The exclusionary rule holds that, when the police violate a suspect’s constitutional rights, that suspect has the option of requesting a court to “exclude” or declare inadmissible any evidence that was obtained as a result of the constitutional violation. The exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right but rather a judicial tool established by the Supreme Court in 1914, as a means of deterring police officers and law enforcement officials from violating the Constitution when arresting suspects and conducting criminal investigation (Weeks v. United States, 1914). Up until 1961, the exclusionary rule was only available to defendants in federal criminal cases. In other words, if a police officer in a state or local criminal case violated the Constitution in arresting a suspect or conducting a criminal investigation, state courts often still allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant. To be sure, there was no disincentive for police to violate the Constitution in state criminal cases, if it would lead to an arrest or a conviction.
This all changed with the Supreme Court decision in the 1961 case Mapp v. Ohio. The case focused on a state police investigation, in which officers attempted to enter and search the house of Dolly Mapp (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961). When she refused to allow the search until the police obtained a valid search warrant, the officers broke into the house and conducted a search anyway. Although the original purpose of the search was to determine is a person of interest in a bombing was present in the house, the search also revealed pornographic contraband belonging to Mapp. As a result, Mapp was also arrested. Mapp was subsequently arrested for the possession of the pornographic contraband. On appeal, Mapp argued the law criminalizing the contraband violated her First Amendment rights.
In a 6-3 decision overturning Mapp’s conviction, the Court held that the issue in Mapp’s case was not whether the pornographic material was legal or not but rather whether the police officers obtaining of the material was constitutional (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961). Under the Court’s analysis, it was not. According to the Court, the police first should have obtained a warrant to search the house for the person of interest. In addition, even if they had validly obtained a search warrant, they would have violated its requirements by searching areas, such as a cabinet’s drawers, were it would be impossible for a suspect to hide. Consequently, the Court found that the search was a violation of Mapp’s Fourth Amendment rights and any evidence produced as a result was illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible in court against Mapp.
The major change that Mapp made in constitutional law was that it expanded the application of the heretofore federal exclusionary rule to all police or government searches, whether federal or state. In other words, after Mapp, evidence obtained by police officers in state criminal cases that violated the Constitution could also be found inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
The Court’s ruling in Mapp was especially surprising when considering the Court’s ruling in the 1949 case, Wolf v Colorado, where the Court help that although the Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states and state courts must abide by and follow its requirements, because the exclusionary rule was not part of the Constitution, state courts did not have to apply it in criminal cases. In other words, although police might violate the Fourth Amendment in obtaining evidence state court did not necessarily have to exclude the evidence from trial (Wolf v. Colorado, 1949).
After so many years of not applying the exclusionary rule to state criminal cases, the Court provided three justifications one why, in 1961, its applicability changed. First, since the exclusionary rule had originally been based on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was in essence the same, it did not make sense that the exclusionary rule could not apply to state cases. Second, since federal and state law enforcement officers are subject to the same Constitution, it did not make sense that only federal officers are bound by the Constitution’s requirements. Third, as the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to deter police misconduct, it did not make sense that it did not apply to state and local level where the clear majority of criminal cases are litigated.
References
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643(1961). Retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/367/643
Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383 (1914). Retrieved from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/232/383/case.html
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949). Retrieved from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/338/25/case.html
