The Second Battle of Fallujah
The Second Battle of Fallujah
The Second Battle of Fallujah (Operation Al-Fajr) took place in Fallujah 43 mi west of Baghdad. It is city with more than 300,000 residents and people often call it a “city of mosques”. Fallujah had not been affected by the military activity in Iraq until 2004, but then it became a hot zone where insurgency led to the large number of casualties. Fallujah’s residents used to be open to the Coalition forces, but on 28 April 2003 several local demonstrators were killed by the military and this incident caused a rise of insurgency in Fallujah. The point of no return was when the insurgents ambushed four American contractors. The Coalition forces were unable to respond adequately and failed to free the city from the insurgents during the Operation Vigilant Resolve. Therefore, the insurgents had 6 months in order to prepare for the next battle. In the meantime, the American forces and Iraqi government were preparing for the joint operation code-named Al Fajr. One of the key figures in the operation was Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski who commanded the 1st Marine Division and the ground combat element of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He effectively used the principles of mission command during all phases of the operation which resulted in the liberation of the city.
The Army Doctrine Publication No. 6-0 stipulates that there are six principles of mission command and they include: building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, providing with a clear commander’s intent, exercising disciplined initiative, using mission orders, and accepting prudent risk.1 These principles help commanders to reduce uncertainty during operations and make decisions more quickly. In general, mission command leads to mutual trust and a shared understanding between commanders, subordinates, etc.
Lieutenant General Natonski had to analyze the First Battle of Fallujah (Operation Vigilant Resolve) that resulted in failure and in which he did not take part. He started to prepare for the Operation Al-Fajr by building a cohesive team through mutual trust. He had previously worked with several military units in Najaf, Iraq and wanted these units to be involved in Fallujah.2 Firstly, Natonski could fully rely on them and knew what to demand from them. Secondly, he was confident that each of the units could contribute to the quick penetration into Fallujah which was one of the key tasks. Prior to the beginning of the operation, the incoming commanders had to participate in the 15 day “right seat, left seat” program in order to get familiar with the situation in Fallujah.3 Natonski ensured that this time there were sufficient forces and resources to carry out the operation. The goal of the operation was to destroy the armed forces of the enemy and to establish the legitimate control in Fallujah.
Moreover, Natonski had to think of the ways how to involve the Iraqi forces. He took the decision to integrate and train them at first. Most of the Iraqi soldiers had no experience and for them it was the first serious combat. However, they trained a lot and were eventually well-prepared to participate in the Second Battle of Fallujah.4 In order to motivate the Iraqi battalions, Natonski would put them in the lead whenever that was possible. For example, during the Second Battle of Fallujah the Iraqi battalions successfully captured the Government Center that was strategically important. Later, the local and foreign media showed how Iraqi soldiers were raising their flag over the building.5 Such steps helped to build trust between the American Marines, the Iraqi forces and the local population. More importantly, it was vital to act cohesively from the very start and after the failure in the First Battle of Fallujah there were some doubts about effective cooperation between Iraqi battalions and American forces. However, Natonski and other commanders found the way how to build a cohesive team with the reciprocal understanding between the battalions.
