Hamas movement has been perceived over the years as an Islamist extremist terrorist movement. This perception has been informed by the mission behind the formation of the movement which is in a nutshell, the obliteration of Israel and the ultimate establishment of a Palestinian state. Besides, the perception derives justification from the religious ideologies such as fundamentalism and radicalization often associated with Islamism and adopted by the Hamas in addition to several terrorist activities that have been carried out by the movement (Pettersen, 2009). However, this paper seeks to portray the Hamas as a movement in pursuit of self-determination and capable of change in line with democratic ideologies as viewed through the lenses of the western world notwithstanding its violent and seemingly static ideological foundation. To this end, this paper demystifies Hamas by critically analyzing its historical background, organizational structure, biographical background of its crucial leaders, administrative strategies, and foreign response.
Hamas is an Arabic connotation for zeal. It is an acronym for Haraqkat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, Arabic words which when translated connotes Islamic Resistance Movement. It was established in late 1987 by the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (Satloff, 2006). Therefore, it traces its roots to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni movement, which was established in 1928 to address the vulnerability of Muslims to colonization through religious observance. However, Hamas was established to provide means by which the Muslim Brotherhood could take part in the violent confrontation with Israel without risking exposure of the Muslim Brotherhood and its social organizations to Israeli retaliation (Satloff, 2006). Before the establishment of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood had desisted from any involvement in violent resistance against the Israeli occupation of what was traditionally Palestinian territory. Instead, it had limited the scope of its activities to social welfare and religious activities. Therefore, the Palestinian uprising of 1987 invited the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood necessitating the formation of Hamas originally in the Gaza strip ( Sunsehaugen, 2011).
Whereas the origin of Hamas can be traced back to Muslim Brotherhood, this paper sides with the view taken by Pettersen, 2009 that the birth of Hamas was prompted by the socio-political contexts brought about by Israeli Occupation of what had traditionally been Palestinian lands. It was not birthed out of Islamist ideology as proffered by the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The 1947 decision by the UN to establish a settlement of the Israeli State in Palestine led to the establishment of 600 000 Palestinian Jews most of whom were immigrants and occupied more than half of the Palestinian territory. This decision was pre-empted by the British withdrawal from Palestine and the resultant tension between the Jews and Arabs. Arabs were angered when the State of Israel was proclaimed on the 15th May 1948 by the United Nations (Mirault, 2010).
Palestinians rejected the idea of the establishment of any Jewish State in Palestine. Neither did they agree to any partition arrangements as earlier on recommended by the United Nations’ Special Committee on Palestine. They based their claim to the Palestinian land on the fact that the Arabs had occupied the territory for hundreds of years as opposed to the Jews who had only occupied it for less than thirty years. Therefore, the Arabs felt entitled to the land. Furthermore, the Arabs were outraged by the fact that the United Nations Resolution allotted the Jewish State the portion of the Palestinian Land that was endowed with rich resources and a lengthy coastline whereas the Arabs ended up with a barren land. Besides, 54% of the land was allotted to the Jewish State which at the time had only 600 000 Jews contrary to the 1.4 million Arabs who were awarded 46% of the territory (Graham, 2009). The day following the passage of the United Nations Resolution in 1947 marked the first Arab-Jews war in Palestine. It went on until the day of the proclamation of the Jewish State in 1948. Both sides reportedly committed atrocities and suffered casualties. Realizing that the Palestinian Arabs were not able to drive out Jews in Palestine on their own, the rest of the Arab community joined the war. They included the Egyptian Army, Arab Legion, the Lebanese, Iraqis and the Syrians. The Arabs were defeated in 1949 resulting in great humiliation throughout the Arab world and causing more resentment against the Jewish people. The Jewish gained more land during the war and controlled two-thirds of the territory having displaced 750 000 Arabs. Most of these devastated refugees settled in Gaza strip. After that, Arab community set in motion events that culminated in a six-day war in 1967 when Israel launched the first pre-emptive attack against Egypt. They were humiliated again by Israel which then seized a larger territory from Arab community and ended up being three times larger than it was before war (Graham, 2009).
