Conflicts in the African continent are notorious with their complexity. There are host of reasons for that. These include the complicated history of Africa, especially of the last several centuries when existing divergences were accentuated by the presence of colonists who imposed new circumstances and conditions. These also include many natural reasons stemming from climate conditions and geopolitical situation of Africa. These include as well the ethnical and tribal divergences that turned out to be the major fueling factor in the conflict that set it ablaze for almost fifteen years.
There is one thing I am going to make the cornerstone of my research. The thing is that in my opinion there are the two distinct blocks of matters that influenced the protracted nature of the Liberian conflict. The first block will help us embed the Liberian civil world into the general framework of African conflicts since it will outline the major factors that add up to the gravity of conflicts in the African continent as a whole. There is a number of trends and a number of problems that are always present in African conflicts (including the one I am considering in this paper) which enhances the complexity and the protracted nature of conflicts. The second block comprises those factors that are inherently Liberian. I will speak about specific pre-history, about details of tribal clashes and other political intrigues that made namely this particular conflict so protracted.
So let me get started with the first block of factors. Those challenges the African continent had to deal with are quite many and they are multidimensional. They are of a very different nature as these challenges may happen to me from outside or inside, they may stem from geography, geopolitics, climate issues, history and things. In his book Robert Guest dwells upon a wide range of reasons for which Africa is lagging behind in economic terms and why so many conflicts happen there. Among others Robert Guest points out to the following ones:
Geography and climate. The region of Sub-Saharan Africa includes vast territories and problems, in the sense of geography and climate, in various places of this part of the continent are different. First of all, in the major part of the outlined area climate is not suitable for harvesting crops. This is true primarily about those regions that are located in the near proximity to the equator. Very high temperatures coupled with the factor of land infertility, yet combined with very limited water resources lead to the impotence of countries of the region to make their own economic living. However, there are places in Africa that are situated in the regions that are more moderate when it comes to climate where and were it are far more suitable for growing crops. These countries include Mozambique, Zimbabwe and some others situated at the same latitude (Madawo, 2005, 13). At the same time, what touches upon Liberia, the situation with climate is a double-edged sword here. On the one hand, Liberia is situated in the equatorial region in conditions of the very high humidity. On the other hand thirty eight percent of the country’s GDP comes from agriculture. Based on this I can conclude the following: climate is not such a determinant factor in causing scarcity of resources in Liberia which leads to conflicts as in other countries. However, since such a big fraction of population is employed in agriculture the average income is very low for a Liberian. This determines low economic success and poverty among the population which always adds up to political turmoil.
The further group of factors outlined by Robert Guest is the influence that slavery had on states (Guest, 2005, 67). It is very interesting to find out that he considers slavery to have a much more complicated and not so unequivocal history in the countries of the African continent. He states that before any foreign countries – European or American ones - enslaved the blacks the latter had already been enslaving one another. After that, Arabs came and started to exploit Africans, until Europeans came a bit later along with Americans (Mazrui, 2013, 212). However, it should be commented that Europeans implemented slavery in every part of the globe they came to, that is why it cannot serve as an unequivocal explanation of why African states are involved in so many conflicts. I think, we should dig deeper, back to the times when African peoples enslaved each other. I think the secret of many inter-racial and inter-tribal conflicts consists in their age-old feud, including feud over slavery processes. And although practices of enslaving each other virtually stopped after Europeans and Americans took on the role of enslavers the memory of the degree of tensions still reinforces stand-offs in African societies so much. Liberian tribes and peoples are not an exception. Tribes of Mano, Dan, Butuo are those that were suppressed when African-Americans came back to Africa from the United States approximately when the Liberian state was actually founded, in 1847. Exploitation of one peoples and tribes by the other created social disparity which very often was used by the belligerent parties in the course of the Liberian war. For instance, Charles Taylor gathered representatives of tribes of Mano and Dan to support him because these latter were the ones that were the most suppressed by the regime of Samuel Doe. Representatives of these tribes were trained in Cote d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone in order to prepare to topple Doe. That is why, as we can see, though very remote in chronological terms the question of slavery may seem to be, it still adds up significantly to why the conflict was so protracted.
Colonial rule in the African history is yet another factor the states of the region had to deal with for quite a long period of time, and it came to an end only a decade after the middle of the previous century. There is unequivocal opinion about what exact role – both a good or a bad one – colonialism may have had in the historical development of sub-Saharan states. On the one hand, colonialism caused economic thriving because the metropolis needed ensure for itself economic conditions in Africa. On the other hand, when we speak about social and economic standards colonialism must have really been a coercion on the African naitons. (Ramos, 2014). The problem – strange though that one may call this a problem at all – of Liberia consists in the fact that this country is one of only several that was never a colony. Since the very creation of this state in 1847 with the help of the United States of America it was never subjected to any European state, nor to any whatsoever. That is why, Liberia has always lacked the good level of development which translated in worse socio-economic conditions, political instability and enhanced rivalry between clans, tribes, ethnic minorities some of which I have already mentioned above, etcetera.