One more principle of mission command that Lieutenant General Natonski applied in Fallujah was the creation of shared understanding among the forces. In order to achieve that, Natonski had to communicate with all units on regular basis, plan the operation in advance and make changes if that was necessary. Collaboration during all stages of the operation’s process that includes planning, preparation, execution, and assessment is what the commanders should always strive for.6
The joint operation in Fallujah involved many Army units and successful assault depended on understanding of the mutual goals and tactics. The success of the Operation Al-Fajr was due to the readiness of the commanders to cooperate in an open manner and similar understanding of the operational environment. Commanders approached the operation professionally and with respect for the other representatives of the joint forces. Col Mike Shupp, who commanded the Regimental Combat Team 1 during the Operation Al-Fajr, said that there was “a sense of camaraderie and reliance”. Soldiers were able to avoid the large number of casualties through “good cross talking”. There were not many differences at the tactical level and the units acted as one solid team.7 After the Second Battle of Fallujah Natonski said:
“You don’t need to be a squad leader clearing buildings but you need to be present so you can talk to company commanders, battalion commanders and the troops to know what’s going through their minds. That’s just what you do as a leader.”8
Thirdly, Natonski and other commanders exercised disciplined initiative. The forces acted in accordance with the plan that the Coalition and Iraqi government developed two months before the D-Day. The array of the Coalition forces was very wide and Natonski described the participating units as “the greatest concentration of combat power on the face of the earth”.9 At first, the units acted strictly in accordance with the developed plan: they closed access in and out of the city and minimized the number of the civil people in Fallujah. Then they initiated electronic, aviation and artillery attacks on specific insurgent targets. The intelligence expected up to 4,500 insurgents with 306 defense positions including 33 mosques.10 The strikes were carried out in order to exhaust the insurgents and prepare the area for the ground assault launched by the Army and Marine battalions. The disciplined initiative was especially important after the second phase of the operation when the battalions started to enter Fallujah from the northern side. This phase was very difficult to complete due to the complicated urban terrain of Fallujah and preparedness of the insurgents to fight to the death in the close quarter combat.11 They set up the defense positions and built secret paths between the buildings. It took approximately 3 days to reach the southern side of the city.12 Due to the disciplined initiative, the participating units were able to complete the III phase of the operation successfully. The penetrating forces cleared the insurgents from house to house and were supported by the tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles when the situation required that. Marines always needed tanks for direct fire support when they found insurgents’ pillboxes.13 Natonski had to define the boundaries within which his subordinates were able to take decisions. Therefore, the units accomplished their goals with the different speed. For example, RCT-7 entered the city in less than 14 hours, but RCT-1 required almost two days in order to achieve the same goal.14
Finally, mission command is based on taking prudent risks. Natonski had to go into the city every day and he knew the full picture that allowed him to take weighted decisions. He could talk to the subordinates and after that he was in no doubt what orders he had to give next. He gave very clear guidance and had good rapport with the young marines. At the same time, U.S. Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford characterized Natonski’s approach as “continue to march”, because he used the options that had were developed after the First Battle of Fallujah, but anyway he made the final decision.15 In order to assess the possible risks, during the planning stage he brought in many specialists and subordinates for the analysis of the upcoming operation. They approached the development of the possible courses of action in detail and also wargamed them. Under Natonski’s command, they tested command, control, communications and timing to get to the attack positions.16 Natonski realized the importance of the Second Battle of Fallujah and asked for more mechanized battalions and brigades to help surround the city and reduce the risks.17 As the result, the actual assault element equaled to approximately 6,000 U.S. troops and 2,000 Iraqi troops and they had to fight the well-trained insurgents that came from Afghanistan, Chechnya, etc.18 Lieutenant General John Sattler, who was Director of Operations, U.S. Central Command at that time, said that Natonski took full responsibility for Phases II-III and required his assistance only starting from Phase IV after the city was freed from the insurgents.19
In general the tactics of taking risks proved its value. Stormtroop tactics applied by the well-trained small units and supported by the well-coordinated fire support helped to contribute to the main assault.20 Usage of armored vehicles saved the lives of hundreds of soldiers and speeded up the operation. It was a relative risky decision to use armored vehicles in Fallujah. There are plenty of examples when the use of vehicles in the military operations on urban terrain may lead to the negative consequences. For instance, in 1994 in the Chechen city of Grozny in similar military operation more than 800 soldiers died because the insurgents destroyed some armored vehicles and blocked the streets. Therefore the military units could not rely on the fire support and suffered great losses in the battle. In terms of the Operation Al-Fajr, coordination of the activity and use of different types of weapons helped to reduce the risks and keep the number of casualties low in comparison with the other similar operations carried out by the U.S. Army in the past.
At the same time, the mission commander still had a number of difficulties such as equipment, intelligence, perception issues, breaching operations, and communications.21 There was insufficient communication between the Army and the Marines. The units in the battle space did not receive all information due to the different radio systems that were used by the Army and the Marines. So the operating picture was sometimes different. Moreover, the Marines had some problems with the equipment, in particular ambulances. They suffered the most in the battle, and their medics could not cope with all casualties. So the Army offered to transport and treat the wounded. What is more, the casualties could have been lower, if the Marines had used all the tactical assets, including tanks and other vehicles. In terms of the breaching operations in Fallujah, some of them were problematic. For example, the breach across the railroad berm resulted in the delays in the operation and influenced the battle plans of some units. There were also the times when information exchange between the Army and the Marines was slow.22 The skills of the commanders including Natonski helped to overcome the problems, but in the future cohesive work between the Army and the Marines needs to be improved and the mistakes made in Fallujah should not be repeated.
