EU Common Security and Defense Policy
Increasing threats of the terrorism and insecurity have thrown the world into a frantic run of securing countries and regions. For the last few years, many countries have anchored their primary policies around the issue of security. Increasing cases of radicalization among the youth in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East have forced policy makers to rethink their strategies of curbing insecurity. To ensure increased protection of the citizens, governments, and regional blocs have taken to developing systems and policies that safeguard the people from acts of terrorism and insecurity.
However, these policies are confronted with challenges and obstacles when it comes to their implementation. The focus of this paper is on the Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. The discussion is centered on some of the shortcomings of that policy in its quest to achieve its goals (Cross, 2011, p. 48). The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union is the basis of European Security and Defense and Policy. It provides a framework for the European Union member states to follow when developing their security policies. Over the years, debate has been raised about the need for establishing the effectiveness of the policy.
The Common Security Defense Policy was launched in 1999 by the European Council. In its sixteen years of its existence, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), has faced a number of challenges with the increasing crises of borders and territories. There has been an increase in external and internal security threats. For the European Union, the drastic increase in global security threats has created a new challenge for the European Union especially in terms of creating stability in its environs and protecting the region (Cross, 2011, p. 53). Crucial processes were put in place to ensure that the military instruments and institutional structures had been established to bolster the capacity of the policy implementation.
A practical approach was necessary for ensuring the creation of effective mechanisms that would deal with insecurity in Europe and its geopolitical neighborhood. The creation of the Common Security and Defense Policy can be looked at as one of the most important events in the history of the European Union. The goal of the policy was to ensure that a multinational military tool was created for use by the entire European region (European Defense Agency, 2010, p. 6). The military tool that was to be created would be used by the European Union in situations that required military intervention across the globe.
The success of the policy would ultimately result in the creation of a European Army and allow for the merging of the individual member states of the European Union. The end goal for such a scenario would be the creation of a single unitary state composed of all the European Union member states. The flop of the CSDP, on the other hand, would depict a failure in pooling of military resources of member states (Cross, 2011, p. 69). The failure would thus mean that the role and participation of the European Union on the international scene would be undermined and diminished.
The historical background of the Common Security and Defense Policy can be traced back to the Treaty of Dunkirk, which was signed in 1947 by France and the United Kingdom. The Treaty facilitated mutual assistance and alliance between the two countries. Its sole aim, however, was to ensure protection against any form of renewed German aggression. After one year, the treaty was expanded to include three more countries which were Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg (European Defense Agency, 2010, p. 13). The treaty went on to incorporate a mutual defense clause since it was primarily created to protect against any German aggression.
The clause created a platform for military assistance among the member states in case of an attack. This clause was crucial in the treaty owing to the fact that it was a binding factor against any form of attack directed towards any states that were signatories to the treaty. The creation of the Western Union Defense Organization in 1948 was a move to meet the goals of the treaty. The military agency became a precursor to both the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A meeting at the Cologne European Council in 1999 would see the agreement establish a European Security Defense Policy, the affirmation of the Union’s roles and objectives and most importantly, the integration of the Western European Union into the European Union.
The last step was the formation of the common policy for security for the European Union was attained through the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. The mutual defense clause of the Western European Union was superseded by the call for obligatory solidarity that the Lisbon Treaty incorporated. The first move to establishing a formidable military force by the European Union was achieved when the CSDP was allowed to conduct tasks that had been described in the Helsinki European Council of 1999. To understand the impact of the CSDP in regards to the accomplishment of its goals, one has to consider some of the military interventions that have been accomplished as a result of the implementation of the policy.
Such an analysis allows for the evaluation of the success, or failure thereof, of the military policy of the European Union. The onset of the Libyan Crisis in 2011 provides a credible start point for the evaluation of the impact and success of the CSDP. The European Union declared its interest in the Libyan Crisis in 2011 through the launch of a solidarity operation that was aimed at protecting the migration flows that were ongoing in the region. This would later escalate into bomb attacks by France and the United Kingdom against Gaddafi’s forces.
The participation of France and the United Kingdom in the bombing marked the official entrance of the European Union into the crisis owing to the fact that the two countries have the most powerful militaries within the Union. The European Union would later go on to create the EUFOR Libya that was aimed at providing humanitarian support and for the Libyan operation. However, the European Union exhibited a great deal of struggle in terms of its preparedness to deal with conflicts of such magnitude. The European Union, in comparison to NATO, exhibited a lack of experience in such military interventions. NATO has been actively involved in defense, military planning, and conflict intervention for over six decades.
For the European Union, on the other hand, the member states faced a challenge in terms of implementing CSDP. Despite showing the desire to intervene on the international scene, as depicted in the Lisbon Treaty, the lack of harmonization within the European Union member states greatly impacted the on the outcome of its intervention in Libya. The European Union exhibits a great deal of bureaucracy, which impedes its decision-making process, more specifically in relation to the CSDP. A myriad of military institutions and defense policies impact the decision-making process of the European Union and in effect cause a drag in numerous directions.
