The principle of work of our brain and consciousness has always been a topic to investigate. This question is not only psychological, because it tries to get to know the deepest structures of our brain activity, but as well philosophical, as we question ourselves whereas we could believe in what we cannot see. Basically, I see it as it a discourse around the endlessness of our mind and its capacities. Are there any boundaries that cannot be crossed or it is an eternal structure that is unable to measure?
Our mind is observed and considered by researchers in various ways, simple or complex approaches. This is why, for now, in order to understand how does the mind works there have been different theories that are supported and argued at the same time. One of such theories, about the structure of peoples’ mind, proposed by Fodor and discussed by Prinz will be considered in this paper.
The main principle of the theory of modularity claims that our mind is composed of the units that are performing a set of functions and are having a range of certain characteristics and that what makes them able to exist . The module is characterized as localized, selectively impaired, mandatory, fast, shallow, ontogenetically determined, with a special domain of the activity, inaccessible and encapsulated . From the first point of view these features are creating the image of the very closed and determined structure.
Prinz has questioned all these factors and tried to prove that the work of mind cannot be considered as modular because the implementation of proposed conditions is impossible due to the fact of their incompatibility with the real mind functions. We will try to have a closer look at these arguments in order to give an opinion whereas the modular theory together with its principles is a consistent theory or not. Therefore, I claim that I regard the modularity as a useful tool to represent the mind functioning, which, however, lacks the flexibility in terms of characteristics proposed.
The starting point is that modules are located in certain position, though, are localized, and are divided by the functions at the same time . Such a position would make them easy and comfortable to define, but, according to Prinz, this assumption is false. The problem here is that such a formation of mind is not possible for all the individuals as in fact they are more diversified than that. I agree here that the individual factor should be taken into consideration as we are all somehow unique and it would be too simplified to suggest that the scheme of localization of the modules is universal for everyone.
I suggest that if we described the brain activity through the biological prism, it would be easier to decompose it into various segments that are responsible for the certain activity. Nevertheless, our psychology is much more complex, and, even if the theory of the modularity is somehow right, I believe we are underestimating the complexness of the parts that are working together. This is why I once again support the idea that there is no chance that different brain regions do correspond to specific functions as we use our brain quite in a wide way. On the other hand, if there is a real possibility to break the activities according to the parts of the brain, I assume they would still have a high coherence with each other and this will enable the functioning of one part without the other.
Similarly to the described examples about the language and color perceptions, it is important to say that we do not simply think of categories, but engage them together. The mentioned outputs could also vary depending on their level of hardness. For example, in my opinion, when we shift from our mother language to a foreign one, the scheme of the mental outputs already becomes more difficult.
The one possible definitive characteristic from this range of the three is modules are mandatory. It is a logical assumption, because, if they were not mandatory, they would not have existed at all. Moreover, I believe that some of them are as well fast, but that parameter could vary within the necessity of the response. For example, there could be some brain operations that would cause postponed in the time reaction as causing a memory of something that happened a long time ago. The shallowness is the only parameter that I regard as a completely impossible one, as I would not agree that any of the outputs that are caused by our brain activity can be indicated as shallow. Probably, it is a semantic problem of this characteristic.
All in all, these three properties should not be considered in isolation , however, when they are taken together they do not have the enough coherence to be considered as the ones that truly work.
The ontogenetic determinism seems too perfect to be the reality as it proclaims the predictable development of the modules in healthy in individuals. However, it as well claims that in this case modules are possessing innate characteristics . I agree with the author that it will put under the question the learning process as the primary source of our mind capacities. We do obtain the information about how to act not from the inside but from the outside sources. Of course we cannot deny that some skills are innate, but they truly need some outside motivators to be developed from their basic configuration.
Another thing, as already mentioned before in the article, there is no objective construct about a person’s mind as we are very diverse. The same is here, as the definition of the healthy individual seems to be too generalized and subjective.
Considering the domain specificity, here the author states that both components of the concept are defined wrong and not properly . If we speak about the domain as the certain field or category, than then we will have a hard time with the definition of it as like in the example with the “camel” and “animal”, both of these references are not enough inclusive. I think that the possibility to define a domain in various ways has both bad and good points. Yes, it makes it very vast as the definition, however, what if there is a real classification that could be applied rationally? The definition of the specificity is as well regarded as blurry and limited at the same time, because it means that our brain activities are classified according to specific, though, exclusive domains. I do agree that in this case we do speak either about everything or about nothing and the question of the definition stay unsolved.