After that several wars were waged against Israel by the Palestinian Arabs mainly led by Arafat and with crucial support from Egypt and Syria. However, all attempts by Arafat were futile. In the 1970s, Yassin’s influence had tremendously grown. Although he was a very influential voice of Islamism, he had not been able to build enough capacity to be able to mount an armed resistance against Israel. The Israelis viewed Yassin as a potential competitor to the Arafat-led movement for the support of the Palestinians. Accordingly, they created an enabling environment in which Yassin’s influence would grow with a view of eventually weakening Arafat’s movement. It worked. Yassin was, therefore, able to preach Islamism and radicalized a significant portion of the Palestinian population. Although he was later convicted of organizing attacks against Israel, his thirteen-year sentence was later cut short when he was included in a prisoners swap (Graham, 2009).
In May 1987, a series of events took place and led to the historical uprising in Gaza and paved the way for the establishment of Hamas. An Israeli commander was assassinated by Islamist jihadist, and an Israeli soldier stabbed to death. Afterward, an accident involving Israel Defense Forces truck and a Palestinian car occurred resulting in Palestinian fatalities. The end of the funeral of the Palestinian victims of accident marked the beginning of protests by Palestinian. The protests were fueled by the frustrations and resentment that had been taking root among the Palestinians especially the youth. The protests culminated in an uprising. The Muslim Brotherhood resolved to capitalize on the uprising. It viewed it as an opportunity to reinvigorate a violent resistance against Israel. However, they did not want to expose the Brotherhood’s social welfare institutions to retaliatory attacks from the Israelis. Accordingly, they decided to form a proxy movement that would spearhead violent attacks against Israelis and through which the Brotherhood’s involvement would be disguised (Graham, 2009).
Hamas was therefore birthed on December 9, 1987, at Yassin’s house in a meeting which was attended by the seven Hamas founding fathers. They included Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abd al-Fattah Dukhan, Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Ratinsi, Muhammad Sha’ah, Isa Al-Nashar, Salah Shihadah and Ibrahim al-Yazuri. They resolved to take control of the uprising. To this end, they established different wings tasked with various spheres of the movement such as security, youth, communications, and politics. Besides, they settled on Gaza strip as the movement’s headquarters (Graham, 2009).
On September 28, 1989, Israel found out that they had erred in supporting Hamas having perceived it as a harmless group. Accordingly, they designated it an illegal organization. This change of heart was informed by the conviction of Yassin for the offense of ordering kidnapping of an Israeli soldier. However, the public outlawing of Hamas by Israel resulted in counteractive outcomes. Instead of crippling its credibility, it invited more support for the movement as most Palestinians already mistrusted Israel. (Graham, 2009).
The principal mission of Hamas first found expression in the 1988 Charter. The charter in questions cites in its preamble the obliteration of Israel as the primary objective of the Hamas. Specifically, it states that “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam obliterates it, just as it obliterated others before it’ (Brackman, 2011, p. 2). The mission statement derives justification from the fact that it recognizes the land of Palestine as a waqf which denotes an Islamic trust or endowment by dint of Article 11 of the Charter. It follows therefore that no one is entitled to yield it to anyone. Accordingly, Article 15of the Charter sets out jihad as the only solution by which the land in question could be liberated. This is perhaps because jihad is considered to be a religious duty of every Muslim. Therefore, it appears that Hamas has no legitimate reason to exist other than to fight Israeli occupation. Nevertheless, it sought to completely eradicate the Jews as opposed to just putting the Israeli occupation to an end (Brackman, 2011).
Hamas adopted several strategies in their violent resistance against Israelis. The youth, for instance, was encouraged to participate in protests and public strikes. Those who did not be intimidated by burning of tires in front of their homes. Besides, Islamism found generous manifestation during the resistance. A radical interpretation of Islam was highly encouraged. Martyrdom was highly glorified. Moreover, Majd was established by Yassin and charged with carrying out of executions of those Palestinians convicted of collaborating with Israel. The Majd executed approximately 800 Palestinians found guilty of assisting Israel (Graham, 2009). More so, in 1988 Hamas under the leadership if Yassin began carrying out kidnappings of Israeli soldiers and trading their bodies for the release of Hamas prisoners (Graham, 2009). It also waged full-scale military attacks. This became possible at the end of the Gulf War when the Majd and the Mujahideen al-Filastinum merged to form a proper military wing of Hamas. Its military capacity was thus strengthened. More so, the inflow of funds at the end of the Gulf War facilitated the establishment of a standing army (Graham, 2009).
