A fundamental problem facing new democracies is the hijacking of the political process by elites. Economic performance is affected by elite politics leading to underdevelopment and sometimes morphing into political violence. The transition from colonial regimes to democracy has been subverted by the harm that was done by the colonial subversion of traditional institutions in favor of artificial Western ones. This provided an opening for the rise of elites and the rule of ‘the big men’ (Owusu, 1992). What role do elites play in transition to democracy or its opposite? This paper seeks to provide an analysis on how elites hinder democratic transition in developing nations with the particular focus on Africa South of the Sahara and Eastern Europe. Failure to transition to democracy has adverse effect on the economy and social transformation.
It is difficult to talk about economic and democratic transition in developing countries without exploring the role played by elites in either enhancing or sabotaging democratic processes. Scholars have argued that the “inevitability of elite rule makes democracy an imaginary dream”(Higley & Burton, 2006). Higley and Burton (2006) assert that elites can never be accountable to ‘the people’. There is an inverse relationship between elites and democracy so that institutions proclaimed to be ‘democratic’ are in reality exercises in futility (Higley & Burton, 2006). Elite interest often contrasts with democracy promoters and civil society and since they hold the power and leverage, whatever goes against their interest is easily crushed. Were elite power and resource mobilization is strong transition to democracy often depends on whether it is favorable to the elites or not.
Notable scholars on institutions and democracy like Acemoglu and Robinson argue that elites, when sufficiently and politically powerful, will often support economic institutions and policies inimical to sustained economic growth. In some cases they will block new technologies; elite also have the capacity to prevent the greater part of society from positive contributions to the economy, and in some cases they are prepared to destroy and hinder human rights and investments because it goes against their primitive accumulation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). If these elite economic and social interests are not satisfied they can also stifle moves toward democracy. What emerges out of elite led institutions is elite manipulated democracy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Elections are a formality without desired results of economic growth or societal change for the better. People have representatives and all formal offices without anything of significance to count on.
Kifordu (2011) notes that founded on the ideas of classical elitists, the elite are usually defined as those groups with excellent access to resources or capacities, a characteristic that sets them apart from other (non-elite) members of society. According to Kirfordu (2011), the assumption is that when it comes to who has power, only those who have access to elite resources and relationships have the ability to wield any economic or political power. Pluralists also see power struggle as an inter-class affair but argue that the composition of the political elite may change as a consequence of autonomous group action and periodic renewal (Kifordu, 2011). Political power in this case derives not just from the ownership of economic resources but also an array of other resources that promote access to and retention of state power.
In their seminal work Endogenous Democratization, Boix and Stokes conclude that the interests of a special group of elites (capitalists) define whether democratization happens or not in rich or poor countries. They argue that; “capitalists living in a rich dictatorship are more likely to choose democracy than capitalists living in a poor dictatorship, just as capitalists living in a rich democracy are more likely to favor continued democracy than capitalists living in a poor democracy” (2003). If we follow Boix and Stokes’ (2003) argument the chances of a stable democracy emerging in Africa are slim considering the fact that most of the dictatorships are poor. Their explanation barely explains why Singapore and China are still undemocratic states despite the high levels of economic growth and the advantages that the capitalist may incur from a more free political and economic system.
Some scholars have argued that were ‘elite transformations’ have occurred, the uniform political consequence has been the emergence of stable liberal democracies that usually receive Freedom House’s highest rankings for political rights and civil liberties. To this extent and in these ways, the futility thesis has been somewhat vitiated by basic but rare transformations of elites that make them compatible with the stable liberal form of democracy. But in the vast majority of countries today and in modern history where no such elite transformations that have occurred, the futility thesis remains highly relevant (Higley, 2006).
Elites and Democratic Transition in Africa and Eastern Europe
In places like Africa, democratic transition has been hijacked by elite. Elections are tools used by the elites in political and economic circles to legitimize holding on to power and subverting the democratic process. Without the veneer of elections, elites find it difficult to hold on to power and even sabotage the economy (Lynch & Crawford, 2011). Only in cases where the elite have not only agreed to hold competitive elections but made them free and fair has the result been democratic. Lynch and Crawford posit that limited access to power and resources continues to over-determine African politics meaning that the political elite will continue to see elections as a mere legitimating process rather than the fundamental expression of collective choice (Lynch & Crawford, 2011).
East Europe despite the high levels of democratization in the period after 1989, witnessed also high level of elite resistance coupled with authoritarian learning. Bunce and Wolchik (2011) observed that as democratizing elections take place across the East European region, they are not only inspiring “would-be adopters” but also providing valuable lessons for “would-be resisters” (2011, p. 282). Before the 2006 elections in Belarus, for example, President Lukashenka took a number of precautions, including increasing pensions, introducing pro-regime election monitors, prohibiting exit polls, and cutting off access to central squares. This suggests that there are two sides to the process of democratic diffusion that deserve equal attention, namely, its promotion and resistance (Koesel, 2012). Democratization in Eastern Europe has also been attributed to structural changes in the international system that came about as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. The elites who had ties with the Soviet Union aided in the democratization processes by providing little resistance as compared to African countries were elite cohesion has been very strong.
Authoritarian elite learning has also made the retreat to authoritarian rule possible in the African context. Elites have managed to trump civil society and democratic promoters’ effort to push African states towards a democracy that “not only respects civil and political rights but also accounts for the socio-economic rights and the physical security of ordinary citizens” (Lynch & Crawford, 2001). Authoritarian elite learning has also benefited from changes on the international level, where African state political allegiance and trade partnership are slowly shifting towards the East especially China. The result of this development has been a reduced level of leverage for democratic promoters and reduced incentives for authoritarian governments to democratize (the example of Sudan and Zimbabwe). This elite learning point more towards what Levisky and Way (2010) termed competitive authoritarianism rather than any variant of genuine democracy.
