual (Swinburne 321). What happens if that person forgets some details about their earlier existence? The memory continuity theory fails to provide clarity on that aspect, and that defines the area that makes it insufficient for use in establishing personal identity (Swinburne 321). The truth is that a person only remembers a few significant events in their life, and that cannot be sufficient in defining who the individual is as they derive from more. The theory implies that if a person fails to create a connection between a chain of memories from the experiences in their past, then they are not identical to the earlier individual (Swinburne 321). That makes the memory continuity theory inconsistent and insufficient in reflecting personal identity.
The Psychological Continuity Theory in Personal Identity
The psychological continuity theory is the most consistent in defining personal identity by proposing that a past individual is identical to a future person if that next person exists and contains similar character traits and memories (Sider 15). Take the example where God resurrects humans on judgment day; all individuals will retain their identity since they are capable of connecting that character traits with their memories. One of the challenges to the psychological continuity theory is in the case that the nature of a person branches and leads to duplication (Sider 17). However, most philosophers provide a solution that eliminates the numerical assumptions that result in the branching of continuity (Sider 20). That enables the psychological continuity theory to hold ground when defining personal identity in a human. The proposal is that when duplication occurs, the individual ceases to exist and gives rise to new ones that develop their personalities from the traits of the earlier person. The argument develops on the same premises as the reproduction through cell division in microorganisms. When the organism divides itself, it gives rise to two new ones that will continue with the trend in reproducing.
Conclusion
The findings indicate that the psychological continuity theory is the most consistent in defining personal identity in a human being. The same body approach fails to encompass even the slightest changes in the human such as growth from a child to an old bald head man. The other theory is the memory continuity theory that fails to account for the forgetfulness of the human mind, especially for insignificant events. The implication is that those two initial approaches lack a focus on the basics of life that do not alter the identity an individual holds about themselves. That leaves the psychological continuity theory as the only solution to define the constructs that make the identity of an individual. The theory provides an answer to its inconsistent premise, and that makes it relevant to the definition of personal identity.
Works Cited
Sider, Theodore. "Personal Identity" in Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics. Clarendon Press, 2005. Print.
Swinburne, Richard. “Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory” in Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 2001. Print.