Besides, Hamas resorted to the execution of Israeli civilians. These executions were carried out by the Al-Qassam Brigades which took over the role previously played by the Majd. The execution of Israeli non-combatants by Hamas was justified by the belief that all Israeli civilians were obligated to serve in the Israeli military at some points in their lives (Graham, 2009).
Furthermore, Hamas adopted suicide bombing as a tactic against the Israelis. This tactic gained traction in 1994 following the signing of the Declaration of the Principles which was negotiated by Arafat. Suicide bombing proved to be effective with one mass suicide bombing resulting in one of the most catastrophic attacks on Israel. It took place at the end of the Passover on March 27, 2002. 30 people were killed, and 140 left injured during the attack (Brackman, 2011).
Hamas has been able to secure support in the form of military aid and funding from various sources. Neighboring states such as Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, for instance, supported Hamas in the war with Israel. Iran, on the other hand, remains a major source of foreign funds to Hamas. In 2007 Hamas reportedly received approximately $200 million from Iran (Graham, 2009). Besides direct financial aid from Iran, Hamas raises funds through membership fees, donations by Palestinian expatriates and private benefactors from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states (Santis, 2008).
Hamas has a complicated leadership and organizational structure (Wilson, 2015). However, there appears to be a scholarly consensus as to the view that Hamas leadership is three-fold by structure. According to Satloff for instance, in the inner circle, there are local leaders who are based in Gaza and West Bank. The most popular ones in this circle include Sheikh Ahmed Yasin and Abdul Asis Rantisi. They were both killed by Israel. However, they have been succeeded by other leaders. The prominent ones include Mahmoud al-Zahar and Ismail Haniyeh. The second circle consists of political leadership. It is Hamas external leadership. This circle is external to the Hamas military activities. The prominent leaders in this category include Mousa Abu Marzouk and Khaled Marshal. Thirdly, the outer ring comprises the international leadership of Muslim Brotherhood which is responsible for the coordination of the global operations of the Brotherhood. The leaders in this ring include prominent figures such as Muhammad Akef who heads the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and a Muslim scholar based in Qatar who goes by the name Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Although all the three rings are involved in the coordination of the Hamas activities, each of them has its sphere of activities. The inner ring, for instance, is involved in coordination of Palestinian social welfare and building the political capacity in areas in which Hamas has a sphere of influence. The outer rings, on the other hand, are responsible for maintenance of contacts and networks with Hamas international supporters and funders. Nevertheless, both the inner ring and the outer ones play crucial roles in the formulation of Hamas terror strategies and the financing of the same (Satloff, 2006). At the local level, there is no distinction between the military and political wings since same individuals are tasked with both responsibilities (Snider Social Action Institute, 2003). It has been argued that Hamas governance takes authoritarian approach without accountability to the people it governs (Frisch, 2015).
More so, this paper takes the view that Hamas is partly a creation of history in which the Jews took part in writing. This is made evident by the social and political circumstances in which some of the people who played a crucial in the establishment of Hamas were raised. For instance, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who was one of the prominent local leaders was not born a terrorist. He was made into one. His father died when he was only three years old. Worse enough he was raised in a refugee camp in Gaza Strip. They were forced to flee their village together with his mother at the age of twelve. He got into a fight at sixteen when he injured his spinal cord and became a quadriplegic. He cleared school and taught Arabic language and Islam in Gaza schools so as to raise funds to go to university. In 1965 he traveled to Cairo to join university but was arrested and detained on accusations of being a member of the uprising and conspiracy to oust Nasser. He was released after two weeks due to lack of evidence and deteriorating health. Upon his return to Palestine, he formally joined the Palestinian resistance. He was assassinated on March 22, 2004 (Graham, 2009).
Hamas has received varying foreign responses. One major such response is its designation as a terrorist group by Israel, the United States and the European Union member states. Accordingly, the movement has been subjected to policies that hinder direct negotiations with terrorist groups (Graham, 2009).
In conclusion, this paper takes the view that Hamas is just a movement in pursuit of self-determination and self-governance. The political and social-economic conditions partly put in place by the International Community and Israel forced its hand. Accordingly, it resorted to violent means of realizing their goal. This is made evident by the apparent unjust settlement of Jewish populations in what was believed by Palestinians to be their land. Biographical analysis of its leaders also reveals these conditions and explains the motivations behind its violent resistance. Islamism and radical interpretation of Islam have been instrumental in mobilizing the movement. Therefore, it is highly probable that the movement might metamorphose into a real democracy should the causative conditions be addressed.
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