Events that led to the influx of refugees in Turkey
The Arab Spring that was experienced in African countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, inspired the protest against President Bashar Hafez al-Assad’s government in March 2011. The government, in response, sent its forces to contain the protest, and as a result, Syria plunged into civil war (Carpenter 2). As the war continued, alliances, mini-alliances and shifts took place throughout the region, and this led to a complex situation as the war developed dimensions involving Islamic extremists, Assad’s government, rebel groups and ethnic groups. In July 2011, defectors from the Syrian army organized a Free Syrian Army and this attracted civilians to join the opposing side and take up arms (Carpenter 5).
Almost five years since the war started, a lot of Syrian refugees have fled to seek asylum in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. It is also estimated that the war had, by March 2015, caused internal displacement of 7.6 million of the Syrian population and another 3.5 million refugees from Syria had fled to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. The number of Syrian refugees in the three countries is even greater than 3.5 million since there are quite a number of unregistered refugees as well. In October 2015, the Russian government began military interventions in Syria, launching airstrikes targeting Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This further worsened the situation in Syria and coupled with the deteriorating social, political, security and economic conditions in Syria, these have led to the increase in the number of Syrians fleeing their country to seek asylum in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.
Factors that allowed the influx of refugees in Turkey
Historical background
As at the start of the Syrian war and the resulting refugee situation, Turkey did not have a properly structured immigration policy to deal with refugee situation. The country had until then experienced rare cases of immigration and more often than not, such cases were from Turkish descendants who lived outside the country (Elitok 161). Its kinship aligned policy on immigration was dominant for a decade after the establishment of the Turkey Republic in the 1920s. By 1930s, Turkey encouraged non-Muslims to leave Turkey and encouraged the immigration of Muslims into the country through its Turkification policy. The early 1980s saw Turkey begin to allow immigrants and asylum seekers who were neither of Turkish descendants nor Muslims (Elitok 165). This partly resulted from a globalization process which allowed people to move alongside technologies, goods, finance and ideas. Following the political instability in the Middle East, many asylum seekers moved to other countries using Turkey as a pathway. Also, as a result of unfavorable laws against minority groups in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, and the insecurity situation in the Gulf States, Turkey received many immigrants and asylum seekers. After the Soviet Union collapsing and the economic stability that prevailed in Turkey at the time, the country attracted students, professionals, casual labor and retirees hence had various foreigners (Elitok 170).
A look into a few decades of Turkey’s immigration laws shows a country with mixed entry of regular and irregular refugees, asylum seekers and migrants (Yurdakul 2). While others went to Turkey as a final destination, some used it as a pathway to cross into to Europe. For example in 1990, about 500, 000 migrants were arrested trying to enter Europe through Turkey.
Evolution of Turkey’s legislative Framework
Until 1994 when the Regulation of Asylum was enacted, there only existed a few regulations that outlined procedures on immigrations. These regulations, however, did not touch on labor rights and asylum. A 1944 settlement law only favored immigrants of Turkish descendants (Kaya 9). Although this law has been repealed and in its place come several legislation, Turkey’s preference for immigrants from Turkish culture and descent has remained an outstanding characteristic of its laws. Though the country is a signatory to Geneva Convention of 1951 and it Additional Protocol of 1967, Turkey has created limitations to the geographical region that they can grant asylum to and that is Europeans. These limitations have resulted into “non-Muslim” and “non-Turkish” be considered illegal. After an ethnic attack in Iraq that saw 500,000 immigrants move to Turkey, the government reconsidered its position and in 1994, a law (Regulation on Asylum) was enforced (Kaya 16). This was also replaced in 2013 by yet another new legislation Law on foreign and international protection. Still maintained in this statute was the clause on geographical limitation on asylum seekers to be from Europe only. This meant that those from outside Europe could not be given asylum in Turkey. The situation did not even favor a non-European granted refugee status from UNHCR (United Nations High Commission on Human Rights). The government only provided temporary protection and those successfully identified as refugees were settled out of Turkey (Kaya 25).
Turkey has maintained its limitation on the geographic origin of refugees it can accommodate despite constant criticism. However the 2000 “Eu-ization process” has set the path for review of various asylum and refugees laws (Kaya 16). In 2005, the Turkish government, in reaction to the EU requirement on asylum and refugees, adopted a plan, “Action Plan on Asylum and Migration.” In favor of the Eu-ization process, the government of Turkey passed the law of work permit on foreigners which in effect facilitates processing of documents to foreigners to help them seek for work and employment and (2), the law on foreign and international protection (Elitok 170).
