The most important preconditions of the Cold War are considered to be the "long telegram" by Kennan and Novikov's analytical review entitled "the U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period." The importance of these documents lies in their objectivity, since each of the authors of these documents describes directly the actions of the States they belonged to due to the duty of service. Kennan saw the main danger for American values in subversive worldwide activities of agents of Soviet influence, in the face of the communist parties and supporters of communism in general. At the same time, Novikov considered the essence and purpose of the U.S. foreign policy to be creation of a global system of military bases. Its goal was defined as the desire for world domination.
"The long telegram" by Kennan and Novikov's analytical paper contained polar positions; however both of them were the products of their time. They were created at a time when the speech by Winston Churchill was voiced in Fulton and when the U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union was clear and debates about the possible and probable "World War III" took place. All these were the harsh realities that forced to reckon with.
These documents are ways of expression and reflection of the times in which they were created; simultaneously, the fate of the two documents under consideration was different. The first of these, known as the "long telegram by Kennan," is mostly considered by historians of foreign policy and U.S. diplomacy unanimously as the instrument that has had the greatest influence on the official circles and the American public, as happened with the "long telegram". Not surprisingly, it generated a plume of research and even until nowadays has been regarded as a key document in the conceptual design of the American policy of "containment" of communism.
The U.S. diplomat expressed his vision of the foundations of Soviet foreign policy as a continuation of the traditions of expansionist Czarist Russia, multiplied by a permanent tendency of Marxism and Leninism to expand its influence. Kennan stated: " We are dealing here with political force committed fanatically to believe that the U.S. can not reach permanent mode of Vivendi, which is desirable and necessary to disrupt the internal harmony of our society and destroy our traditional way of life, to eliminate the international influence of our country, in order to ensure the safety of Soviet power" (Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., 1995, 12).
The "Long Telegram" by Kennan was widely circulated in governmental circles in Washington and laid the foundations of American policy of "containment." It included the active promotion of more attractive ideological and political alternatives by the West, combined with military pressure on the USSR. In the sickening atmosphere of "cold war" and anti-Soviet hysteria the force of projection of Kennan thought, his political realism and aspirations for the future remained as unnoticed.
Impact and compositional features and lexical structure of telegrams, which contained contrasting counterpoint of two principles - constructive (in the face of the United States) and destructive (in the face of Soviet Union), has also influenced greatly the general situation between the two superpowers. Besides, some ambiguity laid also on the thesis of the impenetrability of Moscow to the "logic of reason" and its sensitivity to the "logic of force." Later, forced to clarify its position with respect to the use of force in situations of conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Kennan gave his personal interpretation: "This is something that I have never approved, and I have never spoken about" (Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., 1995, 18).
The peculiar equivalent of a "long telegram" by Kennan was the policy note of the Soviet ambassador on U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period K. Novikov, prepared by him in September 1946. K. Novikov pointed out in his note: "U.S. foreign policy that reflects the imperialist tendencies of American monopoly capital in the postwar period is characterized by a desire for world domination. That is the true meaning of the repeated statements by the President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles that the United States has the right to world leadership" (Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., 1995, 23). According to Novikov, the service of foreign policy demanded all possible forces of the Army, Air Forces and Navy of the United States, its scientific and industrial potential, all the forces of the American diplomacy. The note of the Soviet ambassador could thus be summarized by the idea of tough rebuff to far-reaching political and military efforts of the United States.
Thus there was a system of representations, characteristic of the Cold War: a global and total confrontation between the two superpowers, the idea of Soviet-American relations as "zero-sum game," hostile rhetoric on both sides. If Kennan considered the subversive activities worldwide agents of Soviet influence as the greatest danger with American values (through the Communist parties and sympathizers of communism in general), then the Novikov saw the essence of U.S. foreign policy as one embodied in the creation of a global system of military bases. Its purpose was defined as the desire for world domination. In this case, although reservations have been made, the overall picture of the world was drawn by the same method of dichotomous dissection - on one side the forces of good were placed, on the other side – evil forces.
However, the process of idologization foreign policy thinking of Soviet diplomacy can not be underestimated since is rapidly gained momentum. In many cases, it transformed the country's diplomatic service into a prisoner of preconceived schemes that did not keep up with changing circumstances and a live stream of completely new phenomena and trends. Therefore, the "Long Telegram" by Kennan and Novikov's analytical paper written with the polar positions, and those having different "viewing platforms", were the products of their specific time, the manner of expression.
References
1. Kenneth M. Jensen, ed. Origins of the Cold War: the Novikov, Kennan, and Robert’s ‘Long Telegrams’ of 1946 (Washington, D.C.:, Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 3 – 31.