A challenge of another nature African states had to deal with was the persistent need o depend on the help from the foreign countries or from international bodies like the UN (Koutonin, 2013). In Guest’s opinion,this assistance the African states are striving to get hold on so much is good for nothing for it can help insignificantly in some situations were certain shortages may be filled in by the influx of the borrowed money but virtually impotent when it comes to more serious and large-scale things like building a nation. (Guest, 2005, 117). Again, the situation boils down to poverty and incapacity to build up facilities to thrive economically. At the same time, thriving namely economically is the key to political stability – hardly would have Liberian recurrent authoritarianism been able to go on for that long if the country had had a healthier economy.
All that was mentioned above was those factors that I can call as sources of external influence on the formation of the nature of conflicts in African states, and Liberia within that number. These are challenges that all were obstacles to the development and stability of the nation. However, in my opinion, a no less number of factors adding up to the protracted nature of conflicts in Africa should be searched for in. I will enumerate them below.
The first factor I am going to describe is the process that acquired the name of “africanization” of African states. No matter how a person used to become – and, frequently, still becomes – the head of a state – either by a coup or by an election or otherwise – he referred to the idea of africanization very often. The reason for this was – and is – to tarnish the reputation of former colonialist European states, primarily Portugal, Great Britain, France and Italy, in order to make them guilty in the eyes of Africans for all the bad that had happened to the continent (Schraeder, 178). The authoritarian leaders of African states hoped and hope that presenting the European states in this light they themselves would be more warmly welcome and regarded as ones who have come to liberate African nations from the yoke of colonialism. In that case, if they manage to present themselves as such, their peoples will overlook them being greedy, cruel and other suchlike things. And their harsh politics, their tight grip on their nations was and is justified by them by the need to keep the unity of a given nation in order to be able to respond to colonizers with a unified front, if need be. In this sense, the idea of africanization means, in its essence, a try of authoritarian leaders to find a way to seem positive figures to their nations. And this has become a not only a very solid obstacle to the development of African nations but also a factor that significantly steps up the level of tensions between the nations, on the one hand, and between the nations and their rulers, on the other hand That is why it is so very much necessary to try and get rid of this phenomenon in the African societies. This will serve not only the deprivation of the authoritarian leaders to explain their deeds but also to a more peaceful atmosphere across the continent, including Liberia in which for the last four decades authoritarianism thrived.
Another factor that needs highlighting is the scope of the bureaucratic apparatus that is existing within the state machine of virtually every sub-Saharan state (Africa’s Development, 1). This can be illustrated by the following example. Back in the 1960s the number of those who were employed in the state organs increased by six percent annually during a decade. This means that in 1960 the scope of the bureaucratic apparatus more than doubled! Obviously, the main reason why this happened was because it was beneficial for state authorities to put obstacles before virtually every worthy initiative. In terms of our topic in this research, this bureaucracy obviously added up to the steam that was piling up among the grassroots, because relations between the state and the nation started becoming unbearable in virtue of this (Glantz, 1991).
The third thing that is worth highlighting is an inherent feature of every normal state machine – the mechanism of checks and balances. This is the thing that introduces democracy to a given state. However, in most African states this phenomenon is either very lame or not present at all (World Bank, 2016). It is interesting that the concept of this balance was brought about to African states only by the already mentioned colonizers, those whose reputation is actively tarnished by those who impose the concept of “africanization.”Anyway, first introduced in the colonial era, the system of checks and balances began to be dismantled almost immediately after African states began gaining independence. What should be interesting for us in this respect is the way in which African authoritarian authorities did this, what primary method they used. This was the process of centralization, when not only the same organs but also the same people tried to have their tight grip on every possible state structure, state organ in order to control every decision taken. That is namely why it happened so in Liberia – Both Dow and Taylor, those they were such antagonists used the very same methods to control the state – through force, military power, deception, terror and reluctance to negotiate. That is why this is how this argument shows that this feature deeply rooted in the political culture of African states manifested itself so explicitly in Liberia during the civil war.
The fourth factor is oppression of opposition (Farah, 2011). There is not so much to elaborate on here, suffice it to mention how opposition was prohibited by Taylor or Dow, how newspapers and radio stations were hunted down and shut while their employees were incarcerated. Anyway, I shall elaborate on that a little bit below.
