Compare and Contrast
Philosophy
Introduction
The context of determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism can be attributed to the two notions of freedom the metaphysical and circumstantial. The latter encompasses an idea that everyone has freedom to act without being interfered by any obstacle while the former demonstrates the freedom of oneself to choose among alternatives. This notion of freedom will be articulated in this discussion by comparing and contrasting the philosophical context of determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. Furthermore, the discussion will also differentiate the three positions in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Based on the interpretation of the three positions, a personal take on the topic will be provided at the latter part of the discussion encompassing a justification as to which of three positions are correct. At this point, it can be assumed that compatibilism is the most reasonable choice because people cannot be free without being morally responsible for their actions.
The Metaphysical and Circumstantial Freedom
When someone says that they are victims of circumstances, it can be considered as either true or false depending on how the person perceives his idea of freedom. From a philosophical point of view, freedom can be circumstantial or metaphysical. Circumstantial is the freedom to do things without interference from certain obstacles (Bateman, 2014). For example, a person has a circumstantial freedom to walk back and forth at the hallway, but loses such freedom when the hallway is blocked for some reason. On the other hand, metaphysical freedom encompasses a power to choose between alternatives, which are usually linked to ethics and intellect. It can be described as the power to choose from opportunities by deciding on the possibilities of one over another. The two notions of freedom are imperative in understanding the difference between positions.
One would question everyday activities or decision whether it was caused by the things that people did prior, or the decisions and actions they did was part of the choices they made. Contemplating on such questions gives rise to the notions of freedom. If metaphysical freedom does govern the way people act, then the facts the human psychology is not sufficient to making certain actions necessary (Chisholm, 1982). This means that any actions made by people are inevitable and that they come naturally instead of having a predetermined path or resulting consequences of certain actions. These notions of freedom has been a subject of debate among philosophers because the school of thought regarding free will is divided among determinism camp, compatibilism camp, and the libertarianism camp. Several discourses on the subject of free will encompasses differences on positions, which at the center of the argument is whether or not freedom can do without moral responsibility.
Determinism, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism, the Comparison and Contrast
Determinism or hard determinism asserts that people has circumstantial freedom, but lacks metaphysical freedom in which the liberty to act is apparent in all human being while the choice for one’s path in life is inexistent. In this sense, it can be assumed that people are at the mercy of their own physical self and the circumstances. The most important argument about determinism is that freedom is an illusion, which means that one’s path in life is predetermined. While people meditate on making choices, determinism asserts that such choices are just results of the events or physical impulses that occurred prior to making any choices. For thinkers in the determinism, when a person contemplates why he is for instance tied to a chair, it can be explained as the result of running around uncontrollably.
In this example, running around was a circumstantial freedom that the person has, but when that person was tied to a chair it can be assumed that the reason behind it is subjugation. Hence, subjugation was not a metaphysical choice, but rather a result of the circumstances prior to the subjugation. The person in the example has no metaphysical freedom to leave the chair or to stand up because of the presence of an obstacle created by the prior circumstances. Therefore, the person in the example is an illustration that determinism only has circumstantial freedom, but the choice to exercise that freedom is an illusion in which metaphysical freedom is not applied. In comparison to the principles of compatibilism, determinism lacks the concept of moral responsibility, which is apparent in compatibilism (Fairlamb, 2007). There are options about freedom characterized by the statements such as people are determined, if people have such determination, then necessity for moral responsibility is inexistent, and also people has freedom and can be morally responsible at the same time.
Libertarianism suggests that people have metaphysical freedom and that everyone has a choice. In addition, determinism is false and that people are morally responsible. One of the arguments attributed to this position asserts that although events are caused by prior events, it is still not enough to precisely determine future events. For example, a person may choose to marry and it is a freedom that anyone can take regardless of the prior events. This means that getting married is a choice instead of a predetermined future that is not particular attributed to any causality (Harrison, 2006). In relation to human will, freedom is primarily uncaused because it is unintelligible. Therefore, libertarians provide the deterministic a form of compatibility, which is a kind of freedom that assures people of the will to do what they want, but taking responsibility for it. If determinism is based solely on the innate freedom to act, libertarianism is the opposite in which the results of an event are not predetermined, and that a person’s opportunity to choose should not be influenced by obstacles and other external factors.
