In 219 BCE general Hannibal Barca the son of Hamilcar Barca, who had led the First Punic War laid siege to Saguntum which was an ally of the Romans (Polybius, book II). This violated the treaty that Hamilcar had signed with Rome ten years before (Polybius, book III). The Romans ordered the Carthaginians to hand Hannibal over to Rome. The Carthaginians refused and the Second Punic War began in 218 BCE. Hannibal was aware that Rome had a superior navy and that the Romans intended to use their navy to invade Carthage. Hannibal however had other plans. His strategy was to mount an invasion by marching his troops from Spain over the Alps into Northern Italy (Polybius). His plan was to force the Roman army to abandon their plans to attack Carthage. The trek across the Alps cost Hannibal over 10,000 men and almost all of his elephants.
Once Hannibal had reached Northern Italy he enlisted help from the Gauls living in the Po Valley. His strategy was to win the Gallic tribes over by defeating Rome, one battle at a time. Hannibal believed that he could weaken Rome’s military power by conquering cities throughout Italy. Rome would have no choice but to sign a new peace treaty, according to Carthage’s terms. (Potter). Hannibal quickly won a battle at Ticinus after which 14,000 Gauls joined his fight against Rome. (Potter). This forced the Roman army to put their plans to attack Carthage on hold. Hannibal would follow his win at Ticinus with victories at both Trebia and Trasimene. Contrary to Hannibal’s expectations, Trebia and Trasimene refused to join his campaign against Rome. This forced him to have to go into southern Italy in an attempt to garner military support (Carey). Eventually, Hannibal found himself stuck in southern Italy without the necessary troops to implement a siege.
The Roman Senate appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator. Fabius was the general of the Roman army (Carey). Fabius decided to tail Hannibal’s troops, but refused to engage him. This was because many of Fabius’ troops were inexperienced. Rather than engage Hannibal in battle. Fabius cut off the supplies to Hannibal’s army. A rumor spread that Fabius was really in league with the Carthaginians (Potter). This led to the Roman’s replacing Fabius with Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus (Potter). Paulus would soon face Hannibal and his army at Cannae in 216 BCE in what would be one of the most important battles of the Punic War. (Potter)
The Battle of Cannae
Hannibal’s strategy at Cannae was brilliant. He led his men down the center of the line, knowing that the Roman army would focus on them. When the Roman army behaved accordingly, pressing what they felt was an advantage. Hannibal’s brother Hasdrubel’s army closed in on them from behind and on the sides (Potter). The Roman army was badly defeated, losing about 70,000 men or the equivalent of 7 legions (Potter) According to Livy they also lost 2 Quaestors, 29 of 48 military tribunes, a few of who held the rank of consulate the year prior. They also lost a number of Senators and men who would have been potential Senators (Potter). Hannibal’s army only lost 6000 men (Potter). After Hannibal’s decisive defeat of Rome in Cannae many of Rome’s allies switched sides (Potter).
After Cannae
After Hannibal’s success at Cannae several cities revolted against Rome in order to join Hannibal. Rome still maintained allies in the central part of Italy. Hannibal created an alliance with Philip V of Macedonia. Philip V attacked the Roman city of Illyria. Things were looking bad for Rome. They had lost a large amount of territory, and many of their alliances (Potter). Rome’s enemies were also lining up to take advantage of their situation. Despite the Rome refused to give into Hannibal’s peace demands. Instead Rome began recruiting new armies (Potter).
Hannibal tried and failed to take the port cities of Cumae and Puteoli. This inhibited his ability to receive new troops. Hannibal quickly decided to capture Tarentum in 213 BCE along with a number of other ports. This enabled Hannibal to receive the troops sent by Philip V of Macedonia (Potter). In 212 BCE Rome laid siege to Capua and Syracuse cutting off Hannibal’s line of contact. Hannibal tried to divert Rome’s siege of Capua by making it look he and his men were going to conquer the city of Rome. Hannibal did this by camping out with his troops outside the walls of Rome for several years (Polybius). The Romans were not intimidated by this because they were secure in the fact that Rome could not be taken. Rome finally took Capua in 211 BCE. The Roman’s recaptured Tarentum along with a number of other cities in 209 BCE (Potter).
Rome also began advancing on Hispania at this time (Polybius). Hannibal reached out to his brother Hasdrubel for help. (Polybius) In 207 BCE Hasdrubel’s troops were defeated before they could reach Hannibal (Polybius). Hannibal was now reduced to attacking areas of southern Italy. General Publius Cornelius Scipio, who would later be known as Scipio Africanus conquered Hispania in 206 BCE weakening Philip V’s power (Potter). Scipio realizes that Hannibal would be recalled to Carthage if Carthage was attacked, did just that. He took a fleet to North Africa, where he captured the Carthaginian city of Utica. As he predicted the Carthaginians called Hannibal back to Carthage in 203 BCE (Potter).
The Battle of Zama
After a few small skirmishes Hannibal and Scipio finally clashed at the Battle of Zama in North Africa in 202 BCE. Scipio was a fan of Hannibal’s military strategies. He had spent a lot of time studying Hannibal and his tactics. When Hannibal tried to reuse the strategy from Cannae, Scipio was ready and easily defeated Hannibal. In fact, they reversed it. Scipio’s men killed the men riding the elephants and then they sent the elephants back to the Carthaginians. Scipio’s army then followed with the cavalry and infantry trapping Hannibal’s men between them. Hannibal then had no choice but to request that Carthage surrender.
In conclusion, Hannibal failed in his campaign against Rome because he was not able to keep a sufficient number of men or make sound military decisions. First, he lost a third of his army crossing the Alps and even though he won a number of battles, including Cannae which many consider to be his greatest success. He was not able to capitalize on his victory properly. Secondly, he and his men camped out outside the walls of Rome for nearly ten years. During this time there was a large number of small skirmishes. Each one costing Hannibal more lives that for him were not easily replaced as Rome had cut off most of his lines of communication and his ability to receive more supplies. Finally, his fatal mistake was reusing the tactic he used at Cannae. This is because once a tactic is used successfully the opposing side makes it a point not only to figure out a way to prevent the same outcome in the future. The becomes expected and the enemy watches for signs that it will be implemented once again.
Works Cited
Carey, Brian Todd., Joshua B. Allfree, and John Cairns. Hannibal's Last Battle: Zama and the Fall of Carthage. Yardley, PA: Westholme, Pub., 2008. Print.
Polybius. "The Histories." Polybius • Histories. Loeb Classical Library Edition, Web. 04 Feb. 2016.
Potter, D. S. Ancient Rome: A New History. 2nd ed. New York: Thames & Hudson, 2009. Print.
