Military campaign in Syria, which Russia started in the end of September of 2015, naturally raised issues related to the goals of Russia in this conflict. Despite the fact that it was known earlier about Russian assistance to the government of Bashar al-Assad — it took many by surprise that Russians openly joined the war in Syria.
Russia officially announced that its aim in Syria is to create an international coalition to combat the ISIL terrorist group. In practice, Russia has nevertheless focused on the attack on other armed rebel groups. This focus helped to ensure the sustainability of the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. (Batchelor & Virtue)
Russian Foreign Policy Objectives in Syrian Conflict
Therefore, Russia's participation in military operations in Syria on the side of Bashar al-Assad leads to the fact that Russia is at war with the Caliphate, which previously had made its claims to the Caucasus and conducts outreach and recruitment of supporters also in Russia. This clash was unavoidable. It seems, Russia chose Syria for the first open clash.
However, was it the only reason for the overt Russian military intervention in Syria? At least currently the Caliphate does not pose a direct threat to Russia and the worst here is the organization of terrorist acts on the Russian territory. So far, militarily, the Caliphate is a medium-term threat for Russia, that lies in the context of informal religious and ideological impact that the Caliphate spreads throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union capturing people`s minds.
Consequently, along with purely military considerations, connected with the restriction of expansion of borders of the Caliphate (the present composition of the group of Russian armed forces in Syria, also the situation of Iraqi and Syrian armies hardly suggest a thumping victory over the Caliphate), it is crucial to weaken the core of the system of Jihad, in order to put breaks on the expansion of Jihadist ideology. Elimination of the Caliphate and its prominent leaders can seriously impede this process, and the fall of large cities, controlled by the Caliphate, can strike the prestige of the Caliphate among Islamic groups. And a number of defeats are able to change the whole approach to ISIS among subordinate groups and lead to internal conflicts, thereby deaccelerating the ideological expansion.
The level of support that Russia provided Syria with (military advisers, weapons, data of technical and satellite reconnaissance, ammunition) was insufficient, as the prospects of Assad`s military victory were rather vague, but the possibility of further loss of the territory was quite topical.
In this regard, it is hardly surprising that Russia strengthened its policy toward Syria supplying Assad with weapons, and proceeded to the intensive military assistance. It must be confessed that besides Russia on the side of the Syrian President there are also specialists from the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and fighters from Hezbollah movement dependent on Iran. Russia's military presence expands this conventional coalition and suggests that the Syrian President`s military affairs are getting better; although this help could be more effective a few years ago. (Miller) Начало формы
Конец формы
But it is also rather a consequence of the key reason why Russia intervened in the conflict. In the framework of the ongoing confrontation with the U.S. in the Ukraine, where there is a profound diplomatic deadlock, Russia used the failure of the strategy of Barack Obama in the Middle East and did its best to change the present format of relations with the U.S. speaking at the United Nations with a claim to its own perspective of the Syrian conflict and its future scenario. For the USA this maneuver and sending troops to Syria were unexpected, and the reaction to the actions of Russia turned out quite bewildering. The Russian Federation solving the urgent diplomatic issues to prevent international isolation plus the salvation of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, has made an interim diplomatic success (which is well observed even according to the comments of the U.S. press, where the American President was branded for the failures of Middle Eastern politics and the connivance to actions of Russians). (McCain & Graham) But due to more serious problems in Russia–United States relations this success does not lead to significant transformations of the targets of the parties in this war, where the US continues pursuing the goal of depriving Russia of the foreign policy subjectivity and pushing Russia out of the Crimea and the Donbass. In this respect, the US has received a painful flick on the forehead, but within the overall context of confrontation, this is nothing more than an episode, as the U.S. revising its approach toward Syria obviously will do everything to inhibit the military presence of Russia. Meanwhile the intervention of Russia predicts quick end to the Arab Spring. However today the war in Syria looks like a battlefield between two Great Powers which solve their issues in a region often without any coordination with Washington's policies.
According to the latest news, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin on March 14 ordered the Ministry of Defense to start the withdrawal of the main part of the Russian troops from Syria, noting that in general they have fulfilled the tasks. Air operation of Russia in Syria lasted 5.5 months. During this time Russian militaries managed to break the arms and ammunition support for terrorists, block the basic channels of illegal supplies of oil, and push militants back in several provinces. Thanks to the intervention of the Russian air space forces, it became possible to avoid the capture of the Syrian capital by militants, to stimulate other external players including the U.S.-led coalition forces to united actions to prevent terrorists from coming to power in the region. (bbc.com)
However, the goal of Russia today is not the defense of Syria “at any price” but the formation of a new international order in which Russia must win back its right to have a zone of influence and satellite states. In this sense, the decision to protect Syria up to taking military measures or to lease it under certain conditions should be made not under the influence of emotions and nostalgia for the Superpower but for quite selfish, cynical and unscrupulous reasons. The Kremlin is not guided by any sympathies or antipathies, it is guided by very clear objectives:
1. To retain power;2. To get released from the political isolation;3. To gain financial and economic stabilization;4. To ensure acceptable currency inflows into the country.