The last position argued by the author is that the modules are inaccessible and encapsulated that makes them isolated one from each other and with the low capacity of the information exchange between each other as well as the person itself. I do agree that, perhaps, our mind accept the outside signals without processing it, though, unconsciously, and this can be regarded as the indicator of its encapsulation. However, as it was described, there is a connection between; for example, the syntax can be influenced by conceptual knowledge .
The story about the woman that has fallen on the street and the continuation that our conscious is building up, considering the received information, make the assumption that that the modules are unreachable to each other wrong. They do not simply opened to each other, but also can influence, I believe, in various combinations. The interaction happens both between the modules and the surrounding even though we do not notice that.
Moreover, there is probably a chance that this connection cannot be limited by two systems. For example, together with our sight and knowledge, we can as well interact with the tactile system, as we know, or, assume, how a certain object will be perceived. Knowing that the cat is fluffy or the ice cream is cold will recall the expectations about the potential physical feelings they can produce.
It is claimed that Fodor applies the narrow-scope encapsulation that stand for the complete resistance of the system against the occurring processes on the outside . In the contrast with Prinz opinion it makes somehow the sense of me as it shows the steadiness of the modules. However, I also regard the idea with the wide-scope encapsulation of the modules as more applicable. It makes them reachable and places them in an order to avoid the overwhelming of the system . In this case it would be more appropriate to say that modules are not encapsulated, but that they a niche where they are located until the time when brain will recall them from the consciousness when is necessary.
All in all, the Prinz’s position about the modularity can be regarded as quite radical, even though it has the support of various arguments. One of the most persuasive examples is how the author refers to the language as the category that participates in the combination with others activities. This puts under a doubt almost all principles needed for the modules to exist.
Despite that, I believe that the possibility of the flexibility is not shown, whereas it can really be the solution in order to support the whole theory. The truth is that even if all of the necessary conditions are hard or, according to Prinz, impossible to fulfill, there is still a chance that our mind is modular. Probably it will require a complete rebuild of the primary statements or their re-consideration, however, it is unfair not to admit, that our brain functions as a certain system.
As the main counter-argument to this, I would pose that the overall complexity of our mind cannot be diminished till the complete modularity. Our mind is a subject we still know very little about and it means that putting it into some frames of modules would be a sign that we assume it as a limited construction. I believe that it is probably too early to state that we have found these boundaries that could serve as module borders. In fact, we have a two-sided coin here. It is the true that we actually really do not know whereas our mind is so complicated that it cannot be segmented or on the opposite. This is why some scientists are developing new theories while others are refuting them.
The problem here is that there are a lot of in-between differences among the people and the generalization could appear to be very blurry in the end. I believe that the unification of people’s experience is impossible due to its diversity and this is why in order to understand the borders, if they exist, of the person’s mind, we would need to look at each individual separately.
On the other hand, I believe that if we the weakness of the theory is in the in its uncertainty, it gives us the opportunity to develop both theories, that these modules are existing and not, and use multi-paradigm approach considering this matter.
In conclusion, I believe that for now it is hard to say whereas the theory of modularity is completely right or wrong. It exists, based on the principles proposed, but in my opinion, there is a possibility of the future development of it, as well as proposing another set of conditions.
The idea itself, that our mind functions in a way that can be, hypothetically, measured with the help of functional units, seems as a desirable one as it simplifies somehow the whole concept of human brain activity. Not that it shows the mind as a simple construction, but as a composed, and the one that is possible to measure. It is a case when the willingness to systemize all surrounding world in the order faces the unknown categories. There are limits and boundaries proposed, however, they are invisible and hard to determine in space and time. This is why, for now, the theory of the modularity of mind stays a very debatable one, as well as any possible other.
Until the time we will be able to actually measure these modules and define not only their necessary attributes but as well their real properties and system of work, there is no chance we can claim the mind is modular. However, there is as well no surely possibility to claim that it is not modular. There is a certain construction, for sure, that helps us to orient and respond to diverse stimuli. Probably, there could be other divisions for metal structure units.
Nevertheless, I admire this idea and I think that if we add more of the variability inside all the features, mentioned by Fodor, it would be easier to investigate the rightness of this theory. Such approach would facilitate the comprehension of how does our mind works and could have helped to solve various existing problems, such as psychological disorders.
Reference
Prinz, J. (n.d.). Is the mind really modular? . 1-15 .
