Question 1
The Constitution gives Congress a wide range of specific enumerated powers. One of Congress’ most far-reaching powers under the Constitution is derived from the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states” (U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3). This power remained largely unused until the landmark decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (Cheeseman, 2014). The political landscape of the case was significant because it arose at the height of the Civil Rights Era. In the Heart of Atlanta Motel case, a private motel refused to rent rooms to African Americans (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 1964). Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial discrimination in places of public accommodations and specifically included motels (Civil Rights Act of 1964). The owner brought an immediate challenge to Title II on the grounds that it exceeded Congressional power to regulate commerce (McClain, 2011, p. 88).
The Supreme Court took an expansive view of Congressional power to regulate commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause. While the motel itself was of an intrastate character, the Court found that because the motel was located nearby an interstate highway and 75 percent of the motel’s clientele were interstate travelers, it substantially affected interstate commerce (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 1964, p. 274). The crux of this case was the question whether the means Congress chose to eliminate racial discrimination in society were reasonably adapted to the ends permitted by the Constitution (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 1964, p. 262). Because the motel had interstate characteristics, Congress was within its Constitutional power to regulate commerce as a means to ending racial discrimination in public accommodations (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 1964, p. 262). This case was significant because it set precedent for interpreting Congressional power broadly in ending racial discrimination in society.
Question 2
The first case to delineate the substantial effect on interstate commerce test was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. In this case, the Supreme Court held Congress can regulate that intrastate activities under the Commerce Clause if those intrastate activities are “substantially relat[ed] to interstate commerce” (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 1937, p. 37). This interpretation significantly broadened Congressional authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Most activities do not occur in pure isolation. That is, products and goods are easily transported across state lines in everyday life. Even those economic activities that do not cross state borders may have substantial relations with interstate commerce. While restaurant is fixed location and is intrastate in character, the restaurant will necessarily have substantial ties to interstate commerce. Customers, food, supplies, and various other commodities related to the restaurant may come from out-of-state. Recognizing that many intrastate activities will have an effect on interstate commerce, the Court sought to enable Congress the power to regulate these activities.
Question 3
The vast majority of commerce will be construed as interstate commerce. This is because even activities of a purely local nature will be characterized as interstate commerce if such activity has a “substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” (Gonzales v. Raich, 2005, p. 16). It is difficult to imagine any activity that does not have any effect on interstate commerce. The power to regulate commerce is extremely broad, and virtually nothing falls outside its purview. Even if an activity is purely local in nature, there will be inevitably be some attenuated connection to interstate commerce.
References
Cheeseman, H.R. (2014). Contemporary business law (8th ed). Prentice Hall.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
McClain, L.C. (2011). Involuntary servitude, public accommodations laws, and the legacy of
heart of atlanta motel inc. v. united states. Maryland Law Review, 83-162.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3
