Abstract
When the Soviet Union collapsed in the 1990s after the Cold War, the international arena has shifted drastically from the nature of the status quo to the conflicts that continues to trouble several regions today. In terms of the status quo, many nations adhered to democratization that resolved many conflicts that were influenced by the Cold War. On the other hand, the nature of conflicts after the Cold War have drastically changed as some wars are now fought by different actors and the intensity of each conflict varies. At the present time, conflicts persist throughout the globe and even though some conflicts do not escalate into full-scale wars or inter-state conflicts, these conflicts tend to force the international community to intervene. Out of these inter-state conflicts that have occurred after the Cold War, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border crisis of 1998 to 2000 earned international attention and prompted the necessity for intervention.
The conflict involved two Middle Eastern nations which aimed to increase their presence in the region and subsequently affected their bilateral relations and stability. Casualties have been reported in both sides and several strategies were done to resolve the conflict. International action had also been present in the conflict: from the joint US-Rwandan action, the OAU to the United Nations. This paper argues that while international strategies were done by the international community in the 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea Crisis, it was not enough to stop the animosity between Ethiopia and Eritrea given the nature of international intervention proposed by the US-Rwanda joint proposal, the OAU and the UN. In order to analyze the extent of the crisis and international action, this paper will be divided into three sections: the cause and nature of the conflict, the strategies imposed by the international community to stop the conflict, and the outcome of the conflict, especially its current status.
Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Crisis of 1998
The Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States is often considered the war that has drastically influenced the state of the international arena even at the present time. The War had revised the major players in the international community and influenced the ideologies that ran rampantly in major areas that caused conflict to rise consistently. After the Cold War, inter-state conflicts continue to cause problems for the international community and one of them is the Ethiopia-Eritrea border crisis in 1998. Although the conflict is no longer a major concern for both countries, continuous strife remains heavy between both factions even if the international community has intervened in the conflict. In order to expound on the nature of this inter-state conflict, this paper will be divided into three sections: the causes of the conflict, the strategies which were used to resolve the conflict and the outcome of the conflict. While the international community has applied intervention strategies in the 1998 Border Crisis, it was not enough to stop the animosity between Eritrea and Ethiopia given the nature of international intervention proposed in the period by the US-Rwandan facilitating committee, the OAU and the UN.
The history of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea can be traced back since 1971 when the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) fought against Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam who was supported by the Soviet Union. According to Hamilton (2000), the EPLF joint forces with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to fight against the Mengistu government. Both groups were successful in taking over Ethiopia in 1991 with TPLF’s leader Meles Zenawi became Ethiopia’s Prime Minster and Eritrea was given its independence in 1993 with EPLF leading the country as its first president. Many considered this period to be the start of peace in the region and the change in leadership in Africa and even the US lauded this change in the region. Both leaders were also very amicable with one another as their relations have always been cordial and personal in basis. Their relations slowly faded in 1997, Ethiopian military slowly moved in Eritrea and dismantled the control of Eritrean governments starting from the southwestern region. After a month, the Ethiopian government moved to Badme on the Yirga Triangle close to the southwestern Eritrean border. According to the Eritrean government, they sent unarmed military personnel to confront the Ethiopian military and peacefully drive them away from their territory. However, instead of listening to the Eritrean military, the Ethiopians shot the officers dead which Ethiopia then denied as both parties had reported casualties. A week since the incident, Eritrea sent its own troops in full battle gear from Badme to a territory under Ethiopian rule and easily claimed the region after a few weeks .
Experts are divided with regards to the root causes of Ethiopia’s sudden movement to Eritrea; however, the International Crisis Group (2003) indicated that it is likely that the tension was brought by the ambiguity of the borders of both countries. Both countries do not have a clear demarcation as to where their territories end or begin as some areas are open freely for their people who are looking for employment or areas for herding. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have also been engaged with various colonial treaties from 1900 to 1908. In some border areas of Eritrea and Ethiopia, both countries have overlapping jurisdiction as seen in Badme. Badme’s people vote for Ethiopian leaders and their currency is the Ethiopian Birr. However, Eritrea claims that Badme itself should be a part of its territory and not Ethiopia. Unfortunately, given the lack of clear demarcation, even the diplomats are not aware as to how many people actually live in Eritrea or Ethiopia and which country should control this area. Although the leaders of both nations have a battlefield alliance which allows easier communication between them, both Ethiopia and Eritrea never officially formalized this partnership into a binding foreign relationship. Both also failed to address how they can determine how their people can be identified as Ethiopians and Eritreans. As a result, the records of the population of both countries since Eritrea’s independence were freely shared and interpreted by both countries. Both countries also laid conflicting claims over the border and it was only in 1998 did a military action was launched by one country to stake their claim .
