1. Wise v. Mead 614 F. Supp.1131 (1985) Question: Was this sex discrimination and if so why?
The termination of Velva Wise was a form of sex discrimination. There is a horde of evidence to this assertion. Wise’s conduct and that of male employees Thomas, Butts and Boyd who had been previously involved in fights, were of equal seriousness, but the company (Mead) treated her differently from her male colleagues (leagle.com). Of all the fighting incidences, Mead fired only Ms. Wise for a first time involvement in a fight. Unlike Singleton who was terminated after being put on probation due to involvement in a second fight, Wise was terminated on her first fight without a warning (leagle.com). The language used during the fights not withstanding and based on circumstantial evidence it is evident that Mead treated the males and the plaintiff differently because of their sexes. The company discriminated against Wise because she was a woman.
2. Quinones v. Houser Buick, 436 F. 3d 284 1st Cir (2006): Question- Does he have a case and why?
Quinones does not have a case against Houser Buick. He was not adept with the flat rate payment system which he had opted for, and he acknowledges that he was not as adroit as the payment system required of him in order to make more money (law.justia.com). Additionally, Quinones had no evidence that Barnes, a white worker with whom he was under the same payment system was being paid more than him because he (Barnes) was white. In fact, fellow employees gave evidence that Barnes was more adroit in his work and, therefore, his higher salary was commensurate with his work (law.justia.com). Most of Quinones’s evidence is unfounded and unverifiable. He was unable to give names of his fellow Hispanic employees who he alleged were underpaid, and also the names of visitors who were treated better than his visitors. Quinones had never filed a prima facie case of discrimination and did so after 4 years. In summation, there is insufficient evidence to show that O’Connor underpaid Quinones and if indeed he was; the underpayment had to do with his nationality.
3. Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores,240 F.3d 255 4th Cir. (2001). Question: Did Lack have a case and why?
Lack had a case against Wal-Mart stores. The West Virginia Human Rights Act provided that in order for a court to sustain a sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must prove four elements. These are that the overtures directed at them were unwelcome; they were based on their sex, and the evidence must prove that the overtures amounted to an abusive work environment (law.justia.com). Additionally the evidence must be imputable on some facts to the employer. Wal-Mart did not refute the first and fourth elements. Though Wal-Mart refuted the second and third elements evidence pointed to the contrary. Bragg- Lack’s supervisor and who Lack alleged to have sexually harassed him, once told Lack “I need a small bag and not the one between your legs” (law.justia.com). This statement inter alia shows that Bragg harassed Lack because he (Lack) was male. Bragg retaliated to Lack’s disapproval of sexual harassment by overworking him (Lack). Wal-Mart was aware of Bragg’s harassment of Lack but took no immediate action to stop the abuse.
4. Grosjean v. First Energy,349 F 3d 332,6th Cir.(2003) Question: Does he have a case and why?
Grosjean does not have a case against First Energy. Grosjean aged 54 years at the time, alleged that he was demoted from a supervisory role due to his age contrary to the requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (law.justia.com). This was not true for several reasons. First, Grosjean had been rated as inadequate in dealing with his subordinated by his supervisor. He was, therefore, unfit to hold a supervisory position in First Energy. Secondly, his replacement-Riley was 51years old at the time and only 3 years his junior. As such ADEA recognized Grosjean and Riley to be in the same age bracket. Thirdly, Grosjean was unable to prove that First Energy discriminated against him because of his age. He also failed to file a case citing the alleged discrimination when it first surfaced. As such Grosjean does not have a case against First Energy.
Works Cited
Wise V. Mead Corp. 614 F.Supp. 1131 (1985)
United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division. August 6, 1985. Retrieved 7 November 2012 from: http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=3&xmldoc=19851745614FSupp1131_11585.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985&SizeDisp=7
349 F.3d 332: William Grosjean, Plaintiff-appellant, v. First Energy Corporation; Toledo Edison Energy, Defendants-appellees United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. - 349 F. 3d 332 Argued: August 7, 2003 Decided and Filed: November 13, 2003. Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206. Retrieved 7 November 2012 from: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/349/332/636841/
240 F.3d 255: Christopher Lack, Plaintiff-appellee, and Susan Willis, Plaintiff, v. Wal-mart Stores, Incorporated, a Company Licensed to Do Business in West Virginia, Defendant-appellant, and James Bragg, Defendant. United States Court Of Appeals, For the Fourth Circuit. - 240 F.3d 255. Argued: September 27, 2000. Decided: February 13, 2001. Retrieved 7 November 2012 from: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/240/255/564793/
436 F.3d 284: Jose Quinones, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Houser Buick, Defendant, Appellee United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. - 436 F.3d 284 Submitted January 11, 2006 Decided February 2, 2006 Retrieved 7 November 2012 from: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/436/284/593702/
