Elusive Objectivity: Historical Interpretation and the Reality of Sino-Tibetan Relations
Many of the various histories written about the tumultuous relationship between China and Tibet offer polarized accounts of an international controversy that has come to define the struggle for ethnic identity and political autonomy. Indeed, it is a conflict fought as much in the media and the international consciousness of the global community as it has been contested on the battlefield and behind closed doors between charismatic political leaders like the Dalai Lama and Mao Zedong. The historians and authors who have chronicled a struggle that spanned the 20th century have, in general, seen the matter in terms of Tibetan sovereignty or a Chinese version of manifest destiny. Where the British scholar Warren Smith focuses on the political and ethical ramifications of Tibetan self-determination, Tom Grunfeld’s perspective is one of inevitability and the civilizing influence of an orderly China on an underdeveloped and primitive neighbor.
Tsering Shakya’s The Dragon in the Land of Snows is a scholarly examination of the complexities of the Tibet-China relationship from within the Chinese Communist party; specifically, its internal power shifts and the effect these have had on Chinese policy in Tibet. Shakya describes a situation in which the leadership of the two countries are locked in a perpetual, intractable yin-and-yang struggle, in which the exiled Dalai Lama wields tremendous international prestige and moral authority while the Communists, who are omnipresent, possess coercive force but no philosophical virtue that might appeal to a people with a naturally spiritual orientation. Melvyn Goldstein’s histories also present an extensive “inside-out” study of the Tibetan and Chinese governments. Like Shakya’s work, Goldstein offers a macro view of
the international diplomatic jockeying engaged in by key international players, from pre-World- War-II influencers like Great Britain and India to Cold War power brokers such as the Soviet Union and the U.S.
Tsering Shakya – The Dragon in the Land of Snows
Shakya writes that the character of China’s annexation took on a vastly different hue with the Communist Party’s assumption of power in 1950. The Guomindang regime’s tenuous hold on Tibet’s Lhasa government evaporated and the Communists came into Tibet with a very different modus operandi in mind. Henceforth, China’s ideologically driven state would act in Tibet for its own good. According to Shakya, Tibet’s leaders had been able to disregard the Guomindang, “but the Communists had proved their determination to win at all costs. When they declared their intention to liberate Tibet, many Tibetans realised that they meant it.”1 Communist China’s steadfastness vis a vis Tibet, its uncompromising insistence that the small, Himalayan state is a Chinese province is reminiscent of China’s unilateral stance toward Formosa/Taiwan and, later, Hong Kong.
One of the most interesting revelations in Shakya’s book is his description of covert U.S. involvement in Tibet in the 1950s, and China’s tendency to overstate C.I.A. intervention in Tibet. Seen in the context of 1950s Cold War hysteria, the Tibetan scenario is a flashpoint of America’s containment policy; realistically, the C.I.A.’s actions in Tibet were minimal compared to other parts of Asia, although the Dalai Lama’s escape from Lhasa in was planned and aided by the C.I.A. However, from the Chinese point of view, the perception of American
intervention, covert or direct, was a game-changer as far as Tibet was concerned. “It was no longer a question of revolt by some troublesome Tibetans but an international conspiracy to undermine the victory of the Communist Party in China. ..it presented a direct threat to China’s security. This may explain the ferocity of Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt.”2 Thus, history repeated itself in Tibet, where decades earlier the Tibetans had found themselves a pawn of British foreign policy.
The Tibetan revolt and the Dalai Lama’s flight into India in 1959 began his long exile from Tibet. More significantly, it symbolized Tibet’s final capitulation as a sovereign entity. The 17-Point Agreement between the Chinese and what remained of the Tibetan authority was seen at the time as a conciliation of sorts, in which Tibetans could retain a semblance of their way of life. However, with the Dalai Lama’s rejection of the agreement, the Chinese had no moral authority, despite their attempts to buy the loyalty of the Tibetan ruling classes. Shakya notes that in terms of values Tibet and China could not have been further apart.3 Nevertheless, the Communists “were motivated by the zeal to transform a society which they saw as governed by superstitions and marred by economic backwardness4 This ideological zeal for reform, and a persistent fear of intervention by the Western powers led by the United States, left the Chinese Communists resolute in their determination to maintain Tibet as a province of China. And yet the Chinese authorities were uncharacteristically circumspect when it came to Tibet’s ancient Buddhist traditions and the power of the monasteries (the Chinese authorities even accorded with tradition and joined the monks in giving alms during a religious festival).5
Melvyn Goldstein – The Snow Lion and the Dragon & A History of Modern Tibet
Like Shakya, Goldstein’s scholarship takes aim at the inner workings of the Chinese and Tibetan governments against a backdrop of international political maneuvering. His two books, The Snow Lion and the Dragon and A History of Modern Tibet: The Demise of the Lamaist State, are admirable accomplishments of scholarly research. His second book features key interviews with the Dalai Lama and with government representatives of both sides. It sheds new light on China’s courting of the Tibetan elite and the unique relationship between Mao Zedong and the Dalai Lama. American and Indian policies toward Tibet and the impact of the Korean War on Sino-Tibetan relations are likewise examined. Goldstein’s second volume is also notable for a subtle Chinese orientation, in which he refers to Mao’s stance toward Tibet as one of liberation. “Mao’s emphasis on peaceful liberation stemmed from his realization that the situation in Tibet was fundamentally different from that encountered in the other areas the PLA had liberated and was potentially far more dangerous to the long-term interests of China.”6
In a 2008 review of Goldstein’s second volume, Tibetan author Jamyang Norbu takes issue with the book’s tolerant treatment of Chinese policy and for overlooking Chinese depredations in conquered Tibet. Authors on the subject of Tibetan-Chinese relations manifest different opinions concerning the Tibetan ruling class and its role in the Chinese takeover.