Traditional principles, those outdated political abstractions, such as “peace”, “international law” or “stable international relations” which lumber brains of the older generation and the old political elite, have lost their significance.
“Principles” in politics must be replaced by the subordinated system of the national interests, or otherwise the state will have to pay for its “principles” by a constant and steady loss of geopolitical influence.
If to speak separately about “the cause of peace and international law”, nothing serves the cause of durable peace as a good war, the war, finished in a certain way, with a clear foreign policy outcome, acknowledged by all parties of the conflict and third players. And the Syrian war is not an exception - the only question is: what will the outcomes be? An exemplary punishment of the aggressor would be the right outcome for Russia, the punishment of such a scale which would form a new “Vietnam syndrome” in NATO and the reluctance to participate in new colonial and punitive expeditions. By the way, the size of the Syrian territory (185 thousand square kilometers) and its population (22 million people) is quite comparable to North Vietnam at that time but, alas, Syria has no direct border with the allies, which complicates the task. But Iran has such a border – via the Caspian Sea. Therefore, the battle in Syria has just an intermediate importance until the clock strikes for Iran, where there will be clarified the limits of the U.S. and NATO for a new colonization of the Middle East. Of course, the fall of Syria would accelerate these events, and the hypothetical victory of Assad would be delayed. By the way, Russia has a chance for good benefits in both cases, and it is not necessary to assess this or that outcome of the Syrian “story” as an absolute loss. Syria is not the end, it is a midcourse maneuver.
Major Policy Instruments which Russia Uses to Achieve its Objectives
Focusing on the civil war in Syria and the refugee crisis, the world is distracted from Russia's interference in Ukraine's affairs. Sanctions imposed by the US and the European Union failed to force Russia to retreat. Slowly but steadily Russian President is using the perplexity of the USA and the West to bolster its influence. Thus, Putin returns the world to the opposition and struggle between the two blocs. Putin intends to fill the Middle East vacuum left by the policy of the USA, and consolidate influence in every country that has lost the support of the USA.
Russia's intervention in Syria in 2015 demonstrated a military strength that has largely succeeded thanks to the ongoing modernization program. Military modernization is a priority and it will continue despite Russia's financial problems. Modernization has created a much more compact and mobile military organization with a greater control. Military plans of the Russian government include modernization of strategic nuclear forces, air, sea, and land forces. The main focus is on the ability to control airspace and outer space, as well as long-range conventional precision-guided weapons. (Pifer)
Russia has made a significant progress in establishing responsive and organized forces, modern aviation, and air defense. In Syria there were demonstrated the reliability and the range of Russian bombers; the country's airspace was protected by “smart” missiles and combat aircrafts.
Increased mobility is the most important part of the Russian military reform along with best, less bureaucratic system of management and control.
The ability to quickly move armed forces gives Russia a political tool, which Putin willingly uses. In his first public comments after the announcement about the return of the Russian military from Syria, the Russian President reminded the world community that Russia at any time can easily go back there.
Conclusion
Russia shows greater willingness and ability to use a wide range of tools to achieve its political goals. Currently Russia continues its aggressive foreign policy. Russia shows its growing ambitions particularly in such geographical areas as the Middle East. Intervention in Syria demonstrates a clear shift in Russia's foreign policy. The defense sector is one of the priorities of modernization in Russia. The Russian military power supports high ambitions of the country the best possible way. Modernization of its military forces increases the ability of Russia's influence.
References
Batchelor, Tom and Rob Virtue. “Russia Destroys ISIS Targets in Air Strike Success as Ground War Erupts in Syria”. Express. October, 2015. Web. Accessed April 23, 2016 at <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/609326/Islamic-State-Syria-Russian-airstrikes?_ga=1.260767949.1925964859.1461651193>
BBC. “Syria conflict: Russia's Putin Orders 'Main Part' of Forces out”. bbc.com. March, 2016. Web. Accessed April 25, 2016 at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35807689>
McCain, John and Lindsey Graham. “McCain and Graham: Obama is Failing the Middle East, and U.S. Interests There”. Washington Post. October, 2013. Web. Accessed April 25, 2016 at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mccain-and-graham-obama-is-failing-the-middle-east-and-us-interests-there/2013/10/25/47e8f016-3d83-11e3-a94f-b58017bfee6c_story.html>
Miller, James. “If The Goal Is To Defeat Islamic State, Don't Rely On Russia To Help”. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. April, 2016. Web. Accessed April 24, 2016 at <http://www.rferl.org/content/if-goal-is-to-defeat-is-dont-rely-on-russia/27668912.html>
Pifer, Steven. “Pay Attention, America: Russia Is Upgrading Its Military”. The National Interest. February, 2016. Web. Accessed April 25, 2016 at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/pay-attention-america-russia-upgrading-its-military-15094>
