Democratic revolutions like the Arab Spring has toppled down political regimes abusing their authority for personal gains creating nepotic cults that leave people impoverished. Contrary to expectations, a series of revolutionary movement mostly failed to reach the intended target. It is not that all uprisings were to no avail altogether. Tunisia had better resources than countries like Egypt to reform the country. Overall, the shortage of wealth, the presence of specific US interests in the region, a pro-military electoral mentality, and the dominance of political parties have halted the democratic progress in North Africa and the Middle East in some ways.
Tunisians were the first to overthrow their leader Ben Ali in 2011 (Lust 36). Interestingly, the country seemed more prepared for a transition to envisioned democracy. What distinguished Egypt from Tunisia was the better socio-economic position of the latter, that is to say, a greater per capita wealth, a larger middle class, a higher rate of urbanization and literacy around the time of the Arab Spring (Bellin n.pag.). Naturally, a greater level of education allows average individuals not yet tarnished by corruption to become the nation elite stepping in and filling in positions vacated by the ousted political clique. If solid, urbanization produces new markets, draws myriads of investors, and lures the flocks of tourists, which greatly enhances economic viability and social welfare. Greater wealth like the one possessed by Tunisia enables people to implement the ideals of the social revolution against corrupt kleptocratic regimes like income equality or higher wages. Money is needed if people want there to be reforms and the overhaul of economic, social, and judicial institutions. Masoud (20) suggests that Mubarak left no more left jobs than he did prospects for young people behind, let alone crumbling public infrastructure, corruption, and other woes. Nor was business in the best if shapes, in all likelihood.
The Tunisia wealth argument makes perfect sense. In order for a country to effect reforms in the system of taxation through liberalization and tax rate containment to let businesspersons’ hands come untied and have income leave shade economy and offshore tax havens, it needs money to replace taxation as a source of income for a transitional period. Poorer countries like Egypt leverage taxation as a means of budget replenishment; thus, from want of greater wealth, a new regime may resort to heavy taxation; thereby, getting people cross and infuriated, although wanting nothing more than to keep the economy afloat. Not having progress in terms of taxation and other reforms may stall the progress producing an impression of new power elites not being able or, worse, wanting to change the status quo. Egypt has been unstable obviously due to the deficit of wealth Tunis has had in the years following the upheaval. It remains to be seen what effects further disillusionment may have on Egypt.
Frustration over the lack of changes is particularly dangerous when in combination with the dominance of military elites on the power scene making for chaotic outcomes. Bellin (n.pag.) notes that, in Tunisia, the military elite made it known that it would stand aloof from politics and submit to people’s control. Local society is what spurs the state on to move in a democratic direction seeing it done the compliance of the regime with democratic ideals, acting a watchdog monitoring regime performance, searching for compromise decisions and facilitating dialogue in the event of political schisms. Conversely, Egypt has a rich history that would often see the military involve in politics. Hosni Mubarak ousted, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces seized power in Egypt, which it had not surrendered until President Mohamed Morsi forced it out in 2012. When his tenure came to no good, activists got Egyptians mobilizing against the leader in the summer of 2013, and the military looked ready for power regaining (Bellin n.pag.). They were ready to seize power, and seize they did, incumbent president el-Sisi being a general.
Totten (n.pag.) notes that, shortly upon position takeover, the general-turned-president declared war against the Muslim Brotherhood. Millions of Egyptians could be seen cheering for the coup as a military correction of the previous mistake. De facto, what Morsi was, was an incompetent leader engaging in lunatic politics especially, as seen in the case of appointing a governor linked to a terrorists group. However, the new political regimes smacked of Stalinism. In March 2014, 500 received death sentence in one go (Totten n.pag.). Such was the outcome of the military having assumed power. A popular mentality or even culture of entrusting the armed forces rather than civilian politicians with power is the root of turmoil that has been dragging on since the Arab Spring. Even when they do choose civilians for political positions, these prove linked to extremists, which further aggravates the post-Spring status quo.