However, the context of libertarianism suggests that determinism undermines the necessity for moral responsibility, hence, the existence of incompatibilism. The fact that determinism lacks moral responsibility, libertarianism emphasized that the issue of moral responsibility is about whether a reward or punishment should be afforded for one’s actions. From libertarianism, another position has emerged suggesting that determinism can be compatible with the sort of freedom, which necessitates moral responsibility (Harrison, 2006). For example, a man killed his friend because of heightened argument, in defense of the defendant he acted out of self-defense because his opponent is about to assault with a deadly weapon. In this example, the defendant seems to exercise his libertarianism freedom in which his choices was made in extreme urgency with his life at stake. He can choose to attack or not counter attack, however, his choice is to go head to head with his opponent resulting to the death of the other. On the other hand, just because his action was afforded to free himself from harm’s way, it doesn’t mean that he cannot be morally responsible for such action (Staley, 2005). The notion of moral responsibility between positions becomes the differentiating factor that determines the strength and weakness of one position over the other, which is emphasized in compatibilism. More importantly, compatibilism suggests that moral responsibility should be afforded by free will in order to make justification of certain actions.
Compatibilism is the Correct Choice
Given that compatibilism emphasizes the importance of moral responsibility in every action, it encompasses the advantage of two important areas of freedom. For one is the relevance of free will in choosing the way people live their lives through their actions. Secondly, having such freedom should also afford a great deal of moral responsibility in order to ascertain that human nature was preserved in every action. What sets human apart from the rest of the animal species is not all about the capacity for higher thinking and socialization, but also the capability of the human race to recognize moral dispositions. It is apparent that compatibilism seeks to give a notion of freedom that is different from the libertarianism and determinism positions. It is somehow compatible with the predetermined regardless if the overall premise of determinism is true or false.
Furthermore, compatibilism supports the view that the people’s actions despite some of them are predetermined it doesn’t mean that freedom was restrained in such choices and actions. In contrast compatibilism resists libertarianism only in the sense that freedom is absolute, but compatibilism do not imply that there is no true freedom because the ordinary sense of it encompasses the notion that people are still being able to do things as they please. Therefore, whether libertarianism or determinism is true or not, common sense tells that people has free will, but should not be at the expense of morality. Having a sense of morality within the notion of freedom is what makes compatibilism correct as compared to determinism and libertarianism. One cannot simply do things as they please regardless if it is circumstantial or a choice. There should always be moral responsibility afforded by such actions. Without sufficient attention to the moral significance of each action, people will lose sight of humanity.
Conclusion
In comparing determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism, it became apparent that the sense of freedom varies according to the three schools of thought. Determinism asserts that actions are predetermined while libertarianism suggests that actions are governed by choices. However, compatibilism can be perceived as a more correct position to demonstrate the notion of freedom in one’s actions, but within the context of moral responsibility. Therefore, every action regardless if circumstantial or a choice should encompass moral responsibility.
References
Bateman, C. (2014). Method and Metaphysics: A Legal Historian’s Canon. The Journal Jurisprudence,2(55), 1-58. Retrieved from http://www.jurisprudence.com.au/juris23/bateman.pdf
Chisholm, R. (1982). Human freedom and the self. In G. Watson, Free Will (1st ed., pp. 24-25). Lawrence, KS: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://www.philosophy.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/Chisholm-Human-Freedom-AND-Nagel-Moral-Luck.pdf
Fairlamb, H. (2007). Evolution of autonomy. Cosmos And History: The Journal Of Natural And Social Philosophy, 3(1), 59-92. Retrieved from http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/viewFile/55/109
Harrison, G. (2006). The Case for Hyper-Libertarianism. Kriterion, 20(1), 1-6. Retrieved from http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org/kriterion/issues/Kriterion-2006-20/Kriterion-2006-20-01-06-harrison.pdf
Staley, K. (2005). Aquinas: Compatibilist or Libertarian?. The Saint Anselm Journal, 2(2), 73-79. Retrieved from http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2h_22Staley.pdf