In response to the outbreak of the conflict, the international community immediately sent out groups to try and stop the conflict from growing. According to Lata (2003), the first group which tried to attempt to stop the Eritrea and Ethiopia conflict was the partnership between Rwanda and the United States. The two countries sent a group of Facilitators - comprising Susan Rice from the US State Department, Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame and Gayle Smith of the US National Security Council – to assist in the negotiations. The small team had moved between Asmara and Addis Ababa to negotiate terms with both countries from May 17 to 29, 1998 before consolidating a recommendation to both parties. Three major points were recommended by the Facilitators for both countries which also included the investigation of the May 6 confrontation that eventually triggered the conflict in the first place.
Both countries would accept in seeking the clarification of their common borders as based on both established colonial treaties and international law that these treaties cover;
These countries would also accept an observer mission from the Rwandan government with support of the United States in the town in dispute;
Once the Rwandan-US Observer Team is in Badme, Eritrean forces would start redeploying their soldiers and return back to their original posts prior to the conflict and allow the civilian government to resume order.
The third point is a clear victory to the Ethiopians because they had managed to influence the Facilitators into agreeing that Eritrean withdrawal is a must. However, it is a question as to which these positions are considering the questions behind the borders of both countries. The wording is also very vague as it says ‘to positions held before May 6, 1998’, which may be moot considering that some of these soldiers may be positioned in contested borders and may trigger another conflict all together. In the side of the Eritreans, they wanted the Facilitators to include the clause that stresses that Ethiopia publicly declares where their territorial claims are and their exactly coordinates so it can be verified by the observer team. Unfortunately, this was not included in the proposal and Ethiopia immediately accepted the proposal by the US-Rwanda Facilitator Team on June 4, 1998. Eritrea did not accept the proposal for two major reasons. First, acceptance would immediately mean that they are surrendering their territory to Ethiopia and it would not coincide with their persistence that there are no boundaries that were breached in any way. The second reason was that their acceptance would imply that Ethiopia’s claims are valid and that Eritrea has been aggressive towards Ethiopia. With Eritrea denouncing the proposal and Ethiopia all for the creation of a plan, it eventually disabled the US-Rwandan proposal completely .
The second international effort to try and pacify the two nations came from the Organization of African Unity on November 1998. According to the report of the group Human Rights Watch (2003), the OAU sent in a delegation that would try and attempt to continue the US-Rwandan effort on November 8, 1998. The OAU presented an eleven-point framework which included redeployment of forces close to the contested border city with the supervision of the OAU and the UN. It also included provisions that would address the potential socioeconomic impacts that the crisis would cause to both Ethiopians and Eritreans that would be affected by the crisis. The framework also included aspects regarding the human rights and humanitarian problems that are happening because of the conflict and indicated how the two countries can resolve the issue. Paragraph 8-a, for example, indicated that both countries should stop actions towards the civilian population that causes suffering to either nationalities. The following paragraph, Paragraph 8-b then indicated that those who have been deported since the beginning of the war and assist in their recovery. Paragraph 8-C also included clauses on the OAU and the UN to establish human rights monitors that would reduce the animosity between both countries. Ethiopia had accepted the OAU framework almost immediately when it was presented to them; but Eritrea had several reservations regarding the proposal. First, the country did not wish to withdraw all of its forces in Badme and in other contested territories due to the possible repercussions of this action. They also contested the issue on human rights because there is no clear reference on how compensation can be given to expelled citizens, especially “illegally-expelled” Eritrean nations. However, the country had agreed to the OAU framework on February 27, 1999 after Ethiopia disabled Eritrea’s defenses and captured Badme. Unfortunately, both countries remained in dispute with regards to the interpretation of the eleven-point proposal and triggered the hostilities once more.
