Political culture is a component of the general culture, a cumulative indicator of political experience, a level of political knowledge and feelings, examples of behavior and functioning of political subjects, the integrated characteristic of a political way of life of the country, a class, the nation, social group of individuals.
A feature of political culture is that it makes not policy or political process, but their understanding, an explanation. In the political sphere often the importance is gained not only by real actions and measures of the state but also, by the way they are estimated and perceived in the context. The political culture can be considered as the intermediary between the political world and arena, providing interaction between areas of the social relations, cultural norms, stereotypes and political processes.
The political culture is the part of the spiritual culture of the people. It also includes those elements of the last, which are connected with social and political institutes and political processes. It exerts the impact on forms, functioning and development of the state and political institutes sets the direction for political process, causes the political behavior of broad masses. The political culture is understood as the system of orientations and installations of rather the political system and its components, and also concerning examples of political behavior.
The political culture of any society has deep historical roots. Its features are also connected with the level of social and economic development and a geographical position of the country, with the state's ethnic and confessional structure. The big sizes of the territory, an arrangement on two continents and on a joint of civilizations of the West and East, polyethnicity and a polyconfessional of Russia have predetermined a fragmentariness of its political culture including a set of contradictory subcultures. Besides, the Euroasian features of the Russian civilization exerted noticeable impact on process of formation in this country of special type of political culture.
At the beginning of the 2000th years the generation of the people replacing middle class in the developed countries of the West was fixed in Russia. This generation of young officials of different ranks who in the system of Putin's regime of bureaucracy, could achieve both recognition in society, and the material status. Koruption which prospers from the lower class of official offices to the most high-ranking bureaucrats replace system of control and counterbalances in Russia.
The big role in formation of such order was played by oil- and gas-dollars which in big quantity have gushed to the country.
The democracy has to imply first of all the power of the people, people which realize what is bad and that it is good in long-term prospect. Since the basis of Putin's system is official relatively young class such understanding just couldn't be expected.
In the 90th years on which the childhood of these people fell they didn't see anything, but poverty and consequences of disintegration of the Soviet Union. It results in the fact that their system of values is bent in favor of short-term material benefits, but not creation of democratic society.
If in the consciousness of the citizen the principle "who is not with us, that is against us", has imprinted, it would be hard to respect the foreign opinion. Some politicians seeking not only to aggravate already available conflicts in society, also create new splits to please to own ambitions. The similar "barricade" consciousness, of course, was more characteristic of the period of major political confrontation of the 1990th years. But also in modern Russia, it is shown, especially in connection with the crisis phenomena in the economy and significant political events, such as elections of authorities, the occupation of Crimea, events in Ukraine and in Syria.
As a result of difficult interaction and imposing at each other in many respects of opposite cultural matrixes, on open spaces of Russia there was a syncretic type of political culture combining lines of traditional and orthodox Russian mentality with ideas of the Western European constitutionalism, parliamentarism and liberalism.
East elements in the Russian political culture, in particular, are caused by the centuries-old domination of the state, in fact, related east despotism which is wery close to president Putin’s regime. Such state spreads in the public consciousness of idea about the need of submission and brings up in masses the pleasing authorities patience, humility, traditionalism, paternalism, a communal collectivism.
G. W. Hegel considered that in such state only one person - the governor-despot is free, and all others are only his subjects and, therefore, have no freedom of choice. Political lawlessness of masses, an absence of individual freedom and ability to make the conscious independent choice throughout centuries was the defining sign of mass political culture in Russia and until now prevents democratic values to be approved here. It was the culture not of the citizen, but the subject.
The originality of the Russian attitude, in particular, is based on the fact that on Russian soil the Roman right, which has become the basic element of the political and legal culture of the Western European civilization has badly accustomed. The opposition to "truth" and "right" is since ancient times widespread in the Russian mass consciousness. National ideas of justice are connected with life and actions «on the truth».
