As Sadcheva and colleagues (162) reasonably note, “the question of whether morality is an objective truth gleaned from nature or a socially constructed concept has been important in the philosophical study of ethics as well». In the editorial titled The Moral Instinct, Steven Pinker cultivates a rather controversial and ambiguous issue of human moral judgments, moral decisions/choices and moral dispositions. Thereby, the provocative nature of the author’s argument reveals itself as early as the introduction points to the blurred and seemingly inexplicable standards we evaluate the worth of particular prominent figures in terms of their compliance with moral norms. Interestingly, people are stated to attach greater significance to the “aura of sanctity” than to more pragmatic and less idealized expressions of the person’s moral worth such as the pivotal contribution to the Green Revolution that reduced famine on the global scale (Pinker, 2008). The author refers to an enormous number of studies in the fields of sociology, anthropology, neurobiology and psychology and provides a range of rather controversial evidences in order to illustrate the key fact: human moral instincts and perceptions also referred to as moral sense are highly complex and, in fact, have little connection to free will.
Human moral sense is stated to be extremely vulnerable to confusions and illusions; the modern world’s morality became the domain where extreme rational decisions put aside inherent human sensations about unconditionally right and wrong things or absurd moral norms imposed externally invade of the basic laws.
One of the most fascinating ideas expressed in the editorial positions morality in the domain of neuroscience rather than in the domain of philosophy or religion. Surprisingly, Pinker illustrates that the nature or moral sense is genetic, at least to certain extent: when considering options of behavior in moral dilemmas, human beings are guided by a set of specific brain areas responsible for rationality, mental computations and non-rational information processing. In other words, the moral sense is relocated to the domain of inherent human properties, literally biological ones. Ni (239) provides a supportive assertion, stating that “the moral instinct” here has a close relationship with the internal source of moral consciousness” and is formed by the internal processes occurring in human mind.
Moreover, Pinker refers to the study outlining the existence of moral universals which are inherent to every competent human regardless of national and cultural origins: all individuals are believed to have an inborn perception of “a distinction between right and wrong; empathy; fairness; admiration of generosity; rights and obligations; proscription of murder, rape and other forms of violence; redress of wrongs; sanctions for wrongs against the community; shame; and taboos” (Pinker, 2008). These moral categories are believed to be inherent for human nature and construct a peculiar ‘moral grammar’ (paralleled to Chomsky’s language acquisition framework) which helps individuals gradually absorb the technique of moral judgments and moral decisions. Even small children already have an inkling of what is morally or socially right and wrong. Thereby, the individual is believed to construct his/her moral judgments and behaviors based on the inherent patterns and with compliance to five “primary colors of moral sense” (Pinker): fairness, harm, authority, community, and purity.
If one focuses on the aforementioned ideas, it will inevitably become clear that the defined inherent patterns of moral reasoning often become irrelevant or abandoned when it comes to extreme occasions. Judging by the aforementioned idea of the inherent nature of morality, it could seem that there every individual is inherently and unconditionally prone to resolve all ethical and moral dilemmas in the ‘right’ manner. For instance, empathy and the inherent altruism would drive a person to a decision to help the one in need. However, the are many controversial incidents and instances which compromise morality; and one of the most complex of such phenomena is the bystander effect.
In 2011, the well-off Chinese city of Foshan was shocked by the incident which led to the subsequent death of a two-year-old infant. The toddler who walked to the street was hit by the small van twice, her bleeding body left lying on the ground (Foster, 2011). However, the passers-by walking past the girl showed no intention to help the injured child and just passed the site of the accident “without the second glance” (Foster, 2011). The video record of the incident showed at least eighteen pedestrians walking past the girl, rickshaw drivers and cyclists weaving round the victim without helping her or moving her away from a rather busy road. Eventually, as the bystanders displayed apathetic reactions to the sight of the bleeding child, the second vehicle arrived to run over the girl for the second time. Only the nineteenth passer-by, a female street cleaner, moving the child and calling for help. As much time was waster after the first run-over and due to severe injuries received in the incident, the child died in intensive care several days later.
