Abstract
During this paper, our target will be to analyze the main principles and ideas which could be derived from Carl von Clausewitz’s works concerning the strategy of war and the lessons which the states have to take into account, while planning the military actions. Additionally, we will be trying to deal with contemporary role of his work ‘On War’ which is thought to be the fundamental work in terms of military history and practice. The principles of five ‘W’ will be applied during the analysis. The final objective is to implement the principles and ideas of Clausewitz to the American army’s contemporary reality on the basis of the American Military Leadership handbook.
Part A
Among the most known historians and scholars in the field of the war strategy, a Prussian soldier Carl von Clausewitz plays important role because of his direct participation in Napoleonic wars and proper analysis of their objectives, plot, and results. His thesis in terms of war is as follows: ‘War per se had been lecturing’ (Cronin, 1984).
Clausewitz’s discussion consists in the developing the issue what war and its goal are. At first, the author mentions that war has to be always looked at as a political phenomenon, otherwise it does not have any sense or, as the author says, it is pointless and devoid of sense (Cronin, 1984). It is used so as to achieve political objectives with the most severe means after the exhaustion of all the peaceful ones.
Secondly, according to author, the war is a unity of three elements, namely government, military forces, and people. Lack of one of them leads to failure of the whole campaign.
Clausewitz demonstrates how it works in the following way: the objectives to achieve are fixed by the government in a form of orders, commands, and so on; later, the military forces propose the means to achieve them; the nation or people provides the legitimization, or, in other words, approval of such actions as well as resources for the military service.
The war success depends on the level of participation of political leaders and on whether such leaders, in fact, exist. These are the governmental representatives who could perform two main military functions, in other words, these ones have to be able to answer two questions: what is indentured to be achieved and how this mission will be conducted? During the creation of the plan, the leaders have to be able to combine statesmanship with strategy, understanding all the features of national policy (Cronin, 1984).
In order to succeed in war, there has to be cooperation and partnership between the political leaders and military leaders. Moreover, the former and the latter are to listen to each other, take into account the advice and instructions of one another and so on.
Commenting the war strategy and defining the main principles of war, Clausewitz says that war cannot be limited to them. The author gives three reasons for that: firstly, information about war is always subjective; moral and psychological forces are intertwined with physical forces; and the theoretical model cannot fully provide the vision of what certain enemy will do.
However, certain principles can be extracted from the history, to author’s mind. Firstly, the main rule is to know what enemy’s weak link is, how to attack them properly so as to achieve the successful and desired result, namely to know enemy’s strategic center of gravity. Second idea consists in the need to provide economy of force, when certain military units are not directly engaged in the main battles, but are ready to provide back up, if necessary.
Among the tactics of war, Clausewitz defines surprise to be one of the most effective ones, as speed and impetus are its (war’s) strongest elements and are usually indispensable if we are to defeat the enemy’. Other two important elements of strategy are will and military morale which are to be important for both soldiers and military leaders. These two elements lead to self-discipline, order, and proper performance. These could unite the soldiers as well as motivate them to fight.
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Part B
Comparing leadership strategy and features defined by Clausewitz with the one, defined in the American Leadership strategy, it can be stated that certain receptions have been made in this context. For instance, in terms of such characteristics as will, we need to highlight that it is defined as a catalyst for success by which is, as we have discussed, among two main elements which the military service has to possess.
Such notion has been also made for the American military service. In particular, it is mentioned that the job of the American soldier and leader goes beyond teaching your soldiers how to fight and survive; you must also develop their will to fight and win. Some people call this the “winning spirit” or “warrior spirit” (Military Leadership, 1990).
This ability to demonstrate such feature is a need from the point of view of management as well. For instance, transformational model of leadership proposes the effective way how to make certain organization effective and successful: it could be done if leader or leaders put much efforts so as to demonstrate that they are engaged in all the processes taking place within the organization; as a result, employees could take an example how certain work is to be done.
The value of information is also discussed in contexts of both armies. If Clausewitz gives only a general overview how important it is to possess information about the enemy, this notion is developed in context of the American army’s skills. In particular, it is said that subordinates have to be informed about all the circumstances of a battle as well as potential steps which will be made by the army per se.
It encourages initiative, improves teamwork, and enhances morale, according to the handbook. Such way of cooperation could also lead to the establishment of trust and friendly relationships between the commanders and their subordinates.
The other common ground between two armies is values. Their importance Clausewitz demonstrated analyzing soldiers’ moral and physical courage, when they could both accept responsibility and suppress the fear. These soldiers’ features could be formed by the commander’s behavior and standards. A commander who is ruled by certain principles and beliefs is called, according to Clausewitz, a military genius. If we look at the issue of values through the prism of the American army, the first to be noted is the main rule: the beliefs of a leader impact directly on the leadership climate, cohesion, discipline, training, and combat effectiveness of a unit (Military Leadership, 1990).
There are four general individual values which leaders and led are expected to possess, namely courage, candor, competence, and commitment (p.23). These often depend on the activity of the commanders, their devotedness to the service. In case the commanders rely only on the way how his subordinates will act, it is likely that this military unit will not be an effective one.
Among the actions which the military units have to take, Clausewitz, no matter which one he meant, emphasized on the importance of the direct and clear orders, given by the commanders, namely they have to provide concrete objectives, previously planned algorithm of steps, and the desired result. Also, the plan per se has to be simple and understandable for the soldiers, meaning it could not foresee ambiguity or complicated sentences.
These are the main principles of tactical knowledge. They are implemented into the American military strategy handbook, namely the objective has to direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective (p.42).
As we have analyzed previously, Clausewitz defined two following important tactical moves, namely surprise and economy of force. They are institutionalized in the common practice of the American military service. For instance, economy of force is mentioned among the main tactical principles and is defined as allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts, when surprise can be interpreted as some piece of advice to attack the enemy on condition he does not expect it, thus, he is not prepared for such action (p.42).
References
Cronin, P.M. (1984). Clausewitz Condensed. Washington D.C. : Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress.
