Intellectual property is universally characterized as non-physical property, which is a product of the unique thought. The control of physical expressions of ideas surrounds the intellectual property. The intellectual property protects the content’s- creator’s concern in the ideas by allocating and imposing the legal rights to create and control of the somatic instantiation of the ideas. This essay intends to examine the meaning of intangible property in relation to Adam Moore’s ideas.
According to Moore, intangible property can imply various aspects but all of them should have the feature of non-physical property types whose control surrounds the physical tokens. The primary purpose of this control is to protect the rights associated with the types and abstract ideas. The intangible properties are non-rivalrous, which means that numerous people can use these properties at the same time. Take an example of book that is published and produced in numerous copies. The author is always one or a specific number of authors. This book is accessed and read by numerous people in the world (Moore, 4). This is unlike the tangible property that is used by specific individuals at a particular time. Moreover, acquisition of the intangible property does not leave less for others. Moore asserts that the available intangible property is divided into three domains, which include domain of ideas yet to be invented, also called the new scientific laws, domain of ideas yet to be created, also called the next Lord of the Rings, and domain of ideas, which are clandestinely owned
The fact that a great possibility of individuals can independently invent similar intangible work and obtain rights, then the presently owned intangible works should be included as available for acquisition. This argument leaves the set of thoughts that are in the public domain and those that are a section of the universal tradition not available for acquisition.
Moore extends the argument of intangible property to the Lockean model, which explains how property rights of un-owned objects are created. The technicality that surrounds this aspect is associated with the challenge of original acquisition. In this explanation, Moore offers justifications on both the prima facie claims on generation of labor (Moore, 5). Another justification is based on desert. This implies that individuals will only own what belongs to them or deserve. The justification that labor or ownership may create prima facie entitlement against other could be beached in respect for individual independence and control. As independent and self-governed agents within the liberal customs, individuals are granted the moral and legal space direct their leaves as they see fit.
On the other hand, Moore integrates the Pareto-Based Proviso with that of Locke and concludes that if no one’s circumstance is worsened, then no one can criticize about another individual arrogating section of the commons. However, Moore considers the believability of Pareto-based Proviso as a moral ideology. Moore asserts that, adopting a less weak Pareto ideology would allow individuals to better themselves while worsening others. Such ideologies on acquisition are troublesome since at worst, they can open a leeway to predacious activities and at the best, allows anti-property philosophers the ammunition to combat the weak convincing claims, which labor and ownership may create. Moore argues that, the worst bit of this ideology is the ability of individuals to worsen others and failing to better them. The proviso in this ideology views that labor and mere ownership of un-owned objects generates a prima facie claim to the objects in question. Moore asserts that, individuals are commendable of deep moral esteem and this pulverizes a liberty to utilize and own un-owned objects (Moore, 6).
The control of both physical and intangible objects is of immense significance because at one particular point each individual would be able to have certain things and use them freely without any restrictions. The agreeable point of this discussion is, if the acquisition of an intangible work does not worsen any individual in terms of the level of well-being in comparison to the situation before acquisition, then taking is allowed (Moore, 7). Similarly, the rights to control of intangible property are justified if an individual generates an intangible work and fixes it in a certain design, then labor and ownership generates a prima facie claim to the work and the attributed proviso is satisfied, then the prima facie claim will have to remain undefeated and rights will be created.
The following structure offers the summary of the component of Moore’s argument. If the Pareto-based Porviso is fulfilled by the acquisition of an intangible property, then it can be concluded that, the acquisition and exclusion are acceptable, the Pareto-based Proviso is fulfilled by some acts of intangible property generation and ownership and some intangible property rights are fulfilled (Moore, 7).
My Opinion
I support Moore’s perspective on intangible rights and the attributed to the Parteto-based ideology. Moore’s assertion that, individuals are praiseworthy of deep moral reverence and this pulverizes authority to utilize and own un-owned objects. I agree that, the control of both physical and intangible objects is of immense significance because at one point each individual would be able to have certain things and use them freely without any restrictions. In addition, I concur with Moore’s agreeable point of discussion that the acquisition of an intangible work does not worsen any individual in terms of the level of well-being in comparison to the situation before acquisition. This implies that “taking” is allowed. Further, I agree to Moore’s argument that, adopting a less weak Pareto ideology would allow individuals to better themselves while worsening others. I agree with these assertions because they are supported by Pareto-based ideology, which gives more credit.
Some of the counter arguments to this assertion may include disagreeing with Moore’s agreeable point of discussion that the acquisition of an intangible work does not worsen any individual in terms of the level of well-being in comparison to the situation before acquisition. This implies that “taking” will be disallowed. However, this stand may not be strongly supported. This leaves this study with Moore’s argument viable. Similarly, this study cannot cite an independent view of this discussion, however much borrowing from Moore’s argument is considered (Moore, 12). This is because the aspect of intangible rights is dependent of numerous theories and can be considered as valid.
In conclusion, Moore’s argument offers deep insight on the intangible rights in relation to the generation and ownership of rights. In addition, Moore asserts that, intangible property can imply various aspects but all of them should have the feature of non-physical property types whose control surrounds the physical tokens. Moore is right in his argument because he has fully integrated them with various models such as Pareto-based ideology, which is fulfilled by the acquisition of an intangible property, thus the acquisition and exclusion are acceptable.
Work cited
Moore, Adam D. Intangible Property: Privacy, Property, and Power. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005. Print.