Norbu takes Goldstein to task for a prurient approach to the subject, which seems at times to be overly concerned with salacious examples of the elite’s moral turpitude. While Goldstein does indulge in an excess of detail, his concern appears to be more with explaining the reasons for the erosion of Tibetan society that facilitated its absorption by an acquisitive Chinese Communist regime. Norbu also makes an interesting point in claiming that Tibet was already on the road to economic and social advancement before the Chinese invasion, and would likely have come to some form of Democratic government, as has happened in Bhutan.7
In The Snow Lion and the Dragon, Goldstein is principally concerned with the destruction of Tibet’s social, cultural and economic establishment under Chinese rule. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping sought to open a new chapter in the Tibetan-Sino relationship, holding negotiations with the Dalai Lama that essentially came to nothing after Deng’s death and the retrenchment of China’s hard-line position in the international arena. However, it is a mark of the intransigence of even the most liberal Chinese position concerning Tibet that even Deng’s diplomacy could only go so far. “Despite Deng Xiaoping’s comment that all issues other than independence could be discussed, Communist control was, in fact, simply a given. Rapprochement from the Chinese perspective meant the Dalai Lama had to return to a Tibet ruled by the Chinese Communist party.”8 China’s historic stance toward Tibetan sovereignty, and its belief that the Dalai Lama’s people are de facto citizens of the Chinese state, reasserted itself despite Deng’s attempts to effect positive change and convince the Tibetan populace of their neighbor’s good intentions.
Warren W. Smith, Jr. – Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism & Sino-Tibetan Relations
Warren Smith’s scholarly survey of the troubled history between Tibet and China is less disposed to see China and its actions in the little Himalayan state in objective terms. Whereas Goldstein and others are more inclined to see China acting in its role as a relatively new powerhouse on the world stage, as a country acting in its own self interest, Smith’s research and interpretation of the complex international dynamic has led him to interpret China as an aggressor willing to take whatever action is necessary to keep Tibet securely under its control. As such, Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism & Sino-Tibetan Relations does not obscure instances of genocide. Smith’s focus is Tibet after the 1950 invasion, the application of Communist doctrine in Tibet, the consequent surge in nationalist feeling in Tibet and the ascension of the Dalai Lama to the world stage.
The modern reality of Tibet is the product of what Smith calls a latter-day imposition of feudalism.9 Smith’s characterizes the Chinese occupation as oppressive and barbaric, but doesn’t stop there in assigning blame: the international community has avoided confronting the Chinese over Tibet in the interest of maintaining good diplomatic relations with the Far Eastern superpower. The U.S. government has applied diplomatic pressure in the interest of freeing political prisoners and on behalf of the Dalai Lama (but only after he won the Nobel Prize), yet arbitrary imprisonment and periodic slaughter has remained a constant in China’s Tibetan policy.
The Panchen Lama, who has from time to time supported the Chinese government in the interest of preserving peace, has claimed that as much as 15 percent of Tibet’s population has been imprisoned; others claim that 20 percent has suffered imprisonment, execution or other form of severe oppression.10
The Dalai Lama attempted to facilitate a peaceful solution that would placate China while seeking a resolution that would allow Tibet to regain its independence. Consequently, he has come under criticism from both sides for equivocation and appeasement. His actions have included “mediating with the Chinese, even requesting those in the resistance to lay down their arms. He protested to the Chinese against the methods of suppression they were employing. At the same time, the Chinese accused the Dalai Lama and his government of sympathizing with the resisters and of supplying them with arms.”11 Smith posits that it has always been a pillar of Chinese policy to make it seem as though the Dalai Lama’s agitating for independence is a result of political duress, that he has simply responded to pressure from within Tibet and from the international community.12 This, Smith explains, is another example of Chinese prevarication and the Communists’ ongoing attempt to paint Tibet and its leaders as essentially pro-Chinese government. Chinese attempts to co-opt the Panchen Lama and make him seem decidedly pro-Chinese, is a manifestation of this same political fiction. For Smith, it is part and parcel of China’s campaign to subvert Tibet from within, from the top down, a more subtle and politically savvy measure of control but an attempt to quell resistance nonetheless.