According to Gause (23), although refusing to call the military coup in Egypt by its proper name, the USA speaks in favor of democracy in the country. The USA has its own complex political game in the Middle East, in which it supports and rejects the same forces depending on the country, as is the case with Syria and Iraq where the Western superpower opposes and supports the Iranian-allied forces (Gause 23). It may be hard for the US to support Egyptian democratic pursuits when an American ally like Bahrain does nothing other than squash democratic protests (Gause 6 “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring”). Thus, due to there being some political interest in having military regimes staying in power in Egypt, the USA has not forced any since the Arab Spring ending as it did in Iraq in 2003 by ousting Hussein. Human right violations have been the case in both countries with the sole difference that they served the US agenda in Iraq becoming a pretext for liberation from the a la Stalinism dictatorship of Saddam.
Lynch (6) talks about the role of religion in the new politics of the Middle East. Islamic Action Front in Jordan and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are Islamist political movements with a long history of participation in elections. Both refer to the fatwas of Doha-based cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi seeking to prove democracy is not un-Islamic (Lynch 6). One would expect religion with its archaic script-based viewpoints often rooting in the time of sacred text creation to offer no democratic model of development, as religion hinges on life regimentation and compliance with holy tenets rather than the opportunity to choose what dogmas to embrace, yet religion is pro-democracy in the region. However, according to Lynch (6), in Egypt and Tunisia, the movements were quick to master political competition techniques out-campaigning rivals. In response, their Salafi critics came to form the political parties of their own, which started compromising their commitment to democratic values (Lynch 6). Religious groups in support of democratic development, there is no sectarian rationale behind the failure of democracy in the Middle East. Rather, a flurry of competing secular and religious political power, be they established ones or those recently thrown into the political mix, contribute to the unhealthy political pluralism of development-related opinions now that unity and clarify are needed as never before. Salafi opponents of the pro-democracy religious political movements chip away at their relevance.
Overall, the Arab Spring has not largely proved a success with the exception of Tunisia in some respect better financially prepared for changes people considered needed. In the years after the revolution, the Tunisian society has acted as a watchdog, mediator, and political consolidator. Egyptians, by contrast, gravitated towards the armed forces and their representatives. Economic weakness affecting reform implementation, electoral culture favoring the armed forces and their leaders, the US political interests and the lack of democracy establishment help, the prevalence of excessive political power abundance precluding states like Egypt from choosing a solid vector of development. Sectarianism or religious opposition to democracy does not seem to be the case. Although the Arab Spring cannot be said to have failed across where it unfolded, mostly it has due to foreign interests and noninvolvement, inveterate habits, political rivalry, and inapt candidates replacing ousted dictators.
Works Cited
Bellin, Eva. “Explaining Democratic Divergence: Why Tunisia Has Succeeded and Egypt Has Failed.” Middle East Politician Science. 10 December 2014. n.pag. Web. 8 February 2016.
Gause, Gregory. Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper. 11 November 2014. 1-23. Web. 8 February 2016.
Gause, Gregory. “Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring. The Myth of Authoritarian Stability.” Foreign Affairs. 2015. 1-6. Web. 8 February 2016.
Lust, Ellen. Ed. The Middle East 13th ed. CQ Press. 2013. 1-1072. Web. 8 February 2016.
Lynch, Marc. “The Big Think behind the Arab spring. Do the Middle East’s Revolutions Have a Unifying Ideology?” Foreign Policy. 11 January 2015. 1-11. Web. 8 February 2016.
Masoud, Tarek. “The Road to (and from) Liberation Square.” Journal of Democracy, 22.3 (2011): 20-34. Web. 8 February 2016.
Totten, Michael J. “Year Four: The Arab Spring Proved Everyone Wrong.” World Affairs. 2014. n.pag. Web. 8 February 2016.
