The Second Battle of Fallujah also popularly referred to as Operation Phantom Fury was fought in the city of Fallujah. It involved 13 350 Coalition forces comprising the US, Iraqi and British forces against insurgents led by Al-Qaeda. It commenced on November 7, 2004, and lasted through to December 23, 2004. It resulted in approximately 1500 enemy casualties and an equivalent number of those captured. On the other hand, 107 members of the Coalition Forces were killed in action with additional 613 of them wounded (Chang).
The battle was more like a revenge mission properly so-called following the capture and merciless killing of a group of American contractors who were working in Iraq. The said group consisted of four Black Water security officials who were ambushed by the Al Qaeda militants, killed and their burned bodies mutilated and hang. The footage of the depravity was aired globally (American Veterans Center). Consequently, The United States government launched a revenge operation aimed at capturing the insurgents involved (Lowry 109).
According to Department of Defense, Military Operations on Urbanized Area (MOUT) refers to “all operations planned and carried out in across the range of military operations on, or against objectives within a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man-made construction, or the density of non-combatants are the dominant feature”. This definition of MOUT is informed by the fact that an urban environment is characterized by a complex physical terrain that is man-made, a significantly huge population which is heavy in density, and infrastructure upon which the said population is supported (Chang). This paper seeks to analyze the MOUT policy and operations adopted during the Second Battle of Fallujah against the aforementioned attributes.
MOUT operations entailed encirclement of the city and establishment of checkpoints to prevent insurgents from fleeing and additional ones from entering the city. Additionally, civilians were urged to leave the city in a bid to minimize civilian casualties. It is reported that approximately 70% to 90% of civilians had fled the city by the time the battle begun (Matthews 14). Moreover, misleading information was also released to confuse the insurgents. Following careful operational planning and pilot studies, the operation commenced on November 7, 2004. 24-hour electronic aviation and artillery attacks were executed on specific insurgent attacks previously identified. These air attacks were intended to soften the insurgent defenses and exhaust them both physically and mentally ahead of ground attacks by the Army and the Marine. At the end of the battle, humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations were executed (Caputi).
In conclusion, this paper is inclined to the view that the Second Battle of Fallujah was an ultimate test of US MOUT operations. Compared to the blotted 1992 Somalia operations, the Second Battle of Fallujah represents a significant improvement in the US MOUT operations. However, there are still concerns on the question of comparative spending by the US relative to the enemy spending.
Works Cited
American Veterans Center. 2015. 14 March 2016. <http://www.americanveteranscenter.org/avc-media/magazine/avq/avq-issue-ii/operation-phantom-fury-the-second-battle-of-fallujah/>.
Caputi, Ross. "The Human Consequences of US foreign policy in Fallujah ." 6 November 2004. Justice for Fallujah Project. 14 March 2016. <http://thefallujahproject.org/home/sites/default/files/FallujahPrimer.pdf>.
Chang, Tao-Hung. "The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on (MOUT) in the 21st Century Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain." 2008. 14 March 2016. <https://sa.rochester.edu/jur/issues/fall2007/chang.pdf>.
Lowry, Richard S. New Dawn: The Battles for Fallujah. New York: Savas Beaty, 2010.
Matthews, Matt M. Operation AL FAJR:A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