The institutions that have been created within the Union have a limited capacity to provide proper guidance of the issues related to the CSDP. The division in the European Union is one of the major causes of the failures by the union. The move by the United Kingdom and France to launch joint attack highlighted the lack of a harmonious security and military narrative in the region. The pro-European approaches that had been stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty were violated, therefore, creating a political and military damage to the European Union at large. What can be deduced from the joint action by France and the United Kingdom is that a difference of actions could be witnessed from the individual member states owing to a difference in interest.
The Libyan Crisis points at some of the flaws that the European Union has to reevaluate if it is to strengthen its military intervention capacities. The performance of the European Union provided a solid reason for revision the military policy of the European Union as stipulated by the CSDP. The EUFOR Concordia was an intervention of the European Union in the ethnic conflicts of Macedonia and Yugoslavia (De Waele, 2011, p. 51). The operation marked the very first military mission that was sponsored by the European Union. It was also one of critical importance to the Union.
However, on a deeper analysis, one realizes that the success was largely influenced by the fact that NATO had already carried out three major operations in the area. The entry of EUFOR Concordia found an already safe environment for a low-intensity operation. It took three months for the European Union to plan and operationalize the EUFOR Concordia mission (Helly, 2009, p. 343). The mission was tasked with creating peace and providing support to the development and stability of Yugoslavia. The operationalization of the mission included the use of the Berlin Plus agreement that allowed the European Union to make use assets of NATO (Koops, 2010, p. 61).
Despite the success of the mission in terms of bringing about peace and stability, the magnitude of the process was insignificant since the previous mission by NATO had already established a solid foundation (Koops, 2010, p. 73). The European Agency for Reconstruction would soon take over from the military mission, further providing proof that the region had stabilized enough. The fact that a non-military mission was taking over meant that safety and peace had been attained in the region (De Waele, 2011, p. 58).
Ideally, understanding the failure of the Common Security and Defense Policy lies in understanding the goals and aims of its creation. The focus of its creation had been a united the European region that would allow for the creation of a unitary force of military power. In turn, that would allow for the protection of the region and participation in international peacekeeping processes. However, since its inception, its interventions have been marred by failure and little impact. Divided and individual missions by member states continue to occur despite the binding obligations of the Lisbon Treaty. The failure of the policy, fundamentally, lies in its inability to establish a unitary military power and harmonization of interventions in the region.
The European Union has been involved in numerous military interventions; however, most of them have been of little significance. This can be attributed to the absence of harmony within the group. The lack of a common language in relation to a single military unit in the European Union also impacts on its ability to build the capacity of its existing military unit. A crucial aspect of the military involves the financial capacity to facilitate its operations. The contributions of the member states of the European Union to the CSDP are relatively low. This hugely affects the operationalization of the Common Security and Defense Policy.
A lack of consistency and harmony within the European Union can be singled out as the major cause of a prevalence of failure and unaccomplished goals of the union. A common military action is a crucial part of defense of any region against security threats. Economic and regional blocks around the world have managed to establish functional military units that continue to offer necessary defense services to their regions. The secret success begins with proper funding for the group before it can accomplish its goals effectively. This has been one of the challenges for the CSDP which has failed to solicit for adequate funding to full operationalize its activities.
In essence, the focus of the policy was to enhance the participation of the European Union in military interventions around the world. It was to also help the European Union protect itself and create a stable geopolitical environment. The importance of such a unit lay in the capacity to have a military power that would protect the sovereignty of the various EU member states. Looking at the role that the military unit was to play, one realizes that the success or failure of the CSDP would hold huge implications.
For the success of CSDP in the long term, there is need to strengthen some of the weaknesses inherent in the Lisbon Treaty. The decision making process can also be made simpler because presently EU has been hampered by bureaucracy. Member states also have to responsible because taking individual military actions undermines the spirit of the CDSP. A good example is the military action undertaken by France and the United Kingdom. There should be a means of discouraging such actions if the CSDP is to succeed. Perhaps, if the EU manages to speak with one voice and take action as a bloc instead of individual states, then it would be one of the most formidable blocs in the world because it has the financial muscle, and the capacity to pool its military resources.
References
Cross, M., 2011. Towards European Security Integration. Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-Based Networks are Transforming the European Union (pp. 42-76). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
De Waele, H., 2011. The Common Security and Defense Policy. Layered Global Player: Legal Dynamics of EU External Relations (pp. 47-59). New York City: Springer.
European Defense Agency, 2010. Defense Data 2009 (pp. 1-27). Brussels: European Defense Agency.
Helly, D., 2009. EUFOR Tchad/RCA. In Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, Daniel Keohane (Eds.), European Security and Defense Policy: the First Ten Years (1999-2009) (pp. 339-352). Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
Keohane, D., 2009. ESDP and NATO. In Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, Daniel Keohane (Eds.), European Security and Defense Policy: the First Ten Years (1999-2009) (pp. 127-138). Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
Koops, J., 2010. Unstrategic Partners: NATO’s Relations with the European Union.Entangling Alliance: 60 Jahre NATO. Geschichte, Gegenwart, Zukunft (pp. 41-77). Trier: Wissenschaftsverlag.