Higley and Burton (2006) observed that the year 2007 was a year of democratic rollback. It was ‘a year of notable setbacks’ for freedom and democracy globally. Freedom House rankings of political rights and civil liberties declined in one fifth of the world’s countries during 2007. Four times as many countries received diminished rankings as received improved ones, and 2007 was the second consecutive year in which diminished rankings outnumbered improved ones. Worse, during 2007 many countries that were already undemocratic became more so, while others with loose approximations of democracy were unable to sustain even that. Opposition candidates and parties were hamstrung by deliberate legal restrictions, tax investigations and targeted bureaucratic regulations when they were not – as in Kenya and Zimbabwe – assaulted brutally by gangs of thugs mobilized by incumbent chief executives and their parties (Higley & Burton, 2006). This democratic rollback was a result of elites manipulating elections results and also not supporting the democratization process.
Lynch and Crawford points to the worrying minimal commitment to democratization among local political elites and international donors which has led to quick-fix solutions like power sharing as one of the drawbacks to democratization. The question to be asked is: is the success of democratic promotion possible in this African context where elite power is unchallenged and unlimited? In some cases, power sharing has emerged as an example of elite learning were party officials find it convenient to push for power sharing rather than accept election results. As Cheeseman (2011) observes, there exist a limited number of power sharing arrangements that are bound to produce much more desirable results. If there are institutions that can last longer and individuals inside the parties support each other as well as those in elite circles can find reasons to work together, then elite politics has a chance to contribute to better economic outcomes. The truth is then power sharing comes as a result of the democratic process failing to produce the needed results and in most cases elites refusing to cede power.
Cheeseman’s theory on power sharing helps in the analysis of elite power and the potential for democratic outcome. He creates an analytical model of power sharing in Africa based on the possible combinations of the distribution of violence (low/high) and elite cohesion (low/high) and identifies four ‘ideal types’ of power-sharing dynamic: the politics of collusion, the politics of partisanship, the politics of distrust, and the politics of pacting. Cheeseman’s thesis is a typical example of how elites can undermine or enhance the democratization process. He focuses on the way that unity governments deal with constitutional reform and security sector reform, including how they negotiate the thorny topic of how to deal with past human rights abuses.
According to Cheeseman, power-sharing refers to the creation of an inclusive government in which cabinet posts, and hence executive power, are shared by the major parties (although not always all of the parties) in a given conflict (2011). His conclusion is critical in helping us understand the importance of elites in the democratization process. Where elite cohesion is low and the distribution of violence is high, the relevant parties have no history of alliance formation and all parties share a vested interest in preventing prosecutions and maintaining their coercive capacity. As a result, the most likely outcome is a highly fractious and unstable power sharing deal characterized by the politics of distrust. South Africa is the only example of an elite led democratic outcome with its history of the politics of pacting.
In Bunce and Wolchik’s (2011) analysis of transitions to democracy in Eastern Europe, we can notice effective democratic promotion resulting in the transition to democracy and a strong opposition. The opposite however, happens in Africa were the elites are able to limit the power of donors and democracy promoters resulting in flawed electoral outcomes. Lynch and Crawford (2011) have attributed the failure of democratic promotion to a number of factors among them, economic and political conditionality which has limited the scope for policy debate and thus political party differentiation. They also observe that the flow of donor aid has served to prop up electoral authoritarian regimes.
In addition, donors’ interest in ‘strengthening civil society’ can be seen as having had perverse consequences on both civil society and the state itself, as well as on the democratization of state–society relations (Lynch & Crawford, 2011). Also, support for governments of national unity as a response to conflict, but also electoral chaos, seems to reflect a burgeoning sense of fatigue with representative democracy and a belief that this ‘winner takes all’ model may be unsuitable for developing nations, in particular, those in Africa. An additional factor in the little success of democracy promotion has been the elites’ unwillingness to engage with promoters leaving them with promoters with little access to the political landscape.
In the context of Africa, elite commitment to democracy has been more important that opposition strength. Lynch and Crawford show some positive trajectory of progress in their assessment of changes in the Sub-Saharan region from 1990-2010 (2011). Adebanwi and Obadare however notes that there has been lack of progress in democratization in their assertion that the greatest damage to the prospects of the emergence of a substantive democracy in sub-Saharan Africa comes from the ideology which stresses that even the most horrendous democracy is to be preferred to military authoritarianism.
In Rwanda, Cameroon and Uganda; Presidents- Museveni, Kagame and Biya have managed to use the opportunities provided by multi-party politics to disenfranchise segments of the population and to wrestle power from the legislature. Biya even manages to use the constitutional protection of the minorities in his vote rigging apparatus (Albaugh, 2011). Even democratic promotion which is supposed to be the focus of most donor officials and agents has suffered a huge number of setbacks with officials siding with the host governments.
In conclusion, the democratization and economic development project in developing nations has been hijacked by elites whose interests are best served when the majority of the population does not prosper. In Eastern Europe and Africa South of the Sahara, the failure for democratization has moved hand in hand with economic stagnation. The goal of elite politics is to continue feeding a system that does little for the benefit of the whole society. Despite evidence showing that it is detrimental to growth, elite rule persists in Third World economies. Economic outcomes are closely linked to political factors. Without positive political change economic development remains in flux.
References
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