In terms of ethnicity, the shift from dominant minority to dominant majority is noticeable on an international level in recent times. A major principle of the pre-modern organization is domination by minority groups, usually an ethic minority, but in the modern era, the ethnicity of dominant majority is on the rise. The focus on popular sovereignty, democracy and the intermingling of politics and culture has made the principle of ethnic dominance more untenable. The latest example of this change is evident in Iraq; it is easy to spot the vulnerability of societies dominated by minority groups like Bahrain and Syria .
Minorities who tend to dominate the politics of a nation happen to be communally individual ruling groups who manage to govern majorities in spite of lower demographic numbers. Such groups can be distinctly differentiated from social minorities, a term that encompasses subordinate and disadvantaged groups without taking into account sheer numerical size. Iraq, during the time of Saddam Hussein, had the Sunnis who were a politically dominant minority group. On the other hand, the Shi’ites who constituted the major demographic was the disadvantaged group in society .
Many dominant minorities were able to persist in the present era and several rose up due to post-colonial and colonial approaches. In the modern states, ethnic minorities with politically dominant traits are usually indebted to colonial legacies for their dominant position; they depend considerably on coercive policies while constructing a narrow support base in society. They manage to form clear links to overarching national identities and they have been more common in history compared to the present owing to the processes of democratization that transfer power to the majority sects.
The origins of the hegemony of the Sunni order in Iraq can be traced back right to the beginning of its formation by the British. After winning the World War I, Britain established Iraq through the combination of three past Ottoman provinces – Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. They were able to bring together the minority group of Sunni Arabs in the central area and the Kurdish minority sect in the north with the southern Shi’ite population within the framework of a single political unit .
Hashemite Faysal ibn Husayn, an ally of the British from Syria in their conflict against the Ottoman Empire, was crowned the king of Iraq. Hence, the reigning dynasty was not indigenous to the local population. Moreover, the elite sections of the Sunni Arabs from the region of Baghdad were gradually integrated into the main administrative institutions and they practically controlled the administrative and military authority .
At the time of Iraqi independence in 1932, a mere 15 percent of high-ranking posts in the government belonged to the Shi’ites. Even after the formal establishment of independence in the region, the communal aspects of the organizational infrastructure persisted. The actions of the military and the administration led the Kurds, who accounted for almost 20 percent of the total population in Iraq, and the Shi’ites, roughly 60 percent, to consider the newly formed state in Iraq as an institution governed entirely by the Sunni Arabs. The hegemony of the Sunni Arabs was intact and did not undergo any transformation even after the overthrow of monarchy during a coup in 1958 .
The legacy of the French in Syria is somewhat similar thought it was several decades after the establishment of independence that the Alawi minority, comprising approximately 11 percent of the population of Syria, gained control of the state. Till the time of the arrival of the French invaders, the minority group of the Alawis was treated as inferior. But like the Sunnis in Iraq, the Alawi population of Syria was a minority who had gained the favors of the Europeans. Two significant aspects of the rule of the French from 1920 to 1946 contributed immensely to the empowerment of the Alawis .
First, the Alawis were granted anonymous status by the French in their home area which, in turn, served to provide the earlier subjugated minority with the necessary administrative skills to govern a state. Second, the patterns of recruitment to the security apparatus preferred the minority group since the increasing nationalist resistance in Syria originated from the Sunnis. The French considered the Alawis to be reliable and secure allies who could be trusted to suppress nationalist revolts .
Even though the autonomous status of the Alawis was lost in 1936, their disproportionate attendance in the military remained after the withdrawal of the French troops from Syria. Their influence increased as a large number of military coups led to the expulsion of several senior officers, generally belonging to the Sunni sect, from the ranks of the military, thereby forming space for the promotion of the Alawis. The officers of the Alawi sect played a considerable role in the coup of Ba’th in 1936. This action permitted them to further cement their position in the army at the ranks of officer and eventually replace Amin al-Hafiz, the Sunni president, in 1966 .
This indicated that many dominant minorities gained their superior political rank as a result of the group identities of sub-states which were politically relevant after the departure of the European Great Powers and, so, they dominant minorities had to deal with different challenges. It was necessary for the minority group to maintain political hegemony and they relied extensively on the coercive exclusion of the majority groups from the areas of decision-making. Widespread security apparatuses were been used on a regular basis to ensure that every citizen was discouraged from dissent. The message was delivered via ruthless suppression of every resistance motivated by the communities as well as opposition activism .
In Iraq, the Kurdish uprising of 1974 led to the slaughter of thousands of Kurds along with the relocation of many others to the southern part of Iraq. In the latter half of the 1980s, the Kurds were subjected to chemical weapon attacks and, according to reports, almost 50,000 of them were killed by the Anfal campaign regime. On a similar note, the Shi’ite uprisings in the 1990s were repressed rather brutally. Almost a quarter million people belonging to the Shi’ite community in southern Iraq were forced to shift after almost forty thousand troops arrived in the region and drained the local marshes. Moreover, any revolts that were attempted in Syria were suppressed in brutal fashion .