Finally, the last factor that is, in my opinion, worth of highlighting is the extensive reliance on military and adjacent services by authoritarian regimes. We can talk on a couple of issues here. First of all, army. I will talk below about the fact that Dow declared himself in 1984 to be the chief of staff. This is the direct evidence of the fact that he wanted to tighten his grip on the country by using force and coercion. Second, this also comprises the development of secret services and the increase of their role in the societies. Of course, this is also something that significantly heats up the temperature of the public discontent and what leads to clashes, if not to wars – just like it happened in Liberia (Mazrui, 1993, 182-183).
Given all of the above, we can come to the conclusion that the problem of the African development is far more complex than one could imagine. It covers a broad array of reasons of both external and internal nature and needs a no less complex approach to make Africa progress.
Further I mean to concentrate more on practicalities rather then tendencies. I will analyze the more precise triggers and factors of impediments that added up to the protraction of the Liberian civil war from 1989 to 2003.
In order to explain the direct reasons of the protraction of the civil war I have to refer to developments that took place almost a decade before the coup of 1989 when Charles Taylor came to power.
On April 14, 1980 the first address to the nation by Dow cited three reasons for the coup: corruption, poverty of the people, lack of respect for human rights. He claimed that 133 years of leadership of the so-called American Liberians were good for nothing, and announced that the government would now work for the interest of the people of Liberia.
Normal life in the country was restored surprisingly quickly. This proved: a) the ability to easily govern without American Liberians elite; b) that the economic activity led by the middle classes is of paramount importance; c) that during the years of reforms there emerged national economic potential.
In 1980 Liberians were full of hope: it was the first year of real independence, they said. The new regime was supported by all progressive and moderate politicians. Liberians optimism was reinforced by the first decisions of the new authorities. One of the first orders of the Council of National Rescue was to increase salaries of soldiers up to $ 250 per month (officials received to $ 200.). Many have been assigned a high officer ranks. The hut tax - the most humiliating and unjust tax – was repealed. At Christmas 1981 Dow freed all political prisoners and declared an end to political repression and "alien" rule. The new regime solemnly promised that in the next 5 years free democratic elections will take place. Dow tried to fight ethnic strife. At the border post at the entrance from Sierra Leone a traveler was met by a huge slogan: "There is no tribalism, no socialism!" Dow has repeatedly proclaimed the principle: "We are all Liberians." The newspapers published ads like "Lansana P. Joe will continue to be called Ponte Lansana Qwill", i.e. it was the rejection of the European names in favor of Africa. Nascence of "new nationalism", which took into account the achievements of both settlers and the indigenous ethnic groups, took place.
The most difficult problem Dow faced was land managment. American Liberians seized huge holdings. It was claimed that Tolbert and Henrys (Speaker of the House of Representatives) owned half of the Bong County, the Horton family - almost all the land of Monrovia. Indigenous population lacked land, instead. But Dow has not managed to do anything to solve the agrarian question.
In mid-1981 the euphoria of the democratic changes began to give way to anxiety. There was growing evidence that Dow did not intend to part with power and was going to reestablish an oppressive regime.
Dow sought absolute control over ideology. December 10, 1982, he gave the right to the police to arrest any person for the "unhealthy expressions towards government policy." News papers were under tough control. In Liberia, the media have been traditionally controlled by the authorities. These media comprised newspapers, semi-official organs "Liberian Age" (1946-1964), "Liberian star" (1964-1980), "Daily listener" (1957-1977), the radio stations. As for the opposition media, they were always persecuted. When the Dow was the target of constant attacks of the newspaper "Daily Observer" and its editor Kenneth Best, its reporters have repeatedly been arrested, three issues have been banned, and in January 1984 the newspaper was all closed after publishing an article about the strike of teachers, which, for several months, were not paid their salary.
The main Dow support in the struggle for power was the army. In 1984 its quantity was 6,750 soldiers - 6,300 in the National Guard and 450 - in the Coast Guard. The police was 2 thousand employees. Upon achieving complete control over the army, the Dow in August 1981 declared himself chief of staff.
In 1984, Dow continued to strengthen his personal power. In July, he actually usurped the presidency. He usurped this title, naming himself President of the Transitional National Assembly, and created a government, without waiting for the elections.
Public funds were spent without thinking, corruption thived. An example is the Dow itself. He bought a private jet and an armored car, opened accounts in foreign banks, became the owner of land property in the United States.
