(Professor/Instructor)
On the 6th of August 1945, a B-29 bomber deployed the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. The detonation of the atomic bomb resulted in the instantaneous death of more than 80,000 people. Several days later, another atomic weapon was detonated in Nagasaki, resulting in the deaths of more than 40,000 Japanese. President Harry Truman authorized the deployment of the weapons over the two cities; at present, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb attacks are the only ones in history. In the succeeding months, an estimated 100,000 died a slow and extremely painful death resulting from radiation exposure (AETN 1).
The questions regarding the deployment of the atom bomb and the justification of the carnage resulting from the bombings are among the most disturbing queries in history. In his work The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (1995), Alperovitz cites the statement of one of America’s military leaders, Admiral William Leahy. Leahy, the highest senior American military officer in the Second World War, in his belief regarding the use of the atom bomb in Japan, states:
It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrenderMy own feeling was in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children (italics mine) (Alperovitz 3).
Aside from the moral dilemmas posed in the issue, one must ask whether the deployment of the weapons a necessity to bring about the end of the war in the Asian theater. Weber (1997) argues that by any measure of reason, the deployment of the bombs were unnecessary. Japan was, in all sense of the conduct of the war, a badly beaten nation. Very little remained of the Imperial Army forces and the air force was all but decimated.
Ranged against minimal to symbolic opposition, American military planes flew almost unopposed over Japan, with Allied bombers wreaking havoc over the country. The remnants of the Japanese industrial sector pitifully tried to churn out more weapons from what little materials it could muster. On the 23rd of May, the largest Allied air raid was launched, with more than 500 B-29 Super fortresses dropping more than 4,500 bombs on the already crumbling Japanese capital of Tokyo. After several days, a second 500 plane wave dropped an additional 4,000 tons of bombs. Taken together, the Allied bombers obliterated more than 56 square miles of Tokyo (Weber 1).
One here has to ask, with the Japanese seemingly ready to surrender, their military forces all but spent, why did the Americans choose to deploy the bombs? Again citing Alperovitz (1997), the existing literature on the topic indicates Japan would have surrendered sans the use of the atom bomb, a declaration of war by the Soviet Union, and even without the US leading an invasion into Japan. What is being seen is that American policymakers saw an opportunity to display the power of the new weapon against their long time rivals, the Soviet Union. According to American officials, though the atom bomb would need to be tested further, deploying the bomb and have a global audience to its massive destructive potential would ultimately inflict fear in the Russians and would make them “more manageable (Alperovitz 5-6).
A number of issues linked to the decision to deploy the atom bomb are highly contentious even to this present day to a degree no substantial gain will be acquired by resorting to “shortcuts.” The sole avenue to answer the most difficult queries is to examine the evidence. The only feasible method here is to gather all available data and then edit the possible answers. Here, if the atom bomb was unnecessary in stopping the war, and the position then was to avoid further bloodshed, the public has been severely misled as the use of the bomb resulted in additional loss of life that could have been avoided if the Americans and its allies were to have accepted the surrender of Japan months before (Alperovitz 9).
Additional initiatives by Japan on the same vein one though Portugal and the other from Sweden were also unceremoniously dispatched. The Japanese, even before the actual surrender, already acknowledged their defeated status. Kantro Suzuki led a new government in Tokyo with the goal of ending the conflict. The Americans were confident of their ability to defeat the Japanese with or without the deployment of the atom bomb. History notes that former Japanese Prime Minister Funimaro Konoye stated that the actual reason that Japan sought peace with the United States was not the possibility of the atom bomb being real, but the endless waves of B-29 bombers (Weber 1).
How then can history actually chronicle an accurate record of the war if the party deliberately exerted efforts to hide the information? The process of discovery is innately hidden. Other parties’ in the event exerted efforts to mislead the public as to their actual participation in the event. Each of the parties is complicated; for example, President Truman is not only the “man of the people” many would picture him to be.
History also records Truman as the prime candidate of the Kansas City Pendegast group, as well as being a clever poker player. There is incontrovertible evidence that Truman willfully changed significant details of the Hiroshima chronicle to the American public and even to the Cabinet. In addition, Truman’s writings show a pattern of systematically deleting data on a number of critical aspects of the story, which if compared to the known stories, will run significantly against what is currently known about the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.
Truman was locked in to the belief that the only and correct option to end the war was to deploy the new weapon. Though the military establishment itself expressed a voice of caution should the bomb be deployed, Truman held on to his stand; half a year of intensive planned bombing runs decimating Japanese urban and industrial areas had little to no effect at destroying the resolve of the Japanese, and Japan continued to reject calls for total surrender made in Potsdam. To the Americans and the Allied coalition, the deployment of the atom bomb was the best option at forcing the Japanese forces to capitulate and in the same line terminate the conflict. The other alternative was that of an all-out military offensive of Japan was declared as a more expensive choice and would result in incalculable casualties (AETN 1).
Works Cited
AETN, “Atomic bomb,” <http://www.history.co.uk/study-topics/history-of-ww2/atomic-bomb
Alperovitz,Gar. The decision to use the atomic bomb and the architecture of an American Myth. New York: Knopf Publisher, 1997 online
Weber, Mark, “Was Hiroshima necessary? Why the atomic bombings could have been avoided.” <http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html
