Introduction
Intellectuals spent a considerable period of time during the 20th century discussing skeptical arguments which claim that it is impossible to have knowledge of the existing world. These arguments stem from theories of Descartes and have been the basis of heated discourses on the subject of the external world. The skeptics to the notion of the external world have claimed that their premises on the subject are intuitively obvious. However, they have not offered empirical evidence to underpin their intuition. Some authors contend that the intuitions underpinning their skeptical arguments are universal (widely shared) for those who think critically about knowledge. Others, such as Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (13-17) are of a different opinion and have provided results of inquiries that imply that intuitions on the external world are varied depending on culture and socioeconomic status of the respondents. This paper provides arguments that refute the methods and examples used to further the premise that epistemic intuition is non-universal.
The first reason why the methods provided by Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (4) are questionable is that they generally imply that variations in epistemic intuitions are absolute far-reaching. In showing that epistemic intuitions vary depending on the socioeconomic class as well as the cultures of the respondents used, the important finding that some variations only exist in terms of strength is merely mentioned. This is because a variation by strength only not only confirms the universality of epistemic intuitions but also disregards non-universality. For example, in the study involving Pat and the zoo, a majority of the socio-economically diverse sample chose the option “only believes”. The difference between them appears slight when compared with more definitive results. While Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (8) mention the finding in their research, they fail in recognizing it as a major point of contention in the debate on universality and one which has the potential to change the entire outlook of the debate.
The second reason why Nichols, Stich and Weinberg’s methods are flawed is in the fact that they do not make it clear, for the purposes of further research, which questions the respondents disagree on since people often derive different assumptions that may not be explicit on text. The research does not provide information on whether the respondents were afforded an adequate number of choices or whether the disagreements that arose among the respondents were purely verbal. A limited number of choices to either “really knows” and “only believes” are limited because they assume that intermediaries or neutrals do not exist between the two extremes afforded by the choices. The significance of this information is that if present, it lends credibility to the research while if absent, it may lead to loss of faith with the findings.
The third point on discrediting the research methods is that the sample sizes used or referred to in the research by Nichols, Stich and Weinberg. While they claim to be radical experimentalists, the sample sizes used are too limited to afford such bold generalizations. For a study sample to be fully representative of the population, it must be reasonable sizable and varied. The sample sizes of some of the studies presented by Nichols, Stich and Weinberg are not documented while the ones that are do not use a representative sample.
Some of the examples used to further the argument against universality of epistemic intuition either inappropriate or biased. This is because Nichols, Stich and Weinberg only use examples about either objects other people or animals rather than about “the self” or the individual. The intellectual struggle to determine whether an external world exists, which is the basis of this debate, is found within the individual as a self reflection. This implies that more investigations and examples on how the individual perceives themselves is more appropriate for this inquiry than using examples of how the individual perceives other people (or other things). In this regard, for example, on universality of epistemic intuition may consider examining how people feel about themselves in terms of optimism, personal control, kindness etc. It is a well known fact that most people are exceedingly optimistic about themselves. This pattern of intuition is commonly/ universally shared. This shows that a more personalized approach to intuition is more applicable than using intuitions on other people and objects.
Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (4) and other researchers against the use of intuition in epistemology claim a lack of evidentiary power in intuition. In doing so, they misrepresent some truths in their examples. For example, Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (4) provide an example which is inherently flawed and self-defeating. The closure principle used, while intuitively correct, should not be applied to an example which is innately flawed. Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (4) refer to Dretske (n.p)’s argument which reads: A person is at the zoo observing a zebra. The person considers the probability that what they are looking at may not really be a zebra but a cleverly-disguised mule. Although it doesn’t seem right for the person to claim that the animal seen is not a cleverly-disguised mule, they may have a reason to deny that what they are looking at is a cleverly disguised mule. After all, a cleverly-disguised mule would look no different than what the person is seeing (paraphrased). This example is arguably flawed because it disregards the fact that there may be some truth obtained over time from observing zebras and mules in the way the person differentiates the two. This experience then provides evidence to the person regarding why they believe the animal to be a zebra or not. It is not possible for one, not to have reasons why they think the animal is a zebra or not.
However, this argument would be refuted using the reasoning that what intuitionists provide as evidence is based on the fact that it appears in an intellectual sense to them as evidence while it must indeed first be proven to be true. This reasoning may be overcome by the premise that the intuitive evidence enabling the person to know if the animal is a zebra may have been obtained through teachings from a number of other individuals. This may have provided some authority to the intuition.
The most important objection to the argument that is presented in this paper that Nichols, Stich and Weinberg fail in their methods and examples to prove non-universality of epistemic intuition is that many tests prove non-universality. Nichols, Stich and Wenberg borrow their examples from various research sources which favor their opposition to universality. While the methods used in some of the surveys appear wrong, the researchers appear vindicated by the findings of other researchers. However, it is important to treat each unique case independently to determine its credibility. Cases in which the methods used are statistically or scientifically wrong should be ignored in this debate.
Conclusion
Epistemic intuition favors the premise that the non-existence of the external world is possible since the existence has not been proven. In their defense to some of their arguments, proponents of epistemic intuition claim that intuition is universally practiced in a similar way. However, Nichols, Stich and Weinberg (4) provide pyrrhonist and other arguments to prove that epistemic intuition differs across groups whose members belong to different cultures as well as different socioeconomic statuses. In so doing, some of the methods and examples they use have lent themselves to closer inspection. The findings of inconsistencies in the methods and examples are represented in this paper. The first major finding is that slight disparities in the number of same choice responses by the subjects used in some studies are represented as evidence of non-universality rather than evidence of universality in intuition. Another issue is that the questions to which respondents disagree on are not documented. The problem with this is that people often derive different assumptions that may not be explicit on text. In addition one does not know whether an adequate number of choices were used or whether the disagreements that arose among the respondents were purely verbal. Overall, the findings of this research indicate that some aspects of epistemic intuition are universal while others are not.
Work Cited
Nichols, Shaun, Stephen Stich, and Jonathan M. Weinberg. "Metaskepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology." The Skeptics 12.1 (2003): 1-21. Print.
Dretske, F. 1970. “Epistemic Operators.” Journal of Philosophy, 67(24), 1007-1023.