Example was followed by his subordinates. There were dozens of cases of theft by officials. For example, a member of the CNR Colonel Harrison Penn boasted that he had robbed ex-President Tolbert. There was the disclosed information that the director of the Special Security Service Gbeku Wright stole 117 thousand, chief accountant of the Government Gibson Suncor - 75 thousand, George Seygbe Pains, one of the leaders of the Ministry of Education, - 48 thousand dollars, and so on.
But it was not only Dow who was responsible for the economic crisis. It had deep roots: reduction of the role of the natural economy, huge external debt, decline in exports, the shortcomings of the tax system, the growing budget deficit. The decline was predetermined by miscalculations in strategy of economic development. It was caused by the growth of exports of raw materials, but not accompanied by structural adjustments of the economy. The economy was based on foreign investment in the private sector and foreign aid in the public sector. As already noted, between 1969 and 1976 13% of all investment in Africa, although its population were sent to Liberia is only 0.3% of the inhabitants of the continent.
During the Dow rule in the country triumphed lawlessness.
Second Republic (1980-1990), established by Dow brought tragic change the people of Liberia. It was an attempt to replace one oligarchy by another instead of introducing radical reforms Second Republic was the regime of personal power, terror, violence and open ethnic hostility. It is not surprising that it has become a prelude to civil war, that broke out in December 24, 1989 in Nimba County and acquired the original character of the struggle between the tribes Gio and Mano, on the one hand, the president of Dow army and tribe crane, on the other. Later, Dow was supported by Mandingo. Rebels fought against the government led by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), headed by Ch.Teylorom.
In his address to the people of Liberia, NPFL has indicated the following reasons for the armed uprising:
1. The bloody suppression of 24 August 1984 strike of students of the University of Liberia, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of people.
2. Shameless falsification of election results October 15, 1985
3. The brutal repression against the civilian population after a failed attempt to overthrow General Thomas Kvivonkpa on November 12, 1985 Doe regime, during which five thousand people were killed, mostly Gio and Mano.
For the 6 months of June 1990, Taylor's forces placed under its control 95% of the territory of Liberia. They mercilessly slaughtered all the crane. The survivors fled to Côte d'Ivoire. In May-June 1990, the conflict has reached even a higher peak e and affected the fate of more than a million of people. On July 2 rebel troops surrounded Monrovia. During the battle for the capital the latter was deprived of water, communications and power grid, shops and stores were smashed, all hospitals were closed, doctors have fled the country. But Taylor was unable to take Monrovia, for the defending troops led by Prince Johnson. Thus, in mid-1990 in the battle for Monrovia three forces were involved: Taylor’s, Johnson’s and the remnants of Doe's army. The last were almost all crane. There were 700 to 2 thousand. With them were four thousand women and children.
These three warring forces did not consider complying with any laws. Thus, Taylor's fighters looted embassies of Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Sierra Leone. Dow’s soldiers attacked the building of the UN Mission and the Lutheran Church. The latest killing more than 600 civilians who had taken refuge in it. Taylor suffered the war in Sierra Leone by giving the territory of the sovereign state of their own units.
On 24-25 August ECOWAS contingent composed of 3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea arrived in Monrovia port. September 12, 1990 at a meeting in Abuja of Nigeria's president Babangida and General Secretary of ECOWAS, it was decided to promote the ECOWAS forces strategy of "peace enforcement".
The main task of the meeting, members of the Standing Mediation Committee was to accelerate the implementation of the peace plan for Liberia, break the deadlock in negotiations on concrete ways to implement the earlier agreement on a cease-fire, disarmament of the warring factions. "Peace Plan", approved in November 1990 in Bamako during the extraordinary summit of ECOWAS, provided, in particular, complete cease-fire in Liberia, under control of the ECOWAS forces.
Taylor strongly opposed the ECOWAS "intervention" to Liberia as well as by any other regional organizations, stating that it is directed against the NPFL and that it is the tacit support of the armed forces that are inflicting defeat on Liberia. Taylor criticized ECOWAS for silence before the facts of human rights violations by the Dow regime, with the timing of the deployment of ECOWAS troops on the eve of the fall of the presidential palace in Monrovia, as well as the dominant role of ECOWAS in Nigeria and Ghana – countries who, according to him, sympathized with Dow. President of Burkina Faso Blaise Kompaore said that he learned about the creation of ECOMOG from media reports. Senegal and some of its French-speaking neighbors objected to the spread of the ECOWAS functions in the political sphere, believing that it will lead to a sharp increase in the influence of Nigeria. However, Nigeria was able to break their resistance and in 1978, ECOWAS member states signed an agreement on non-aggression in the form of a protocol on mutual defense. In response, the West African States have concluded their agreement on non-aggression and mutual defense (ANAD).