In conclusion, the Second Battle of Fallujah was one of the bloodiest battles in Iraq War. The Operation Al-Fajr had a vital tactical value for the military campaign in Iraq and required many resources to free the city from the insurgents. Lieutenant General Natonski, who had a 30-year experience of service, was one of the key figures in the Second Battle of Fallujah. His leadership helped to complete the operation successfully even though the conditions were extremely complicated. He created a cohesive team and used the units that he knew from the previous operations in Iraq. He also involved the Iraqi forces into the operation and created a shared understanding between the units. Nevertheless, some experts state that interaction between the Marines and the Army could have been better. More importantly, he assessed all the risks and developed an effective battle plan that allowed exercising disciplined initiative and taking prudent risks. When the forces entered the city and had to clear the buildings from the insurgents, they applied the Stormtroop tactics, which in most cases was effective, but often led to the casualties and miscommunication with the Army forces. The analysis of Natonski’s influence on the course of the operation helps to understand the principles of mission command better. Moreover, such analysis may show the weaknesses that can help to conduct the future military operations more efficiently and coherently. In particular, the interaction between the Marines and the other military units needs to be improved. Due to Natonski’s leadership and experience, the Second Battle of Fallujah turned out to be a success for the American forces and it showed that the modern American forces are able to resolve very complex problems on the urban terrain where battles always bring a lot of risk to the participating parties.
End notes
Combat Studies Institute. Interview with LtGen Richard F. Natonski. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2006. p. 2
Camp, Dick. Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah. Zenith Press, First edition. December 4, 2009, p. 129
Camp, Dick. Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah. Zenith Press, First edition. December 4, 2009, p. 114
Knarr, William and Castro Robert. The Battle for Fallujah Al Fajr—the Myth-buster. Institute for Defense Analysis. US Marine Corps. 2009, p.66
Gott, Kendal. Eyewitness to War, V. 1: U S Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History. Combat Studies Institute Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2006, p.67
Camp, Dick. Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah. Zenith Press, First edition. December 4, 2009, p. 114
Knarr, William and Castro Robert. The Battle for Fallujah Al Fajr—the Myth-buster. Institute for Defense Analysis. US Marine Corps. 2009, p.62
Chang, Tao-Hung. The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) in the 21st Century. Department of Naval Science. Volume 6, Issue 1, Fall 2007, p.34
Knarr, William and Castro Robert. The Battle for Fallujah Al Fajr—the Myth-buster. Institute for Defense Analysis. US Marine Corps. 2009, p.62
Chang, Tao-Hung. The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) in the 21st Century. Department of Naval Science. Volume 6, Issue 1, Fall 2007, p.34
Chang, Tao-Hung. The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) in the 21st Century. Department of Naval Science. Volume 6, Issue 1, Fall 2007, p.34
Chang, Tao-Hung. The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) in the 21st Century. Department of Naval Science. Volume 6, Issue 1, Fall 2007, p.34
Camp, Dick. Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah. Zenith Press, First edition. December 4, 2009, p. 114
McWilliams, Timothy and Wheeler, Kurtis. U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009. American Perspectives. Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1. Marine Corps University. U.S. Marine Corps. Quantico, Virginia. 2009, p. 91
Camp, Dick. Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah. Zenith Press, First edition. December 4, 2009, p. 114
Keiler, Jonathan. Who Won the Battle of Fallujah? Proceedings. 2004 U.S. Naval Institute. January 2005.
McWilliams, Timothy and Wheeler, Kurtis. U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009. American Perspectives. Al-Anbar Awakening Volume 1. Marine Corps University. U.S. Marine Corps. Quantico, Virginia. 2009, p. 85
Chang, Tao-Hung. The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) in the 21st Century. Department of Naval Science. Volume 6, Issue 1, Fall 2007, p.35
Matthews, Matt. Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 20. Combat Studies Institute Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2006, p.79
Matthews, Matt. Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 20. Combat Studies Institute Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 2006, p.79-83
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