The above highlighted historical and legal frameworks signify the absence of properly laid down policy and legislative frameworks to handle asylum and refugees in Turkey. With the rush to lay down haphazard laws to address the refugee situation that started as early as 2011, the weak and poorly formulated laws coupled with interventions of international conventions and treaties; plus pressure from the European Union for the country to review its laws to be in line with the requirements of the union (Keser 119), the Turkish government had an overly swift reaction, allowing the influx of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.
The Crisis
At the onset of the Syrian war in 2011, the Turkish government took a strong stance against Assad. This was to protect the Turkmen and Kurdish people who are closely associated with Turkey and also to position itself as a key player in the region by assisting to solve the Syrian crisis. By March 2012, officials from Turkish government constructed more tents in areas of Hatay, Sanliurfa, Kilis, and Gaziantep (Crisp 9). However, ceasefire talks collapsed in Syria and the refugee situation began escalating in Turkey. This resulted into the rise in number refugees seeking entry into Turkey as it increased to 20,000 monthly. By the end of the year, more than 170, 000 registered refugees were already in Turkey. By close of the year 2014, monthly arrivals had escalated and reached 55,000 people per month (Ihlamur 191). In response, Turkish authorities devised ways to control the number of refugees being allowed to enter the country from Syria. One of such strategies was that the Turkish government provided aid to NGOs to help in managing camps for those displaced internally within Syria. Turkish authorities manning the border also introduced a “passage with careful control policy” that selectively restricted on the number and groups of refugees entering Turkey (Crisp 17).
Challenges faced by EU and Turkey in the crisis
As EU and the Turkish government attempt to solve the crisis in Turkey, there are various challenges that are experienced in the process.
Policy challenges
Through its previous policies and legislative framework, the Turkish government has not had properly established legal and policy frameworks that can be applied effectively to the refugee crisis in Turkey (Kirişçi 14). This has further been worsened by Turkey being signatory to international conventions and treaties such as the Geneva Convention of 1951. For example, the principle of non refoulement incorporated in the Geneva convention which states that “no Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" (Article 33(1)).” This principle contradicts Turkey’s policy which tended to limit admissible refugees to be only those from Europe.
Just like Turkey, other European Union member states have the same challenge. With laws restricting admission of refugees and asylum seekers into a country, these policies and legislations clash with international conventions, hence creating a challenge in the governments’ handling of the refugee crisis in Turkey and many other EU countries (Keser 151).
The Turkish governmental structure of issuing work permits to refugees has led to urban refugees moving to seek informal jobs or jobs which are undertaken under unfavorable conditions and there are also concerns of child labor. This in effect has resulted into competition for employment from both citizens of Turkey and the refugees. This has resulted into deflation of wages and salaries paid for labor and has led to hostility from the Turkish citizens (Akgündüz, Marcel and Wolter 15). This has further raised concerns about the presence of refugees in Turkey and the repercussions it has for the Turkish population.
Meeting the needs of the refugees and upholding rights granted to them
Turkey’s policies at the onset of the Syrian war were friendly and welcoming to the refuges. The government assumed that the situation in Syria would quickly go away and normalcy would return. For example, refugees were being referred to as guests as they crossed over to Turkey. Conditions, however, grew worse and Turkey has felt the burden of providing for these refugees (Ihlamur 191).
With the ever increasing number of refugees and the war in Syria continuing, Turkish government and EU have to consider more than providing temporary settlement and protection of the refugees. By 2013 for example, it was estimated that almost all refugees hosted in Turkish territory lived in camps. However, as the inflow of refugees from Syria grew, the number of camps was not sufficient to accommodate all the refugees, and by the beginning of 2014, it was estimated that more than half of the refugees who had sought protection and help in Turkey were now living outside camps (Ihlamur 191).
Challenge on how to settle and integrate the refugees in Turkey.
The notion that Syrians were temporary guests as was initially held by the Turkish government seems to be fading away and a method of integrating and settling the Syrian refugees in Turkey is the challenge now. The attitude towards the refugees from the host population varies depending on ethnic lines and other demographic characteristics (Ihlamur 191). The Turks for example have a high liking for the Turkmen from Syria and the Kurdish communities easily live amongst the Kurds from Syria. However, in Hatay, Sunny Syrians settling in the town are highly opposed by the Alawite community. Therefore there is a big challenge of integrating refugees into some host communities.