The main source of confrontation became ECOMOG, the fact that only 5 countries out of 16 members of ECOWAS, took part in the creation of a contingent of peacekeeping forces, and from 6 thousand ECOMOG 3,500 soldiers provided Nigeria 2000 -. Ghana, while the rest of the state sent a relatively small contingents.
Participants appeared to ECOMOG, vprochem1 not the only reason for criticism from the French-speaking countries. So, the leaders of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso stated that ECOWAS - a purely economic organization, and therefore has no legal right to intervene by force of arms in the internal affairs of another country. Both countries accused the Nigeria that it had decided not consulted on this issue with other members of ECOWAS.
If the Mediation Committee on Liberia was established by the summit meeting of ECOWAS, with the participation of all parties, not all members of the Community were present at the creation of ECOMOG, for example, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. ECOMOG decision was taken by five member countries of the Mediation Committee, including including the immediate neighbors of Liberia - Guinea, and Sierra Leone. A number of States expressed displeasure not so much about the principle of the creation of ECOMOG, how about the fact that they were not connected to the process of creation of this contingent.
At the very least, several objective factors make the position of the critics of the creation and deployment of ECOMOG in Liberia logically legitimate. Not been properly conducted preliminary consultations between ECOWAS member states at the level of the sovereign decision to establish Guards ECOMOG assumed authority, do not have. thee this authority required. When creating ECOMOG was sdela. derogation from the fundamental principles of peacekeeping operations in their traditional form, when peacekeeping forces are put into effect after the consent of all the warring parties and perform separating function in the buffer zones. The paradox lies in the fact that ECOMOG appears even its name was created as a watchdog group for the ceasefire, while no agreement to suspend hostilities as have been concluded on 24 August 1990. However, we must admit that the higher security interests in the region prevail over procedural "discrepancies".
In 1993-1995 full truce and failed to achieve. With the exception of Monrovia, the rest of the country by armed gangs rampaged formally considered themselves to various political groups. Many armistice agreements were signed over the years. The most significant among them were a few. We mention, in particular, the agreement in Cotonou on 25 July 1993 between the Transitional Government of National Unity, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (YULIMO). It is based on the principles were developed in Yamoussoukro. According to the agreement in Cotonou, declared a truce in Liberia, the observance of which was monitored by observers from ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the UN. A ban on the import of weapons, along Liberia ECOMOG forces of frontiers created buffer zones. The warring parties remain in their positions, and gradually, under the control of ECOMOG, disarmed
The process of forming the new government was followed by a fierce political struggle, poured into armed clashes. Thus, in May 1994 there was a split along ethnic lines YULIMO. Chairman Alhaji Crom (Mandingo) and General Roosevelt Johnson (crane) disagreed about YULIMO representation in the transitional government. Last formed YULIMO-D. Fighting broke out. Then they turned to the east of the country between the NPFL troops and LMS, headed by George Pain. There were attacks on units of Nigerians and Ugandans from ECOMOG troops. Suspend the disarmament process: 3 months laid down their arms YULIMO 739 fighters, 731 - NPFL, 685 - AFL. In August 1994, it was reported on the fighting in the west and the south-east of the country, about the new victims and new refugees. Disarmament and the return of refugees stopped. According to David Kpormakpora, in early 1994 there were 6 armed groups in the country: Taylor, except R.Dzhonsona, F.Massagui (Lofa Defense Force), George Pain and the Central Revolutionary Command (Saint-trawl Revolution commands).
All of the above being said, I can come to the following conclusions:
History and traditions were factors that added up significantly to the protraction of the conflict in Liberia. Centuries-old stand-offs between different tribes, ethnical minorities and inter-clan hatred compiled through centuries burst out so loud that they lasted for a very significant amount of time.
Tribalism, fraction within society along any lines of division let the leaders of different political forces use these fractions with a view to their own political goals which made the civil war eventually senseless. It was a war for the sake of war since there were so many belligerent parties that Liberia virtually risked to become a failed state. Ideas for which the war was led made no sense, it was rather that authorities used public sentiments.
Authoritarianism proved once more to be a very bloody type of regimes. Where authoritarian regimes are instilled no standing peace can happen, this can be deduced from the practice of virtually any African state.
Finally, protraction of the conflict owes to the poor management. ECOWAS did not dispose the needed resources to stop the bloodshed and even lacked competence to interfere in the military sphere. Neighboring countries were either too impotent or explicitly supported only one of the belligerent parties both of which did not add up to chances to finish the war.
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