The case became one of the recent and most shocking incidents clearly demonstrating the notorious bystander effect with compromises the existing notions of morality. Due to its outrageous nature and the striking apathy on the side of so many bystanders towards the injured toddler bleeding on the road, the tragedy has been widely reported in the media, with quite relevant moral concerns being raised. The reluctance to help – or even the deliberate ‘blindness’ to - the injured child might be perceived as an expression of disruption in the conventional belief about the instinctive moralities. Ni (241) supports Pinker, stating that inherent instinctive moralities are those familiar to everyone. For instance, one of them, empathy, could make a person literally feel toothache when s/he sees someone suffering from it; and at least empathy should have made people help the little girl. An especially bright example of disruption in this type of moral instinct is the mother walking past the girl with her own little child: given the usual maternal propensity towards empathy and caring for other children, the mother should have stopped to help the child.
Another remarkable aspect Pinker elucidates in the editorial is external, i.e. cultural, impact on the moral judgments and behaviors: culture and location are strong justifying factors which might overlap with the inherent judgments of moral nature of events. Thereby, cultural conventions and moral norms existing in the local level of society are expected to find their reflection in the situation in Foshan as well. It is known that Chinese culture is characterized by the high level of collectivism and social cohesion. At the same time, the group of people with higher cohesiveness level is more prone to undertake social responsibility and help others. Otherwise, in the classic “bystander effect” [], bystanders in groups are less likely to help strangers than bystanders who are alone” (Hamby, Weber, Gryd 91). Nevertheless, this bystander incident became a highly controversial case in terms of the cultural, i.e. external, impact on human moral instincts. This controversy is especially obvious in the fact that the members of the collectivist society usually associated with high cohesiveness and the culturally induced moral attitude towards helping others did nothing to help the victim. While the inherent nepotism is expected to flow into the perception of solidarity and the willing to support and help the member of the same culture, the 2011 incident shows the inconsistency between the nature of Chinese society and moral instincts and judgments. Yet, the explanations for such tendency might include mental focus on small tied communities in China and the possible Westernization of Chinese mentality.
The aspect of neuroscience and rationalization of moralities included in Pinker’s perspective finds yet another reflection in the case of the Chinese girl is Foshan. Pinker summarized several experimental moral dilemmas where a person was expected to help others immediately. When choosing between manhandling and indirect impact on the situation as it is stated in the article, the individual is more likely to consider the option requiring the least possible direct contact and – respectively – the mildest form of responsibility when facing the need to act in a morally acceptable way (Pinker, 2008). In cases of bystander effect and especially in that of Wang Yue, the failure to pay attention to the child and help her can be perceived as the matter of diffused responsibility. Ignoring ‘violence’ in the street because of thinking that there are other – more qualified – people to help seems to relief the burden of moral liability from the bystanders, even though the discussed cased did not imply the need for complex rationalization of the action (such as in the trolley dilemmas) and literally involved a rather simple and transparent test of reciprocal altruism.
Works Cited
Foster, Peter. “Chinese toddler run over twice after being left on street.” The Telegraph (August 2011). Web. June 9, 2016, < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8830790/Chinese-toddler-run-over-twice-after-being-left-on-street.html>
Hamby, Sherry, et al. "What Difference Do Bystanders Make? The Association Of Bystander Involvement With Victim Outcomes In A Community Sample." Psychology Of Violence 6.1 (2016): 91-102.
Ni, Liangkang. "Moral Instinct And Moral Judgment." Frontiers Of Philosophy In China 4.2 (2009): 238.
Pinker, Steven. “The Moral Instinct.” The New York Times, 2008.
Sachdeva, Sonya, Purnima Singh, and Douglas Medin. "Culture And The Quest For Universal Principles In Moral Reasoning." International Journal Of Psychology 46.3 (2011): 161-176.