The OAU resumed its attempts in stopping the fighting between both countries when the OAU leadership was now under Algeria’s control. The OAU announced in its July 1999 summit in Algiers a “Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU’s Framework Agreement” which would create a compromise on how the document can be interpreted by both parties. The one-page document did not have a clause regarding the issue on expelled and deported citizens, but it did highlight the call for withdrawals to be done by both countries and return back to their positions prior to May 6, 1998. Eritrea accepted the modalities on July 14, stressing that this would address the humanitarian impacts of the crisis and call for the compensation of deported citizens due to the pain caused by the conflict. Ethiopia had also accepted modalities, but this was not enough to quell the tensions between both parties due to the issue of the expelled citizens. Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi even said that they will be watching Eritrea if it will accept without question the ruling without question. They even threatened that they will resume fighting if the OAU plan was not accepted by Eritrea completely . Dagne (2000) then indicated that the OAU also released the “Technical Arrangements” which enunciated further the use of colonial treaties and other applicable laws to determine the borders of both countries. It also included the redeployment of troops and the responsibilities of the civilian government and the UN .
Both countries continued to negotiate regarding the Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, stopping the fighting completely. According to Healy (2008), the agreement was signed in June 2000 and later on formalized under the Algiers Agreement on December 12, 2000. The Agreement established the 25km demilitarized Transitional Security Zone (TSZ) and the United Nations would provide a peacekeeping force – United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) - to ensure that the TSZ is respected by both countries. The Agreement also finalized the adjudication process for the disputed border through the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and provided compensation claims which has been lobbied by Eritrea since the US-Rwandan negotiations under the Claims Commission . Zondi and Rejouis (2006) added that the UNMEE originally focused on peacekeeping in the TSZ, but under UN Security Council Resolution 1430, it was tasked to assist the EEBC to implement its delimitation decision with independent ruling bodies. The UNMEE was also able to monitor the full cessation of hostilities between both countries and stop military deployments from both sides in their respective buffer zones .
Despite these provisions under the Algiers Agreement, Gray (2006) indicated that the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea continued to persist because of the complexities of the Claims Commission. The Claims Commission had overstepped its jurisdictional capability as it was only meant to provide claims for humanitarian violation victims rather than identify who is responsible for the war. The Commission also failed in identifying as to which country should be responsible for the human rights violations done to the people. There is also the problem with regards to the EEBC’s jurisdiction, especially when it had issued its decision regarding delimitation on April 13, 2002. In the decision, three zones of the boundary were under the three colonial treaties which identify which country holds the border. The decision also indicated that it is Eritrea that owns most of the contested territories, and while both countries accepted the binding decision itself, Ethiopia did not wish to have the demarcation begin in its territory. The country filed a ‘Request for Interpretation, Correction and Consultation’ on May 13, 2002 to challenge the decision and the EEBC rejected this request. Ethiopia continued to resist the decision and comment against the Delimitation Decision. The EEBC offered a new report on March 2003 entitled ‘Observations’ to give both countries the idea on how the demarcation was done based on a 1902 colonial treaty and the administrative acts imposed in the area. Ethiopia became more hostile with regards to this report and sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General on September 19, 2003 expressing their disagreement over the decision.
As a result, the demarcation process remained unable to proceed even though the UN Security Council continuously called for Ethiopia to participate in the demarcation process in 2004. The UN SC released Resolution 1531 on March 12, indicating their concern over Ethiopia’s refusal and urged it to cooperate in the demarcation process. Two more Resolutions – Resolution 1586 (2005) and 1622 (2005) - were also released to call Ethiopia’s cooperation without conditions. Since Ethiopia ignored these calls, Eritrea slowly stopped its cooperation with the UNMEE which complicated matters with regards to the enforcement of the UNMEE of the EEBC’s decisions regarding the border demarcation .
Conflict is still a huge possibility in a time of peace, especially if nations have found themselves in a disagreement regarding territory, sovereignty and national security. For Ethiopia and Eritrea, the 1998 border conflict was bound to happen due to the lack of distinction between borders of these countries. Both countries presented that the presence of lapses with regards to the demarcation of its borders that triggered the conflict. The international community has sent out several groups in order to stop the conflict from escalating; however, their actions were unable to meet the demands of both countries and triggered more fighting. While a peace agreement was met under the OAU, it is clear that the two parties remain unsatisfied and hostilities remain even at the present time. Considering these factors, the international community must launch a more extensive study of the contested territories and identify points for consideration before providing their recommendations to the contesting parties in order to ensure that both contesting parties would be heard without the other influencing these recommendations.
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