Thus, the quasidemocracy which has been established at government of the president Putin and is still supported by completely subordinated mass media, absolutely fake electoral system and the passive population, makes almost impossible emergence or at least mass desire of establishing of democracy.
The government in Russia thus is created and works to fight desire to penetrate into mechanisms of his functioning among the population. The system excludes civil participation and civil monitoring just because of lack of an initiative.
In society since the beginning of 21 century the accurate priority of stability of ruling regime as guarantee of success of the state is formed. Sociological polls show a tendency of the disloyal attitude towards democracyamong people.
That’s why the European standards of democracy are hardly built in non-uniform Russian political culture. If residents of the large cities, especially the capitals, in 25 years which have passed since the beginning of radical restructurings in Russia have substantially joined liberal values, have apprehended the European models of interaction with the power including methods of direct counteraction with it, such as the mass protest actions which have taken place in the winter 2011-2012, then the population of the Russian remote place often as before, is the carrier of traditional subject-political culture. It should be noted what, as well as in the past, the political culture of the Russian society, first of all, characterizes by heterogeneity and a conflictness.
Now cardinal distinctions in mass consciousness, the behavior of inhabitants of national enclaves, the South, the Center of Russia take place. It gives the grounds to divide the Russian space into traditional regions with elements of the authoritative political system and democratic, showing the live political process.
It is possible to speak about differentiation within each type. Reserves of the Soviet model with considerable resources of the operated population, absence of real pluralism, the limited choice are distinguished from non-democratic regions (mainly national subjects of the Russian Federation — Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, the Chechen Republic, Mordovia). Other group is made by the regions, which are formally belonging to democratic, but differing in domination of the local leader, nomenclature elite, lack of the real opposition capable to change here the authorities (The Saratov, Moscow regions). Uniformity isn't observed also in democratic regions. They differ on being opposite to the Center, the degree of unity or confrontation of regional elite, activity of the population.
The fact that the domestic bureaucracy for the last 10–15 years has increased not only political, but also economic power, and, respectively, have strengthened the influence on all spheres of life of society, it is connected with the fact that democratic institutes which are urged to act as alternative and a counterbalance to an arbitrariness and absolute power of bureaucracy in Russia haven't gained due development. First of all should be mentioned legislative authorities, judicial system, mass media, political parties and labor unions.
The crisis economic environment created the soil for reproduction in the mass consciousness of traditional values, which got over democratic (a collectivism, personification, centralization of the power). Negative attitude to the last acted as a reaction to instability in society, uncertainty or disappointment in results of democratic reforms of the 1990th years. According to sociological polls, in the structure of valuable orientations of the population of the Russian province nowadays the stereotypes inherent in authoritative society dominate a collectivism, conformism, low level of law-abiding and tolerance, prevalence of material values over spiritual, ideological one. Minority of Russians has mastered norms of democratic political culture. So, communal attitude, strong orientation to the state, the skeptical relation to democratic values is inherent in inhabitants of the South of the country. The democratic system is considered as inadequate for the need of stability. But the given statistics testifies to special, isolated cases, doesn't reflect the all-Russian moods. In general, the expectation stereotype from the state in the person of officials of positive changes is strong: the president, the deputy, but not individuals have to protect the rights of citizens. In the society, very few people are ready to self-organization for the protection of own interests, to a personal responsibility, but the democracy just assumes the last.
Vladimir Putin during the board and at the power in the country of his political party "United Russia" could achieve in the country corporate authoritarian regime in which society is one more resource of existence of the state. The political culture which is formed in such a way that state becomes the highest value, and those who are in the board of the state personify this value. Naturally in such conditions can't there be a speech about creation of democracy.
The fact that the domestic bureaucracy for the last 10–15 years has increased not only political, but also economic power, and, respectively, have strengthened the influence on all spheres of life of society, is connected with the fact that democratic institutes which are urged to act as alternative and a counterbalance to an arbitrariness and absolute power of bureaucracy in Russia haven't gained due development. It first of all concerns legislative authorities, judicial system, mass media, political parties and labor unions.