Tom Grunfeld – The Making of Modern Tibet
If background and personal affiliations are cause for suspicion in a historian, then critics of Tom Grunfeld’s The Making of Modern Tibet would have his personal orientation concerning Tibet and China held up to scrutiny. A member of the “U.S. – China People’s Friendship Society,” which some observers claim is an at-large adjunct of the Chinese Communist Party, Grunfeld’s account of Sino-Tibetan relations does appear to favor a rather ethnocentric account of the Tibetans that fails to take them in their own context. In particular, Grunfeld accuses the country’s religious leaders of keeping the population in a state of ignorant stasis, the better to take advantage of their willingness to follow and obey. “Tibet abounded in itinerant mystics who, more often than not, exploited the gullibility of the peopleAstrologers and fortune tellers also plied their trade, much as they do today on some modern city streets.”13
Grunfeld’s characterization of Tibetan customs and religions make it difficult to determine whether he is attempting to provide a cultural background or if he is simply denouncing what he takes to be a primitive society. “It is believed that if the proper rituals are not performed, the soul may reenter the body and run wildThese corpses are called ro-langs or ‘zombies’ and are believed to be sometimes activated by necromancers for their own supernatural purposes.”14 Such one-dimensional interpretation erodes the objectivity of The Making of Modern Tibet and makes it difficult to regard Grunfeld’s examination of the complex history of the Tibetan-Chinese conflicts as historically reliable. The impression is of a large, powerful civilizing nation enforcing its political ideology and form of government on a country in a state of arrested development.
As such, it comes as little surprise that Chinese brutality in Tibet receives short shrift in The Making of Modern Tibet. Grunfeld states his case early in the book, when he says the Dalai Lama’s campaigning on behalf of Tibet is not based in fact. The Dalai Lama has “generated very little light on the subject of Tibet’s history because (his) intent is to create and maintain a political campaign based on emotional moralism rather than on historical realities.”15 The “reality” being that the Tibetans are actually part of the larger Chinese ethnic group, which can be said to include the Mongolians, Taiwanese and many others in the region. Ethnicity is dubious logic upon which to make a case for China’s assimilation of Tibet but Grunfeld’s use of it is nothing new. Such arguments have been used to justify the expansion of the British Empire into the farthest reaches of the globe and to rationalize America’s mass seizure of Native American lands.
Grunfeld has insisted that the Dalai Lama’s campaign in exile to free Tibet from Chinese rule has had the reverse effect, that it has made conditions worse inside the country and that it has furthered a mythological Tibet which has no basis in reality. It is interesting that so much attention should be paid to Tibetan shortcomings and relatively little paid to Chinese depredations within Tibet, such as the destruction of Buddhist temples, murder and imprisonment. Surely, if Tibet is in such need of improvement, it could just as well be provided by a more benign foreign power not bent on subjugation and oppression.
Conclusion -
Tibet’s fate as an independent nation has mirrored that of other small states that have found themselves in the shadow of a powerful, predatory neighbor. One is reminded of Czechoslovakia and Poland, former Eastern bloc countries that were helpless before Soviet military power; and Finland, which lay just miles from the Soviet border and always lived under the threat of invasion. Geographically, Tibet is in a similar situation with China. Historically, it has been a pawn of high-stakes international diplomacy, once a chess piece in Britain’s “Great Game” and today a cause célèbre for high-minded individuals who admire the Dalai Lama and decry the kind of violently suppressive instincts displayed by the Chinese government at Tiananmen Square. The ideal of national sovereignty, of the naturally endowed right to self-governance, fires the imagination of Westerners who at the same time have used that cherished concept as a bargaining chip. Ultimately, Tibet is the big loser in this game, the never-ending cycle of imperialism-by-other-names.
All of which raises an interesting question: do scrupulously “objective” histories on the subject do a disservice to humanity and the idea that human beings should be free to live without fear of coercion? Or should it be the business of the scholar-author to draw attention to heinous acts of oppression, such as genocide? Tom Grunfeld wrote his book secure in the belief that his viewpoint was arrived at through the careful and thorough scrutiny of the facts, just as Warren Smith’s account of calculated oppression by the Chinese Communist Party was an outgrowth of research, interviews and interpretive scholarship. Ultimately, historic reportage is beholden to the truth and must relate the verifiable actions of all concerned if others are to accurately interpret the history of Sino-Tibetan relations.
References
Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, vol. 2. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 2009.
Goldstein, Melvyn C. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1999.
Grunfeld, A. Tom. The Making of Modern Tibet. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.
Norbu, Jamyang. “Black Annals: Goldstein and the Negation of Tibetan History (Pt. 1),” Phayul.com, 21 July 2008. Accessed June 23, 2012.
Shakya, Tsering. The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1999.
Smith, Warren W. Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