On economic dimension, some urban communities have also developed negative attitudes towards the Syrian refugees who, due to their plights, have had to undertake inferior jobs like street vending. Some go as far as begging on the streets and this has attracted some negative perception about the Syrians from the Turkish public (Ihlamur 191). The Turkish government also spends a lot to provide humanitarian aid to the refugees. This has elicited sharp criticism from various quarters.
EU and Turkey’s policy changes and other responses to the crisis
Turkey’s response
The Turkish government has responded to the crisis by reviewing some of its laws that did not favor non- European asylum seekers and refugees. This has been influenced by and agreement with the “Eu-ization process.” In effect the government of Turkey has reviewed its policies (Taşpınar 129) and in line with the LFIP, a new TP (Temporary Regulation) which came into effect in 22 October 2014, was formed and aims at laying down an effective legal system to be used in providing refugees from Syria with humanitarian assistance and protection (Kirişçi 56). It’s expected that through this regulations, documents will be processed for refugees and safety granted to them until their safe return to Syria. The government has also stopped state-centered approach in handling the crisis and has decided to work with civil societies and international agencies.
EU’s response.
In response to the refugee crisis in Turkey, the EU has adopted a one-on-one policy so as to uphold the non-refoulement and respects rights of individual refugees (Brady 14). The policy agreement by the EU is aimed at curbing the illegal entry of Syrian refugees from Turkey to the EU through the islands of Greece (Carrera, Sergio & Elspeth 4). In their one-for-one policy, the EU offers that for every single illegal Syrian immigrant stopped from crossing to the EU from Turkey through the island of Greece, a single Syrian refugee will be settled from Turkey to the EU. While underlining the policy agreement, Jean-Claude Junker, EU’s president, stated that this policy agreements was in tandem with all international norms and EU laws (Aras, Gokalp & Zeynep 193).
This policy agreement has however been considered inhumane and, as some say, it contravenes the fundamental principles of international conventions and treaties (Fargues, Philippe & Christine 19). For example, the fact that a lack of identification makes the EU consider certain immigrants illegal has been criticized. For example, a judge of the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) responded, in June, 2014, to this position by stating that absence of formal identity papers could not be used to justify extending immigration detention to refugees and other asylum seekers; as a result, asking Turkey to retain such refugees in the country was unreasonable (Hatton, Timothy & Jeffrey 43).
The EU also agreed to disburse € 3 billion under a refugee program in Turkey. Upon the use of all these resources and fulfillment of all conditions necessary for their use, the EU, by end of the year 2018, shall raise another € 3 billion to help in solving the refugee crisis in Turkey (Farcy 54).
The agreement between Turkey and EU in response to the refugee problem seems easy to implement on paper. However, even the top management from the EU have some doubts on the applicability of this plan. For example, Ahmet Davutoglu, the prime minister of Turkey, insisted that the refugee problem in Turkey could only be solved through solidarity from all EU members in handling the issue. A critical look at this situation, however, points to a process that is unlikely to succeed (Lutterbeck 72). With the continued influx of refugees from Syria and other countries affected by war around Turkey, sealing off borders to other EU only means that Turkey shall have received mere financial support but still has to deal with the current refugee problem alone (Hollifield et al. 35).
In order to fully solve the current crisis in Turkey, the EU should try and reduce the burden on Turkey by resettling Syrian refugees without the conditions in the one-on-one policy agreement (Uçarer 224). The financial support that the EU promises to give Turkey to help her solve the refugee problem is not sufficient and not sustainable. To go with the spirit of international laws and conventions which seek to protect the rights of refuges and to which most members states of the European Union are signatories to, the EU should initiate the same process it did in Turkey and that is negotiate with its member states to review their laws so that they can conform to international norms (Kirişci 67).
Moving forward, human rights organizations like the United Nations Human rights commission (UNHRC) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) should try and influence change in policies to allow refugees to move freely to the other EU member states. The crisis in Turkey will not be solved by the agreement between EU and Turkey, and to make the matter worse, the plight of refugees will escalate and the probability that the refuges will attempt to flee Turkey into other EU member states and their rights violated since they are considered illegal is significant.
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