A rebellious power of the Muslim Brotherhood gained control of Hama in 1982 and managed to imprison many of the local officials like the governor. But the army descended upon the city with advanced artillery and through aerial combat, they massacred thousands of the indigenous inhabitants. The regime’s message was unequivocal in every instance and did not allow the consideration for regime change. A widespread belief in the omnipotence of the regime was forcefully instilled and this, in turn, established a cycle where any movements of the opposition stopped mobilizing. This led to the consolidation of the hold of the minority on power. Areas in the Arab world where the dominant minorities were earlier unable to maintain a deterring and expansive security apparatus have seen minority rule dealing with regular revolts and challenges. It is possibly the poor economic condition of the minority regime in the rich oil countries like Syria and Iraq which accounts for its inability to handle a security apparatus .
Most of the important positions in security agencies along with other governing bodies of minority regimes have commonly been bestowed to loyalists. In Syria, the regime of Hafiz al-Asad built its foundation with members of the tribe Alawi Kalbiyya along with other significant members from various large Alawi tribes, such as Haddadin and Matawira. The division of the most prime in the security apparatus among the large Alawi sects helped Asad create a small but faithful circle of confidants. The alliance between the Alawis made sure that the important players in the community were interested in maintaining the rule of the minority. But no single tribe had enough power to overthrow the regime of Asad by itself. A wider coalition was established with various minority groups who were facing considerable loss from the large scale Sunni domination .
In Iraq, the rulers belonging to the Sunni minority laid stress on the element of hegemony in the security apparatus. By the year 1936, almost 95 percent of the senior officers were Sunnis. Even though discontent among the Shi’ite community in the 1930s and 40s resulted in more representation in the civil service and government as well as the appointment of the first prime minister belonging to the Shi’ite sect in 1947, the resistance of the Sunnis altered the trend and forced the resignation of the Prime Minister .
Minority authoritarian regimes have been seen to rely on one-party rule to increase their support base and offer incentives to individuals to join the ruling party while exercising a policy of brutal oppression to incite suppression. Constitutions established in Syria and Iraq in the 1960s supported the Ba’th institution as the supreme institution in the state. In this case, the single ruling party was transformed into the state. On the other hand, the presidency of the party combined with the state presidency and military command. Iraq witnessed the rise of the Ba’th’s Revolution Command Council (RCC) and its Chairman became the Commander-in-Chief of the army. The number of the Syrian Ba’th party had magnified and the party was offering easier access to resources, especially to peasants from the Alawi along with other minority communities and the rural Sunnis .
Authoritarian regimes have often facilitated a unifying national ideal or a supra-ethnic identity by introducing concepts of shared destiny and collective historical memory. The ideologies, which assumed the form of tools for controlling the majority, were often advanced with the aid of coercive methods. In Syria and Iraq, the Ba’th regimes tried to endorse a Pan-Arab identity and eradicate religious differentiation. In a number of postcolonial communities, there is widespread coalition politics in which a dominant minority group mobilizes a greater ethnic coalition around it and forms a more encompassing national identity. These types of ideologies did not need to be entirely inclusive; they would often exclude at the pan-ethnic level. In Iraq and Syria, for instance, the ‘civic’ pan-Arabism was against the non-Arab minorities such as the Kurds. This case also applies to the Shi’a Islamic national identity of Iran which after the year 1979 included almost 92 percent of the entire population but excluded about 7 to 8 percent of the minority comprising of the non-Shi’a groups .
Concerns regarding the increasing nexus of power happen to be structural in nature instead of empirical. When the elite authorities tried to forge relations with the business class in the 1970s and 80s, they were completing more than simple pursuit of interests. They were attempting to respond to rising troubles in the economy. But, with the passage of time, these political elites along with their offspring had become economic elites. Their interests could be perceived in their policy preferences, their transforming alliances in society as well as their lifestyles. In 1980s, therefore, the incentive structure was altered.
It is was important to recognize new social contracts with populist and labor forces that would need a modicum of power-sharing, and noting the rise in their own interest levels in the market along with a flexible private sector, the political elite tried to take the easy way out that coincided with their altering preferences and the transforming incentive structure. In other words, they began to deepen their associations with select portions of the business community, but at the expense of the gains made by the laborers from the time of the late 1950s under the regime of the United Arab Republic, and then during the time of the mid 1960s under the new and radical rural-minoritarian Ba’thist leadership .
It is quite evident from changes occurring in the Middle East as well as several countries in North Africa that, when long standing kingdoms and dictatorships begin to become unstable, it is highly likely the power may be assumed by the minority instead of a government being formed by the majority. The cases of Iraq, Syria and Bahrain serve as exemplary examples of the scenarios that cause minorities to take the lead.
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