A political and cultural situation in modern Russia sometimes is considered to be the conflict of a democratic form and authoritative contents. The coexistence leads them to the statement on the Russian soil of the operated democracy as the certain political system combining authoritative and democratic elements. Russian prospects of development of political culture in many respects depend on their ratio.
The objective situation in Russia (the structure of political system, a social and economic situation, national peculiarities) most likely pushes the country to authoritarianism. The western values function more often at the theoretical, propaganda level, in real process the priority remains behind traditional norms.
Different categories of the population depending on own ideas of ways and the directions of development of the country, the economic situation, implementation of personal plans, etc. put different contents in the concept of the strong state, democratic ways of its development. But finally, all of them agree on the creation of conditions for the combination of development of economic stability and the strong state guaranteeing an order and protection.
The wrong process of building of state’s government in a large context results in disorder in regions. Here, naturally, plays an important role also the territorial sizes of the country. Such process results in a disproportion in the distribution of production forces, in the level of familiarity and development of the social sphere of certain regions. It was possible to refer to a number of the subjective reasons of regionalization only nominal performance by the Center of considerable number of the functions referred under the Constitution to exclusive maintaining Federation .
Russia because of its ethnoconfessional structure isn't predisposed to democracy. Though at the time of Yeltsin regional elite was capable of lobbying de facto the interests at the national level, the competitive federalism has fallen the victim of the subsequent domestic policy. But without real federalism, as well as without political freedom, Russia will hardly be able to become the modern successful state.
It is the most difficult to impart democratic culture in the poorest regions of Russia because of low standards of life of the population; the state has to work on the increase of welfare of the least propertied citizens and eradication of stratification. In the Discourse on Political Economy in the 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote: "The greatest evil has already come about, when there are poor men to be defended, and rich men to be restrained It is therefore one of the most important functions of government to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes". The inequality is dangerous to any society as it leads to substitution of public benefit private, to mutual hatred of citizens, their indifference to the public benefit. In an inequality, the root of the social conflict lies.
After the surge in protest activity in Russia in December 2011 forces of a political regime have agreed to fictitious liberalization, having made concessions to reduce the heat of public discontent. However after consolidation in the power of conservatives in the person of Vladimir Putin and his environment, the regime has begun to put the clamps, and soft members of the regime have been forced out on the second plan. Meanwhile, soft wing of the regime is capable of beginning liberalization of the political system, but not by the means of "marches of millions" or other campaigns against ruling party.
In Russia, the absence of democracy becomes an obstacle for economic development. Though the arrival the of market economy has allowed to come out terrible stagnation of Brezhnev's years, steady corruption, arbitrariness of bureaucrats and lack of legal safety became the strongest brake the for development of the country that, by the way, openly was recognized by the former president Medvedev. Russia remains the poor country, despite oligarchs (or because of them). The poor population of villages and country towns becomes the strongest source of support of authoritarianism and economic stagnation. Nevertheless, the aspiration to democracy in the country exists as has shown the protest movement on the eve of Putin's return to a presidential chair.
Besides, the export of hydrocarbons continuing since Brezhnev's times became a resource "damnation" for the country. Any state of the world noted by similar "damnation" couldn't create stable democratic regime. All western countries having stocks of natural resources have followed a way of democratic board long before the emergence of the world market of hydrocarbons. And the countries rich with resources, which have joined in world economic processes in the second half of the 20th century, became over the years richer and more authoritative. But the end of authoritarian regimes as, for example, the regime of shah Pekhlevi in Iran was much more terrible, than in the countries without the resource capital. The reason is in a resource rent around which political struggle runs high. Natural resources and a rent together prevent Russia and other states to create the effective economy capable of serving as the base for a democratic political system.
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